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Abstract
This research analyzes the use of modern Real Time Locating Systems (RTLS),
such as the Global Positioning System (GPS), to improve the safety of aircraft, equip-
ment, and personnel onboard a United States Navy (USN) aircraft carrier. The results
of a detailed analysis of USN safety records since 1980 show that mishaps which could
potentially be prevented by a persistent monitoring system result in the death of a
sailor nearly every other year and account for at least $92,486,469, or 5.55% of the
total cost of all flight deck and hangar bay related mishaps. A system to continually
monitor flight deck operations is proposed with four successive levels of increasing
capability. A study of past and present work in the area of aircraft carrier flight deck
operations is performed.
This research conducted a study of the movements of USN personnel and an
FA-18C aircraft being towed at NAS Oceana, VA. Using two precision GPS recorders
mounted on the aircraft wingtips, the position and orientation of the aircraft, in
two-dimensions, are calculated and the errors in this solution are explored. The
distance between personnel and the aircraft is calculated in the nearest neighbor
sense. Pseudospectral motion planning techniques are presented to provide route
prediction for aircraft, support equipment, and personnel.
Concepts for system components, such as aircraft and personnel receivers, are
described. Methods to recognize and communicate the presence of hazardous situa-
tions are discussed. The end result of this research is the identification of performance
requirements, limitations, and definition of areas of further research for the develop-
ment of a flight deck persistent monitoring system with the capability to warn of
hazardous situations, ease the incorporation of UAVs, and reduce the risk of death or
injury faced by sailors on the flight deck.
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A Feasibility Study of
a Persistent Monitoring System
for the Flight Deck of
U.S. Navy Aircraft Carriers
I. Introduction
The flight deck of a U.S. Navy Aircraft Carrier (CV/CVN), depicted in Fig-ure 1.1, is an inherently dangerous place to work. An embarked Carrier Air
Wing (CVW), usually composed of around 64 aircraft, must perform all of its flight
deck operations using only 4.5 acres of flight deck space. These close quarters com-
bined with the rapid pace of flight deck operations and the dangers faced by any
ocean-going vessel create conditions that are among the most dangerous in the world.
The official U.S. Navy records of flight deck mishaps [8] include many serious injuries
and fatalities, as well as numerous instances of damage to or loss of aircraft.
After examining 29 years of recorded flight deck related mishap records provided
by the Naval Safety Center, a new mishap classification system was developed. Rather
than classifying mishaps by cost, a new system is proposed to group mishaps by cause.
New methods and systems to mitigate the risks which contribute to these mishaps
are proposed. This research will focus exclusively on the CV/CVN class of aircraft
carrier although many aspects may be applicable to the smaller amphibious assault
vessels.
The safety of sailors and aviation assets is of the utmost importance to all levels
of leadership. There is continual effort to improve safety in carrier operations. Despite
a focus on safety, it is very common for a sailor involved in Naval Aviation to have
been personally involved in a mishap where someone was injured or significant damage
was incurred by an aircraft.
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Figure 1.1: Diagram of Modern Aircraft Carrier (CV/CVN) Flight Deck [35]: JBD
denotes the location of a jet blast deflector, EL denotes the location of one of four
elevators, and a circled number ( 1©) over a long black line provides the location and
identification of each catapult.
Through constant training and vigilant supervision, the safety record of Naval
Aviation has been kept at acceptably high levels. With new technologies, especially
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), being examined for introduction to the fleet, the
procedures presently used to keep equipment and personnel safe will be insufficient.
The use of modern Real Time Locating Systems (RTLS) will be explored to determine
their ability to improve the level of safety.
1.1 Hazards
This section will describe many of the hazards faced by aircraft, equipment,
and personnel involved in Naval Aviation. Figure 1.1 depicts the layout of a modern
aircraft carrier showing the locations of the catapults, elevators, jet blast deflectors,
and island. A full description of the operations onboard an aircraft carrier is beyond
the scope of this document. A brief introduction to flight deck operations is provided
in the Naval Safety Center’s Flight Deck Awareness Guide [35]. A complete layout of
the flight deck and hangar bay, both with and without an embarked CVW, is provided
(See Figure 1.15, page 31 and Figure 1.16, page 32).
While this section treats the flight deck and hangar bay hazards separately, the
term flight deck will be used throughout this research to refer to both.
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Figure 1.2: View of Flight Deck From the Island: Depicts numerous hazards com-
mon to flight deck operations. Taken in 2004 by the author onboard USS John F.
Kennedy (CV-67).
1.1.1 Flight Deck. Figure 1.2 is a photographic view of the landing area as
well as catapults three and four on a modern aircraft carrier. The picture is taken
facing to port from the island. In this picture, an FA-18C aircraft (top left) is taxiing
to catapult four and the port engine of a propeller-driven E-2C aircraft (bottom right)
is being started in preparation for launch. It is important to note that in a typical
launch cycle there may be 10-12 other aircraft elsewhere on the flight deck preparing
for launch. This image is presented as an example of many of the hazards of flight
deck operations. The nose of the FA-18C is over the edge of the deck, and the pilot
cannot see the location of the nose wheel. The pilot is being directed by a sailor
wearing a yellow shirt to the right. With improper direction, the pilot can easily
taxi the aircraft over the edge of the ship. There are several instances of this type
of mishap in the data provided by the Naval Safety Center (Mishap Event 19749 -
Fiscal Year 1987, Appendix A).
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Propeller driven aircraft, such as the E-2C Hawkeye and C-2 Greyhound, present
a significant hazard to personnel on the flight deck. When turning, the propeller blades
are virtually invisible. Also, with the extra hearing protection that sailors must wear
because of the high noise levels, the sound generated by the propeller blades can be
below a sailor’s hearing threshold. Within the E-2C community, there is significant
emphasis on preventing contact between a sailor and rotating propeller blades.
It is also important to understand the challenges faced by the flight deck crews
(ship’s company) as they typically work the entire duration of a long flight schedule.
If the first launch is at 0600 and the final recovery is at 2300, the flight deck crew will
be on the flight deck for virtually all of that time. Fatigue, due to these long schedules,
can lead to numerous mistakes being made, not necessarily after just one day, but
after days or weeks with such a long schedule. With Figure 1.2 representing a typical
day of operations on the flight deck, the pilot of the FA-18C must be aware that the
taxi director who is telling them when to turn may be impaired by a significant lack of
sleep. The human factors present in flight deck operations can have a greater impact
on safety and performance than equipment failures.
1.1.2 Hangar Bay. Any aircraft not airborne or on the flight deck will be
located in the hangar bay which is located approximately 40 feet below the surface
of the flight deck. Typically, aircraft in a maintenance cycle will be parked in the
hangar bay since they are unable to participate in the flight schedule. The hangar
bay is divided into three sections by two sliding doors running the width of the bay.
Aircraft are transferred between the flight deck and hangar bay by one of four aircraft
elevators. There are also doors in the hangar bay’s deck which open to reveal ordnance
elevators.
Much of the hangar bay is used for purposes besides storing aircraft. The
Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD) is located forward of the
hangar bay. AIMD is responsible for aviation support equipment (SE) such as tow
tractors, fire trucks, and hydraulic generator carts, which take up much of the forward
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Figure 1.3: View of Hangar Bay, Facing Forward: Taken onboard USS Nimitz
(CVN-68). The close proximity of the aircraft often leads to collisions. Photo credit:
U.S. Navy.
section for the storage of these components. The Supply Department is responsible
for a large stack of supplies in the aft section of the hangar bay, often called ‘the
mountain.’ The cramped conditions combine with only four entry/exit locations to
make for a dangerous environment. Figure 1.3 shows a typical view of the hangar bay
of a deployed aircraft carrier.
In Figure 1.3, the track for the dividing door can be seen as a horizontal line
extending from the port wing of aircraft 212. It appears that aircraft 212 is parked
across this track, meaning that a closure of the door would significantly damage it.
Two tow tractors can be seen above the same wing. There are 12 aircraft in this view
illustrating the close quarters present in the hangar bay. Aircraft 212 is also parked
with another aircraft directly off its starboard wing. If the wings of aircraft 212 were
to unfold they could be damaged, as well as the neighboring aircraft.
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Table 1.1: Data Elements Provided by Naval Safety Center
Data Explanation
Event Serial Unique number assigned to mishap
Aircraft Serial Unique number assigned to each asset involved
Fiscal Year Fiscal year in which mishap occurred
Event Class Letter designation based upon severity of injuries and/or
damage
Type/Model/Series Description of asset involved (ex: FA-18C)
Total Event Cost Cost including all damage and injuries
Days Lost Total days of work lost by all personnel injured
Total Event Injury Cost Cost of all injuries
Narrative Short description of mishap
1.2 Examining the Naval Safety Center Mishap Data
This section discusses the Navy’s policies and procedures for mishap reporting
and data collection and introduces new methods for classifying mishaps. It then
examines the data provided by the Naval Safety Center, available under the Freedom
of Information Act, on all reported mishaps involving an aircraft carrier from 1980
through 2008.
This data includes 3,228 mishaps, both airborne and onboard the ship. Only
1,506 of the mishaps provided have a narrative, or description of the mishap. The
narratives are required to determine the appropriate grouping for the event. The
mishaps without narratives require privileged access, which could not be provided for
this study. Therefore, only the 1,506 mishaps with narratives were evaluated in this
study. Table 1.1 describes the data elements provided by the Naval Safety Center.
1.2.1 Data Collection Methods. Before examining the data further, it is
important to discuss how it is collected. For any aviation related mishap resulting
in injury to personnel or damage to equipment, the squadron or activity responsible
must submit either a Hazard Report (HAZREP) or Mishap Data Report (MDR).
Some of the information these reports contain is described in Table 1.1, but they
generally contain many more elements including a full length description of the event.
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These reports are all collected by the Naval Safety Center and stored in a computer
database, AVIATION DATABASE NSIRS.
The purpose of the HAZREP or MDR is to record objective data for analysis
by the Naval Safety Center, but there are numerous reasons why the data contained
in the report may not reflect the totality of reality. Due to the natural desire to
downplay the significance of a mishap and the amount of damage as well as the
inherent difficulty in capturing the true total cost of a mishap, the estimated cost is
typically much lower than one would expect.
The Naval Aviation Safety Program [9] classifies mishaps based upon the number
of workdays lost due to injury or the financial severity of damage to equipment.
Mishaps are also categorized as Flight, Flight-Related, or Aviation Ground Mishaps,
but for the purposes of this research these distinctions are not sufficient. According to
the instructions for this program, a mishap is categorized as Flight or Flight-Related
if the intent for flight existed, not simply if it occurs in the air. A collision between
a sailor or parked aircraft and an aircraft launching from a catapult is reported as
a Flight mishap, but it is still of interest to this research because it is potentially
preventable. On the other hand, a mishap caused by system failure on the aircraft
during launch, also reported as a Flight mishap, is outside the scope of this research.
The severity of the mishap is classified by assigning a letter designator, based
upon cost, as outlined in Table 1.2 [9]. The process of determining the cost of a
mishap is detailed in Section 314 of the Naval Aviation Safety Program [9]. The
reporting activity is directed to “Compute the cost of damage to DoD property using
the best known cost of repair or replacement. Base these cost estimates on the price of
materials and man-hours necessary to repair the damage.” This does little to account
for the cost of lost sorties or lost productivity due to mishap investigation. It is
unclear how to estimate the cost of an extreme case like a sailor being lost overboard.
In the 2008 PBS Documentary Carrier, there was a sailor lost overboard and the
Carrier Strike Group spent three days searching with multiple surface ships as well
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Table 1.2: Classification Criteria for Aviation Mishaps
Class Damage Requirements Injury Requirements
A > $1, 000, 000 or Aircraft Destroyed Fatal Injury and/or Permanent
Total Disability
B > $200, 000 Permanent Partial Disability
and/or Three or More Personnel
Hospitalized
C > $20, 000 Five Lost Workdays
HAZREP < $20, 000 Beyond First Aid But Less Than
Five Lost Workdays
as U.S. and allied aircraft. The cost of the search effort and loss of life must have
been staggering, considering the cost of operating a CVN is typically thought of as
over $1M per day. It is unclear how the full cost of such an event would be accurately
determined. One must not only account for the fuel consumed by the searching surface
vessels and aircraft but also the cost of tasking those assets with duties other than
the mission of the Strike Group.
It is a common perception in the fleet that there will be negative repercussions
when reporting a mishap, so efforts are often made to minimize the reported value of
damage that occurred. This is usually characterized by extra effort on the part of the
maintainers to repair a component instead of ordering a costly replacement. The dollar
amounts reported for these mishaps may not always represent the actual cost to the
Navy. Even listing the pre-determined cost of a replacement part doesn’t necessarily
capture the full logistics costs associated with its procurement and shipment. These
statements are not intended as a criticism of the Naval Aviation Safety Program but
to make the reader aware that the costs presented in Section 1.2.4 do not completely
capture the total cost.
Even more important than the cost associated with a mishap is the impact it
has on the CVW’s mission. The collision of two aircraft on the flight deck can lead
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to the loss of scheduled sorties, delays in the scheduled maintenance of other aircraft,
and increased strain on the logistics train. The effect of one mishap is typically felt
for days or weeks as schedules are adjusted with the result being a reduction in the
ability to provide striking power from the sea.
The goal of this research is to evaluate technological improvements which could
be implemented to prevent injury, save lives, and reduce expenses. However, the
incalculable or unrecorded factors in the total cost of a mishap make it difficult to
estimate the true cost benefit of a system designed to prevent mishaps.
1.2.2 Classifying Mishaps. Because the focus of this research is to evaluate
methods to reduce or prevent mishaps, it is necessary to group mishaps into cate-
gories based upon causes, not costs, so that the causes can be targeted for mitigation.
The next step is to evaluate the causes of the mishaps in each category and research
technological improvements that could be leveraged in an attempt to reduce their oc-
currence. A set of categories was created which describes all of the flight deck related
mishaps which could potentially be prevented by applying modern RTLS technolo-
gies. If a narrative described a mishap which the author thought was potentially
preventable, it was marked an Interest Mishap.
In the first step of this research, the narratives of 1,506 mishaps were reviewed
to determine these new classifications. After reading through all available mishap
narratives, the mishaps were either classified into the primary and secondary cate-
gories described below or excluded from further evaluation. These mishap categories
are not exclusive, as some mishaps may fall into multiple categories (primarily when
there is both injury and equipment damage). There were 261 mishaps that fell into
one or more of these categories, which is 8.1% of the total and 14.3% of those with
narratives. It is reasonable to assume that a similar percentage of those mishaps
without narratives would also fall into these categories, since no significant changes
have been made over the period of the recorded data which would have decreased the
rate of occurrence of such mishaps. The primary categories are listed in descending
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order of total cost of all mishaps falling into that category as reported in the data
provided by Naval Safety Center. The occurrence and mean cost 1 of these categories
is presented in Table 1.3.
Primary Interest Mishap Categories:
1. Spotting: Aircraft is stationary when another object in its normal operation
impacts it or aircraft begins uncontrolled movement due to ship’s motion. (Note:
If an aircraft is towed into another aircraft, it is considered a towing mishap
regardless of the position of the stationary aircraft.)
2. Towing: While under tow, aircraft or tow tractor collides with (non-human)
object. This classification also covers aircraft being pushed into a parking posi-
tion.
3. Taxiing: With pilot in command, aircraft collides with (non-human) object.
4. Exhaust: Aircraft is damaged or sailor is injured by engine exhaust.
5. Contact: A sailor is injured or killed by contact with a moving aircraft (excludes
engine/exhaust contact).
6. Engine: Aircraft is damaged or sailor is injured by contact with turning engine
(usually propeller).
7. Wingfold: The spreading (or folding) of an aircraft’s wings impacts another
object (usually another aircraft).
8. Non-aviation: Aircraft damaged during non-aviation related event, such as an
underway replenishment.
Secondary Categories:
1. Miscellaneous: Any flight deck or hangar bay mishap that does not fall into the
above categories but may still be potentially preventable.
1Cost data used in this research is unchanged from the data provided. As an example, adjustments
for inflation are not made.
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Table 1.3: Occurrence and Average Cost of Mishap Categories: Occurrence given
as percent of total mishaps with narratives (excluding HAZREPS).
Category Occurrence (%) Mean Reported Cost ($)
Spotting 5.19 1,251,800
Towing 10.71 335,800
Taxiing 8.93 319,100
Exhaust 5.03 181,000
Contact 4.06 83,800
Engine 1.46 60,600
Wingfold 0.32 10,900
Non-aviation 0.16 1,200
Miscellaneous 2.44 39,800
Unknown 1.79 906,100
2. Unknown: Some mishap that could potentially be prevented occurred on the
flight deck or hangar bay but the exact circumstances cannot be determined
from the available information.
Mishaps that have narratives and were identified as belonging to one of these
categories are termed Interest Mishaps for the purposes of this research. To further
illustrate the method by which mishaps were classified based upon their narrative,
an example for each of the primary categories is provided in Table 1.4. The Interest
Mishaps will be examined further to evaluate methods of mishap detection or preven-
tion. The complete list of Interest Mishaps is provided in Appendix A on page 135.
1.2.3 Preliminary Analysis. Figure 1.4 illustrates the trends in mishap
occurrence during the period of time covered by the available data. Total mishaps in-
clude every mishap within the available data2, including airborne mishaps and Hazard
Reports. It is interesting to observe that in more recent years the Interest Mishaps
make up a larger percentage of the total. The primary reason for this is that the more
recent data has a larger percentage with narratives. If narrative data were available
2Few mishaps are listed for fiscal year 2008 as the data was provided early in the fall of 2007.
They are included in this analysis for the sake of thoroughness.
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Table 1.4: Examples of Mishap Narratives and their Classifications: Narratives are
presented exactly as recorded by Naval Safety Center.
Event Serial Fiscal Year Narrative Classification
22273 1986 PARKED ACFT SUSTAINED DAM-
AGE WHEN BARRICADE STAN-
CHION STRCK HORIZ STAB
Spotting
40688 1994 ACFT UNDER TOW IN HANGAR
DECK BAY COLLIDED WITH
PARKED ACFT.
Towing
47673 1998 ACFT RADOME IMPACTED BY
AILERON OF SECOND ACFT
WHICH WAS TAXIING ON DK
Taxiing
53357 2001 FLIGHT SURGEON BLOWN OVER-
BOARD DURING CQ OPERA-
TIONS.
Exhaust
35370 1992 BLUE SHIRT RUN OVER BY ACFT
MAIN MOUNT.
Contact
47642 1998 PLANE CAPTAIN STRUCK BY
TURNING PROPELLER.
Engine
50548 2000 UNCOMMANDED WING SPREAD
CAUSED WINGS TO STRIKE ACFT
IN CLOSE PROXIMITY
Wingfold
69377 2006 ACFT PARKED ON FLT DECK
STRUCK BY FORK LIFT TRAC-
TOR DUR REPLENISHMENT.
Non-aviation
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Figure 1.4: Number of all Mishaps and Hazard Reports by Year
for a larger percentage of earlier mishaps, it is likely that Interest Mishaps would
constitute a much larger percentage of the overall total.
The data in Figure 1.4 includes HAZREPS which, as noted earlier, have asso-
ciated costs less than $20,000. There are 1,373 HAZREPS in the data provided by
Naval Safety Center with a total reported cost of $750.00, while the vast majority
have a reported cost of zero dollars. Removing these from the evaluation shows, as
illustrated in Figure 1.5, that Interest Mishaps make up a larger portion of each year’s
totals than is depicted in Figure 1.4.
From Figure 1.6, it can be seen that the missing narratives from the first 15
years of data should hold a significant number of Interest Mishaps. The noticeable
drop in mishaps in the late 1980s seen in Figure 1.5 shows an improvement in flight
and carrier landing safety achieved primarily through new policies and procedures
since there were few physical changes to aircraft or the deck during this time. This
leads to Interest Mishaps, those that are potentially preventable, becoming a larger
percentage of the total number of mishaps each year. Interest Mishaps make up an
average of 35.2% of all mishaps with narratives each year, with a standard deviation
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Figure 1.5: Number of all Mishaps by Year (Excludes Hazard Reports)
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Figure 1.6: Occurrence of Interest Mishaps as Percentage of Total Mishaps
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Figure 1.7: Cost of Mishaps with Narratives
of 15.93%. Since improved policies and procedures have been unable to significantly
reduce the number of Interest Mishaps over the period of recorded data, improvements
to flight deck safety must be achieved by other means.
1.2.4 Cost of Mishaps. With an understanding of the limitations on the
collection of mishap cost data as described in Section 1.2.1, the cost of mishaps over
the time period available can be evaluated as illustrated in Figure 1.7. Due to the
great difference between Total and Interest Mishap costs, the Interest Mishap costs
are reproduced in Figure 1.8.
A single flight mishap resulting in the loss of an aircraft (or multiple aircraft),
can incur a cost higher than all of the Interest Mishaps over an entire year. With the
aircraft purchase costs in Table 1.5, it is easy to see why. But, the total cost of Interest
Mishaps since 1980 is $92,486,469, 5.55% of the cost of all recorded mishaps in this
data (including those lacking narratives). This should provide significant motivation
to explore means of reducing the occurrence of Interest Mishaps.
15
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Fiscal Year
C
os
t
(M
il
li
on
s
of
D
ol
la
rs
)
Figure 1.8: Cost of Interest Mishaps
Table 1.5: Aircraft Purchase Costs [23]
Aircraft Cost (Millions of $)
FA-18(A-D) 25
FA-18(E-F) 43.6
EA-6B 55.7
E-2C 70
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Table 1.6: Interest Mishaps With No Reported Cost
Event Serial Fiscal Year Narrative Classification
27475 1982 FLT DECK PERS SUSTAINED LEG
INJ WHEN LEG WAS TRAPPED
UNDER TAXIING A/C
Contact
42144 1995 DURING NIGHT FRS CQ AIR-
CRAFT TAXIED OVER AIRMAN’S
FOOT.
Contact
51762 2000 CV FLT DECK CAT OFFICER
KNOCKED DOWN BY JET
BLAST;SUSTAINED BKN FIBULA.
Exhaust
65193 2003 AIRCRAFT ON DECK PUSHED
BACKWARDS INTO OTHER AIR-
CRAFT.
Towing
68161 2004 DURING FLT DECK VERTREP,
FORCKLIFT STRUCK PORT HORIZ
STAB OF PARKED AC.
Non-aviation
47643 1998 PLANE CAPTAIN STRUCK BY
TURNING PROPELLER.
Engine
1.2.5 Errors in Data. The actual cost of the mishaps is greater than shown
here due to errors, omissions, or inability to capture the true cost in the mishap
reports. Of the 3,228 mishaps in the report provided by Naval Safety Center, there
are 46 mishaps (excluding HAZREPS) which have a total event cost of less than
$20,000. They may have initially been reported as Class A, B, or C mishaps and after
further investigation were downgraded, or their total cost was incorrectly reported
and never updated in the database. Of these 46 mishaps, 11 had no associated cost,
and 5 of those were classified as Interest Mishaps. Information on these 5 mishaps is
presented in Table 1.6. It should be clear from reading the provided narratives that
the cost of these mishaps must have been greater than $0.
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Table 1.7: Mandated Injury and Fatality Costs [8]
Personnel Partial Disability ($) Total Disability ($) Fatality ($)
Flying Officer 210,000 1,300,000 1,100,000
Other Officers 145,000 845,000 395,000
Enlisted 115,000 500,000 125,000
Also shown in Table 1.6 is Event 47643 which was listed as a Hazard Report.
When a person is struck by a turning propeller there is little chance of survival, much
less avoiding significant injury. In fact, this is the only mishap of this type in the data
without an associated fatality or major injury. Without further information, such as
a complete description of the scenario, a detailed analysis of this mishap cannot be
performed. It is presented to illustrate why the true cost of mishaps cannot be easily
determined. One can only hope that since it was reported as a Hazard Report the
sailor survived. There are other mishaps in the data which, based upon the available
data, appear to have discrepancies, but they will be left out of further evaluation.
1.2.6 The Human Cost. The injury-related mishaps in Table 1.6 are sig-
nificant and should be compared to the mandated cost values for similar injuries in
Table 1.7. Interestingly, the mandated costs presented here were last updated in 1988
“so that analysts can make generalized comparisons against historical data” [8].
From the 261 Interest Mishaps, there are 13 fatalities and 34 major injuries. The
major injuries counted here involved sailors being run over by an aircraft, ingested
into a turning engine, or being blown overboard. These numbers were generated from
reading the brief narratives which do not always expressly state the severity of the
injury. A fatality was only recorded if the narrative expressly said the sailor was
killed. Figures 1.9 and 1.10 show the number and recorded costs of fatalities and
major injuries.
Interestingly, the mean cost of both the fatalities and major injuries is below
what would be expected from the mandated costs from Table 1.7 [8]. The mean
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Figure 1.10: Cost of Fatalities/Major Injuries from Interest Mishaps
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fatality cost is $51,462, less than half the mandated amount. This is due to the fact
that through the 1980s the cost associated with the death of an enlisted servicemember
was only $37,000. The mean major injury cost is $82,611. It is not possible to
determine the severity of every injury based upon the available data, but this is still
less than the mandated cost of a partial disability for an enlisted sailor. There are
seven mishaps with associated major injuries that have a cost of zero for injuries. The
narrative for the first of these is “FLT DECK PERS SUSTAINED LEG INJ WHEN
LEG WAS TRAPPED UNDER TAXIING A/C”, which certainly had unreported
associated medical costs.
Beyond the direct medical, life insurance, or disability costs the government
must pay for a mishap involving a fatality or major injury there are other losses that
cannot be calculated with any certainty. A killed or injured sailor affects the perfor-
mance, morale, and retention of those they serve with. Leadership and experience
are lost with a senior member, and their potential with a junior. The effects of these
factors may be difficult or impossible to calculate, but it should be clear that they
are not taken into account when determining the cost of a mishap.
1.2.7 Conclusions From Data Analysis. With the improvements in flight
safety over the last decade, mishaps occurring on the flight deck of an aircraft carrier
are taking an increasing share of each year’s total mishap cost. The annual cost of
Interest Mishaps is consistently in the $2-4 million range, as seen in Figure 1.8, except
for three years where an aircraft was destroyed and the cost was much higher. With
an average of 0.448 sailors killed every year by an Interest Mishap, it is important to
make every effort to prevent them.
By closely examining the data reported to the Naval Safety Center, and an
analysis of its limitations, it has been shown that potentially preventable mishaps,
and their cost, make up a significant percentage of the total each year. This mishap
cost analysis was performed to show that there is still a significant cost every year
to the U.S. Navy for mishaps which have been identified as potentially preventable.
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This cost analysis is presented as a baseline for the cost benefit of a system that could
predict and potentially prevent mishaps.
1.3 Persistent Monitoring
To prevent mishaps from occurring, it is necessary to provide key personnel with
more accurate and timely data describing the state of all aircraft, equipment, and
personnel on the flight deck and in the hangar bay. To do this, a system must first be
developed to more accurately estimate the aircraft position, orientation, and velocity
than is currently done by the Taxi Director or Handling Officer. Such a system would
be persistent, in that it would continually monitor activities on the flight deck and
hangar bay. This section will explore how modern RTLS technology can be leveraged
to provide a more accurate depiction of state and reduce the occurrence of mishaps
both on the flight deck and in the hangar bay.
1.3.1 Determining Flight Deck State. Since the creation of carrier-based
aviation, the management of the carrier flight deck has been an extremely challenging
task requiring hundreds of personnel each having years of experience. The current
system has changed very little since the 1950s. Personnel on the flight deck use hand
signals to communicate with each other and direct the pilot to make aircraft control
system inputs. The position and orientation of each aircraft are loosely monitored in
Flight Deck Control with objects representing aircraft on a table commonly referred
to as the “Ouija Board” depicted in Figure 1.11. When towing an aircraft personnel
are assigned as Wing and Tail Safeties to ensure the towed aircraft does not impact
another, while the Tow Tractor Driver ensures the route is clear of obstructions.
Currently, the state of each aircraft (position, orientation, and translational/rotational
velocities) is estimated only by a human observer’s judgement.
It is this human-based estimation of state approach which creates a capacity
for mishaps. With a very large quantity of aircraft, SE, and personnel as well as
flight deck surfaces such as jet blast deflectors, elevators, and catapults, the flight
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Figure 1.11: Flight Deck Represented by a “Ouija Board”: Photo credit: U.S.
Navy.
deck naturally lends itself to a computer-based tracking system. Table 1.8 illustrates
many of the elements required for a useful depiction of flight deck state. To reduce
the occurrence of mishaps, it is possible to improve the accuracy of the flight deck
state through the use of modern RTLS. For the purposes of this research, the fidelity
with which such a system can determine the state will be divided into four levels
based upon the capabilities the system would provide, increased expected difficulty,
and cost of implementation. Each successive level would include the capabilities of all
previous levels. Further research beyond this effort would be required to determine
the optimal means of achieving these levels as well as their performance requirements.
1.3.1.1 Level One: Aircraft. The purpose of a Level One observa-
tion system is to reduce or eliminate Spotting and Taxiing mishaps as listed in Sec-
tion 1.2.2. As previously stated, the position, orientation, and translational/rotational
velocities of aircraft on the flight deck are currently determined only by a visual es-
timation. To improve this, a new computer-based system can be developed which
provides measurements of aircraft state in near real-time to Flight Deck Control or
other systems and personnel concerned. Level One would also need to determine the
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Table 1.8: Elements to Describe Flight Deck State
Element Variable Measurement
Elevator Status [el1, el2, el3, el4] Up/Down/In Transit
JBD Status [j1, j2, j3, j4] Up/Down/In Transit
Catapult Location [c1, c2, c3, c4]pos Distance of catapult from
launch position
Catapult Status [c1, c2, c3, c4]T Applied Tension
Barricade Stanchion
Status
[b1, b2] Up/Down/In Transit
Hangar Bay Door Sta-
tus
[hbd1, hbd2] Open/Closed/In Transit
Wind Speed v̄wind Free-stream wind velocity
Deck Roll/Pitch [Θ, φ]deck Roll/pitch angle
Aircraft Position [x, y, z,Θ, φ, ψ]ACi Location and orientation
relative to ship
Aircraft Velocity
[
ẋ, ẏ, ż, Θ̇, φ̇, ψ̇
]
ACi
Translational and rotational
velocities relative to ship
SE Position [x, y, z, ψ]SEj Location and yaw relative
to ship
SE Velocity
[
ẋ, ẏ, ż, ψ̇
]
SEj
Translational and yaw ve-
locities relative to ship
Personnel Position [x, y, z]persk Location relative to ship
Personnel Velocity [ẋ, ẏ, ż]persk Velocity relative to ship
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Figure 1.12: Aircraft Parked Over the Track of Hangar Bay Door One [37]
status of flight deck surfaces, such as the elevation angle of a jet blast deflector or the
location of an elevator. Many different types of RTLS could be leveraged to acquire
this data including radio locating systems and optical scanning.
A computer system provided with the state measurements in the top two sec-
tions of Table 1.8 could be programmed to recognize many potential hazards and
either prevent them or warn of their pending occurrence. For example, given an
aircraft parked in the Hangar Bay across the tracks of Hangar Bay Door One as in
Figure 1.12, the system could prevent the closing of Door One but allow the closing
of Door Two if requested (assuming it is unobstructed). This principle can similarly
be applied to Jet Blast Deflectors, Elevators, and Barricade Stanchions.
Such a system would also be able to track taxiing aircraft and warn of impending
mishaps. Recalling the example of an aircraft turning near the edge of the Flight Deck
in Section 1.1.1, the pilot would have two sources of information to ensure the nose
tire does not go over the edge. If the system uses wingtip location measurements to
calculate aircraft state, it may even be possible to determine the wingfold status of
the aircraft by measuring the distance between wingtips. This could allow a Level
One system to warn of impending Wingfold mishaps.
24
1.3.1.2 Level Two: Support Equipment. A Level Two system adds
the ability to reduce or eliminate Towing mishaps and to further reduce Spotting
mishaps. Many mishaps with collision damage to aircraft involve SE, whether it is a
tow tractor, fire truck, power generator, or forklift. With a system that can determine
the instantaneous position, orientation, and translational/rotational velocities of SE
it would be possible to reduce the occurrence of many Spotting, Towing, and Non-
aviation mishaps. For much of the larger SE, this could be achieved with a system
similar to that used for Level One, but many smaller items of support equipment,
such as weapon carts, may require different treatment.
By adding the state of SE to the system described in Section 1.3.1.1, warnings
could be provided for pending mishaps involving the collision between SE and air-
craft. Reports of unsafe operation of self-propelled SE, such as excessive speed or
unnecessary proximity to aircraft, could be provided to personnel concerned. The
location of smaller SE, such as ordnance carts, could be tracked to warn taxiing pilots
of unsafe areas.
1.3.1.3 Level Three: Personnel. To improve the safety of flight deck
operations for individual sailors, it would be beneficial to determine their instanta-
neous position and velocity relative to hazards caused by aircraft, SE, elevators, jet
blast deflectors, and exhaust plumes. With the rapid, relatively erratic motion of per-
sonnel on deck as well as the requirement for close proximity to aircraft to perform
many critical tasks, the detection of a potential mishap involving personnel could
be the most difficult to determine. Such a system could serve to mitigate Contact
mishaps and reduce the number of flight deck casualties.
If the system described in Section 1.3.1.2 is further enhanced to measure the
point velocity and position of each sailor on the flight deck and hangar bay, many
of the worst mishaps could potentially be prevented. Warnings to the sailor and
leadership could be provided if any sailor gets within a specified perimeter of an
aircraft with engines turning, especially for unauthorized personnel. If a sailor were
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Figure 1.13: F-14 Tomcat Preparing for Launch: Of interest are two maintenance
personnel immediately beneath the hot engine exhaust nozzles. Taken in 2004 by the
author onboard USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67).
to fall or be forced overboard, the system could recognize that and inform the Bridge
immediately. This capability is significantly more complicated than the prior two,
as the intended motion of personnel is much more difficult to predict than that of
aircraft or SE. Figure 1.13 illustrates the inherent difficulties in detecting potential
personnel mishaps with sailors crawling under the aft end of the aircraft with engines
turning prior to launch.
It is also critical that the identification of personnel be reported as well as their
position. By combining the identification of each sailor with their position it will also
be possible to ensure that they are only performing actions or in areas which their
level of experience warrants. While an experienced squadron troubleshooter may need
to crawl under a powered aircraft, the system should warn of a trainee performing a
similar dangerous action.
1.3.1.4 Level Four: Aircraft System Status. Many Engine, Exhaust,
and Wingfold mishaps could be prevented by remotely monitoring an aircraft’s throt-
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Table 1.9: Mishap Cost by Category and Minimum Observation Level
Category Total Reported Cost ($) Mean Annual Cost ($) Mitigating Level
Spotting 36,301,190 1,251,800 1
Towing 9,739,576 335,800 2
Taxiing 9,225,025 318,100 1
Exhaust 5,248,076 181,000 4
Contact 2,430,815 83,800 3
Engine 1,756,015 60,600 4
Wingfold 316,596 10,900 4
Non-aviation 35,883 1,200 2
tle or wingfold status. Utilizing a datalink to report necessary aircraft status informa-
tion to Flight Deck Control could provide this capability. There are current systems
to provide this information when an aircraft is powered, but it could prove beneficial
to transmit this information when unpowered.
1.3.2 Benefits. Using the mishap data from Naval Safety Center, this re-
search aims to estimate the cost benefit of implementing such a system. Table 1.9
provides the cost of the different mishap categories and the lowest observation level
which could reduce their occurrence. From the mean annual cost of each category
and the observation level needed to reduce that category, the potential savings of em-
ploying a particular level can be determined as depicted in Figure 1.14. Recalling the
issues with mishap cost data discussed in Section 1.2.4, the dollar amounts described
represent the absolute lowest estimate of potential cost benefits.
Beyond the potential reduction in mishaps there are many additional, significant
benefits to a persistent monitoring system. Such a system could ease the integration
of UAVs into the Carrier Air Wing. The persistent monitoring system would track all
vehicles, manned and unmanned, and could provide a flight deck “map” to unmanned
systems. This could allow UAVs to plan a path to their designated position around
obstacles such as other aircraft and personnel.
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Figure 1.14: Potential Annual Savings of Implementing Observation System
A persistent monitoring system could provide all levels of Naval leadership
with accurate recordings of all flight deck activity. The current reporting system for
mishaps does not document “near mishaps”, or those which were narrowly averted.
Recording and reporting “near mishaps” could become the primary mechanism in
reducing potential mishaps. “Close calls” occur frequently, and if recorded and re-
ported, they could contribute to preventing mishaps through changes in policy, train-
ing, and modifications to the hazard identification algorithms. A complete recording
of flight deck activity would provide the Naval Safety Center with significantly im-
proved documentation on the hazards of flight deck operations, especially for forensic
analysis. It would also provide commanders with detailed records of personnel actions
which can be used to document training and experience, as well as justify manpower
requirements.
1.4 Research Discussion
This section discusses the objectives and assumptions of this research as well as
the methodology used. An overview of this document is presented.
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1.4.1 Research Objectives. This research intends to be a feasibility study in
which the minimum requirements of a persistent monitoring system for parameters
such as position and orientation measurement precision, translational and rotational
velocity measurement precision, update rate, and computational power are examined
to provide the capability of predicting and warning of potentially hazardous situations.
These requirements are described in more detail in Chapters II and IV.
1.4.2 Assumptions. While this research is concerned with preventing mishaps
aboard aircraft carriers, the tests to gather data were all performed ashore. It is as-
sumed that the differences in aircraft tow procedures afloat and ashore are minimal.
It is also assumed that the tow procedures performed at NAS Oceana, discussed in
Chapter III, are representative of those used across the fleet.
1.4.3 Hypothesis. Mishaps onboard an aircraft carrier present a significant
cost to the Navy and pose a significant risk to personnel. The implementation of a
persistent monitoring system, able to measure the state of the flight deck, has the
potential to recognize and prevent mishaps.
1.4.4 Methodology. Beyond evaluating and establishing the performance
requirements, this research investigates methods by which the different Levels can be
achieved using modern positioning, sensing, and communication technologies, but is
primarily focused on the Global Positioning System (GPS). As an example, an analysis
of the capabilities, limitations, and requirements to achieve a Level One system using
one or more types of modern RTLS such as GPS and pseudo-GPS is performed. These
systems could be combined with video or LIDAR data using sensor fusion to provide
visual confirmation of reported positions. Chapter II describes the capabilities and
limitations of such systems.
To demonstrate the ability of modern RTLS to measure the state of aircraft
and personnel, a series of tests were devised for data collection at both the Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT) and Naval Air Station (NAS) Oceana. Described
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in detail in Chapter III, these tests used highly accurate civilian survey-grade GPS
receivers to measure the position and orientation of an FA-18C Hornet being towed on
the flight line by personnel with flight deck experience. The data collected provides
an accurate depiction of USN aircraft movement procedures as well as the ability to
develop software algorithms which can monitor for and warn of impending hazardous
situations. The analysis of this data, described in Chapter IV, allows a determination
of whether the positioning accuracy and noise levels of the receivers used are sufficient
to predict paths for aircraft and personnel.
GPS was selected as the measurement source for this research as the survey-
grade receivers used are considered to provide “truth data” for the purposes of survey-
ing property. The persistent monitoring system envisioned by this research should be
measurement source agnostic, such that any sufficiently accurate measurement source
can be utilized.
1.4.5 Document Overview. This chapter presented an analysis of safety
records showing the high risk associated with flight deck operations. A persistent
monitoring system was proposed to potentially reduce the occurrence of mishaps.
Chapter II provides a detailed overview of past and present research in fields related
to the development of a persistent monitoring system. The tests conducted and
equipment used are described in detail in Chapter III. The results of these tests are
presented in Chapter IV with conclusions discussed in Chapter V.
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(a) Flight Deck (b) Hangar Bay
Figure 1.15: CVN Flight Deck and Hangar Bay Without CVW [37]
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(a) Flight Deck (b) Hangar Bay
Figure 1.16: CVN Flight Deck and Hangar Bay With CVW (notional) [37]
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II. Literature Review
This chapter presents a study of topics relevant to this research. Proposedcomputer-based systems to improve flight deck operations are discussed. Back-
ground information on RTLS such as the Global Positioning System (GPS) and similar
pseudolite systems, as well as methods to determine the position and orientation of an
aircraft based on known GPS receiver location are presented. Algorithms to provide
warnings of hazardous situations are also discussed.
2.1 Flight Deck Systems
Little information is available in open literature on historical and current efforts
to improve flight deck operations with computer-based systems. One possibility for
this is the fact that the U.S. Navy is deeply rooted in tradition. The “Ouija Board”
system of flight deck management described in Section 1.3.1 performs adequately
and is well understood by the personnel involved. Another is that only recently, with
significant advances in RTLS and computers, has a computer-based system to improve
flight deck operations become practicable. This section discusses previous research
into computer-based flight deck management systems, as well as current efforts to
modernize flight deck operations.
2.1.1 Early Research. With a sensing system in place that is able to mea-
sure the flight deck state to one of the four levels discussed in Section 1.3, a means
must be developed to use the state measurement to its greatest potential. Studies of
methods to improve the communication of flight deck state to Flight Deck Control
and other personnel concerned for ‘man-in-the-loop’ control were performed at the
Naval Postgraduate School from 1974-1975 [13,24], the only open literature found on
the subject. These studies did not incorporate RTLS as precise positioning technology
was just being developed.
In 1966, a report was published entitled An Exploratory Study of an Automated
Carrier Aircraft Deck Operation Control System (CADOCS) [43]. This is the first de-
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Figure 2.1: Proposed Handheld “Flight Deck Data Entry Device”, Circa 1974: by
Giardina [13, pg. 54] (from microfiche).
scription of an attempt at using computer systems to improve flight deck operations.
It argued that since many flight deck management operations are repetitive in nature,
they can be performed by a computer. It recognized that the quality of a solution
provided by the computer is dependent upon the quality of the data it is provided.
A variety of stationary and handheld devices used by flight deck personnel were rec-
ommended for data entry. An example of a proposed handheld device is depicted in
Figure 2.1 [13, pgs. 9-10].
The CADOCS concept was further refined in 1967 by the report: Systems Def-
inition Study of Carrier Aircraft Deck Operations Control System [25]. A system
actually capable of generating the aircraft spotting plan for the entire flight deck
based upon maintenance status and flight schedule requirements was proposed. Two
of the unfavorable aspects of CADOCS described by Giardina in 1974 are: inaccu-
racy of position data and performance of existing computers [13, pgs. 10-13]. The
CADOCS system was further refined in two additional reports [42, 44]1.
1The reports on CADOCS ( [25, 42–44]) remain authorized for distribution only to government
agencies. No information present in this research comes from them directly.
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Figure 2.2: Mock ‘Flight Deck Status’ Display, Circa 1975: Used in simulation
created by Johnson and Woolley [24] (from microfiche).
Johnson and Woolley developed a computer simulation to allow the input and
display of flight deck state [24]. Their ‘Flight Deck Status’ display is shown in Fig-
ure 2.2. Their software was capable of storing and displaying state information as
entered by a user. With the limited computing technology available in 1975, this
modest task required the maximum computing power available and was enormously
costly.
Even with the limited computing power available when this research was per-
formed, the conclusion was that an interactive computer interface provides the best
means of distributing integrated information to all decision makers. Modern comput-
ers possess far greater flexibility and capability, such that the computations for the
system proposed by Johnson and Woolley are trivial. A major concern of their re-
search was the equipment used to input and display information. Modern computers,
as depicted in Figure 2.3, support touch sensitive, high-resolution displays capable
of accepting inputs from multiple users simultaneously. Such a system was recently
used to coordinate security at a major sporting event [32]. Advances in RTLS allow
modern computer systems to not only provide near real-time information of the flight
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Figure 2.3: Modern Multi-touch, Tabletop Display
Figure 2.4: ADMACS Electronic “Ouija Board” [31]
deck state but also predict and warn personnel of potential hazards based upon the
measured trajectories of aircraft, equipment, and personnel.
2.1.2 Current Developments. A system currently installed on CVNs, Avia-
tion Data Management and Control System (ADMACS), currently provides systems
to track the flight schedule as well as visual records of launch and recovery operations.
The Block 3 upgrade, scheduled for installation on USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72)
in fiscal year 2010, will provide an automated, digital “Ouija Board”. Measurements
of aircraft position and orientation will be made by video analysis software. Expected
accuracies of aircraft position measurements are approximately 0.3 m [31].
2.1.3 Carrier-based Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. The problem of UAV in-
corporation on the flight deck is currently being actively pursued by many programs.
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The Unmanned Combat Aircraft System - Carrier Demonstration (UCAS-D) is a
UAV prototype to demonstrate aircraft carrier launch and recovery capabilities. The
contract was awarded in August, 2007 with a carrier landing attempt planned for
2012 [7, pg. 74]. The method of providing positive control during flight deck opera-
tions is left to the vendor [34, pg. 36].
Venetsky, et al. performed an extensive study on the use of gesture recognition
to enable UAVs to follow the directions of Taxi Directors, as pilots are trained to do.
Each UAV would have a visual sensor mounted on it to watch its assigned director.
There are significant obstacles such as low light, light source blooming, sun glare,
steam, occlusion, and clutter. The results of the study are that such a system is
feasible if visibility of taxi directors is augmented, sensors are placed high on the
aircraft, and Taxi Director practices are more standardized [54].
2.2 The Global Positioning System
This section will provide a brief overview of GPS. It will focus on the basic
system architecture, signals transmitted, methods of determining position, and errors
in the solution. The risks inherent in a system that relies on GPS will be explored as
well as the modernization efforts to mitigate these risks. Comparable foreign systems,
such as the Russian GLONASS and Europe’s Galileo, will not be discussed.
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terminology used to describe
the orbit of a satellite. A comprehensive discussion of satellite orbits is provided by
Vallado [53], while a more thorough description of GPS is provided by Misra and
Enge [33].
2.2.1 Architecture. GPS is a passive radio navigation system based upon
measuring the receiver’s position from known radio transmitters, a method called
trilateration, as depicted in Figure 2.5. Provided by the U.S. DoD, GPS allows users
to accurately calculate position, velocity, and time. GPS was originally intended for
U.S. military forces, but as of this writing, civilians are the primary user and it has
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Figure 2.5: Illustration of GPS Passive Radio Navigation: Tracing an arc of equal
length from each satellite, the position of the receiver is the only point where every
arc intersects.
become an integral component of the global economy [33, p. 32]. The system is
divided into three segments: space, control, and user.
2.2.1.1 Space Segment. A constellation of 24 satellites (nominal)
transmit pre-defined code sequences, termed Pseudorandom Noise (PRN) code, which
can be acquired and tracked by a GPS receiver. The satellites are in a near-circular
orbit with a radius of 26,560 km. There are six orbital planes, each with at least four
satellites. The orbital planes have an inclination of 55◦ from the equator. [33, p. 33]
The GPS satellite constellation was designed so that at least four satellites would
be visible from any point on Earth at any time. It is more common that a user sees
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six to eight satellites at any given time. Built with a design life of 7.5 years, most
GPS satellites have doubled their expected functional lifespan. [33, pp. 33-34]
2.2.1.2 Control Segment. The GPS control segment serves to accu-
rately monitor and predict the orbits of the satellites. Multiple tracking stations are
deployed around the world to measure the satellite orbits. Without the services of the
control segment, the accuracy of a GPS solution would be severely degraded [33, pp.
34-35].
Headquartered at Schriever Air Force Base, the Master Control Station is re-
sponsible for maintaining the currency and accuracy of information transmitted by the
GPS constellation. Updates are normally transmitted to the satellites once daily [33,
pg. 35].
2.2.1.3 User Segment. Anyone with a GPS receiver is part of the user
segment. While originally designed to primarily support military users, the vast ma-
jority of users now are civilians. Aside from automobile and aircraft navigation, GPS
is used in a wide variety of fields such as farming [16], geology [47], and atmospheric
study [18].
The construction of receivers is the domain of corporations and businesses. Ma-
jor manufacturers design and build their own hardware from the specifications pro-
vided by the GPS Interface Control Document (ICD-GPS-200C) [15].
2.2.2 Signals. Each GPS satellite transmits a pre-defined code on one of two
radio frequencies termed L1 (1575.42 MHz) and L2 (1227.60 MHz) [33, p. 37]. The
L2 frequency transmission, termed P(Y) code, is currently encrypted and intended for
military use only. Some civilian receivers, such as those used in this research, are able
to utilize L2 measurements via proprietary methods. The coarse/acquisition (C/A)
code transmitted on L1 is used for the vast majority of GPS position solutions.
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Table 2.1: Orbital Parameters in GPS Ephemeris Message
Parameter Explanation
M0 Mean anomaly at reference time
∆n Mean motion difference from computed value
e Eccentricity
A
1
2 Square root of semi-major axis
Ω0 Longitude of ascending node at weekly epoch
i0 Inclination angle at reference time
ω Argument of perigee
Ω̇ Rate of right ascension
i̇ Rate of inclination angle
t0e Reference time ephemeris
The power of the signals transmitted by GPS satellites is extremely low, only
10−16 W of received power on the surface of the earth [33, pg. 42]. Receiving this
signal is roughly equivalent to attempting to see a flashlight shined by an astronaut
in orbit. The only way a receiver can pick the GPS signal out of the background noise
levels is by knowing what signals to look for. Therefore, the Pseudorandom Noise
(PRN) codes transmitted by the satellites are specified in the GPS Interface Control
Document [15].
Each satellite also transmits an ephemeris message containing its orbital pa-
rameters and an almanac message containing the approximate orbital parameters of
other satellites as well as the status of the GPS constellation [33, p. 126]. A section
of the contents of the ephemeris message are contained in Table 2.1 [15, pg. 94].
This information is transmitted in a 50 bps stream, and the ephemeris for a single
satellite can be transmitted in 30 seconds. The complete navigation message contains
both almanac and ephemeris information. Split into 25 frames, each frame containing
1,500 bits, the complete navigation message takes 12.5 minutes to transmit [33, pp.
127-128].
2.2.3 Solutions. There are three primary methods to utilize the signals
transmitted by GPS.
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2.2.3.1 Code Phase. The primary measurement intended for GPS is
the transit time of a signal from the satellite to a receiver. This is the measurement
used by the vast majority of commercial GPS receivers and requires the use of only
one frequency.
Each satellite transmits a different, pre-defined sequence of 1023 bits, referred
to as chips, and repeats it indefinitely for the C/A-code. A receiver generates the
same sequence of chips and uses it to correlate with the broadcast signal. This allows
the receiver to calculate the transit time of the signal [33, pp. 38-39].
Using the position of each satellite calculated from the ephemeris data [xk, yk, zk],
the transit time of the signal tk, and the speed of light c, it is possible to calculate
the range to the satellite. Due to clock bias in the receiver, each calculated range
is too long or short by an equal amount. Therefore the calculated ranges are called
pseudoranges [33, p. 23]. The pseudorange ρ to the kth satellite can be calculated by
ρk = c · (tk + ∆tcorrections) . (2.1)
The Newton-Raphson method can be used to solve the resulting system of equations
for the receiver’s position [xrcvr, yrcvr, zrcvr] by solving
ρk =
√
(xk − xrcvr)
2 + (yk − yrcvr)
2 + (zk − zrcvr)
2 + b+ ǫk (2.2)
where b is the receiver clock bias and ǫk represents unknown errors [33, p. 48].
Experiments have shown that the pseudorange solution is capable of three-
dimensional position accuracy on the order of 4 m [33, p. 216]. While very effective,
higher levels of accuracy are required for this research.
2.2.3.2 Doppler Shift. While it is possible to differentiate a time
history of GPS position estimates to calculate a velocity profile, it is often desired to
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determine an instantaneous velocity. This is possible using the principle of Doppler
shift.
Satellites in the GPS constellation travel in their orbits at approximately 4
km/s. This motion provides a consistent doppler shift in the transmission frequency
when a receiver is stationary. A receiver in motion can measure a difference from this
nominal frequency. The receiver velocity v̄rcvr can be calculated by
˙̃ρ = G


v̄rcvr
ḃ

 + ǫ̃φ̇ (2.3)
where ˙̃ρ is a vector containing the rate of change of each pseudorange calculated,
ḃ is the rate of change in the receiver clock (m/s), and ǫ̃φ̇ represents errors in the
pseudorange rate calculation. G is a matrix containing estimated line-of-sight unit
vectors from the receiver to each satellite, given by
G =








−1̂1 1
−1̂2 1
...
−1̂k 1








(2.4)
and
1̂k =
[xk − xrcvr, yk − yrcvr, zk − zrcvr]
|x̄k − x̄rcvr|
. (2.5)
The rate of change of each pseudorange can then be used to calculate local
frame velocities just as pseudoranges are used to calculate local frame coordinates in
Equation (2.2) [33, pgs. 203, 204, 218-219].
2.2.3.3 Carrier Phase. While code phase measurements use the chips
contained in the unique signal of each satellite, carrier phase measurements use the
difference in phase between the receiver generated signal and the signal received from
42
the satellite. Each chip of the C/A code is 293 m along the length of the broadcast
signal, but a single cycle of the L1 frequency is only 19 cm [4, pg. 21]. This allows
for a much more accurate measurement of the signal’s transit time, leading to a more
accurate position solution.
For a carrier phase measurement, the receiver must measure the initial fractional
phase difference between the signals and track all changes to this measurement. This
way the phase of a received signal can be related to the phase at time of transmission.
The phase offset as a function of time φ(t) is computed from
φ(t) = f · τ +N (2.6)
where f if the carrier frequency and τ is the transit time of the signal, and N is the
integer cycle ambiguity [33, pg. 153].
Carrier phase measurements are ambiguous, leading to the integer ambiguity
term N in Equation 2.6. The integer ambiguity represents the number of whole
cycles of the carrier signal, and based upon the calculated transit time τ it could be a
large number of cycles. Resolving this integer ambiguity usually requires a stationary
receiver in a known location which collects accurate data on the motion of available
satellites [4, pg. 6]. The details behind carrier phase ambiguity resolution are beyond
the scope of this document, but are given by Misra and Enge [33]. When using
carrier phase a receiver is able to provide a position solution with centimeter level
accuracy [33, pg. 234].
2.2.4 Errors. This section discusses the major errors in the GPS solution
and methods to mitigate them. These errors must factor significantly into any per-
sistent monitoring system implemented for the flight deck if it used GPS or another
radio navigation system. Errors in the GPS solution generally fall into one of three
groups [33, pg. 155]:
1. Broadcast message errors,
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2. Signal propagation uncertainty, and
3. Measurement errors.
Broadcast message errors typically are associated with incorrect parameters in
the ephemeris message [33, pg. 156]. The prediction of satellite orbits is very accurate
for the two-body problem, where only the Earth and a satellite are considered. How-
ever, each satellite is affected by the gravity of every celestial body. Corrections for
many of these factors are contained within the broadcast ephemeris message, such as
the effect of lunar and solar gravity which can account for 25 m of orbital perturbation
after only one hour [33, pg. 124-125]. Currently, the broadcast ephemeris can provide
2 m accuracy in pseudorange measurements [33, pg. 127].
Signal propagation uncertainty errors are caused by the Earth’s atmosphere’s
ability to change the velocity of radio signals, and the pseudorange method described
in Section 2.2.3 requires a constant signal velocity. The upper layer of the atmosphere,
from 40-100 km, is known as the ionosphere and contains free electrons which can
slow the speed of a radio wave. The lower region of the atmosphere, or troposphere,
is much denser and contains relatively large amounts of water which can refract a
radio signal. The effects of both the ionosphere and troposphere vary with time and
location on the Earth [33, pg. 157-158].
There are two primary measurement errors which affect a receiver: noise and
multipath. Receiver noise is the reception of unrelated signals in the frequency band
of interest. The receiver can only see the sum of the signal of interest and the noise
received with it. If the noise is strong enough, the receiver could lose lock on the signal,
or if their signal strength is of the same order, the signal could be misinterpreted.
Signals from satellites low on the horizon are received with less power than those
with higher elevation angles and are more prone to noise [33, pg. 175].
Multipath is the greatest error source in GPS, after applying correction factors,
as of this writing. It is caused by the reflection of a GPS signal so that it reaches
a receiver on multiple paths. Receiving the same signal at multiple times, such as
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receiving the line of sight signal and one reflected from the ground, adds the additional
reflected distance to the pseudorange measurement. In highly reflective environments,
such as the flight deck of an aircraft carrier, the error in pseudorange measurements
can be as great as 5 m while carrier phase measurement errors can be as high as 5
cm [33, pg. 175-177].
2.2.5 Error Mitigation. Each of the error sources listed in Section 2.2.4
can be corrected for or mitigated through a variety of techniques. This section will
provide a background on GPS error mitigation techniques.
The correction of broadcast message errors is the domain of the Control Seg-
ment, and improvements in satellite tracking will provide improved measurements to
all users, without the need for a receiver upgrade. As an example, when six monitoring
stations operated by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) were added
in 2005 the quality of predicted orbits was improved [33, pg. 126]. Another method to
improve the estimate of satellite locations is to use precise ephemerides, produced by
the NGA and the Naval Surface Warfare Center. These are post-processed satellite
position measurements, which after only three hours for calculation and dissemina-
tion, can provide satellite position errors of less than 5 cm [33, pg 127].
The errors caused by the troposphere and ionosphere can be mitigated, with
varying success, by applying modeled error corrections. The Klobuchar model can
be used to model ionospheric errors using parameters contained in the broadcast
navigation message. This model is able to reduce the pseudorange measurement error
by nearly 50%, but this can be 10 m on a normal day [33, pgs. 168-169]. Tropospheric
errors can also be mitigated by a model or mapping function, yielding a residual error
of 5-10 cm.
If a receiver is capable of acquiring both GPS frequencies, then the ionospheric
error can be effectively eliminated. Each frequency is affected differently by the
ionosphere, so the signal delay can be calculated [33, pg. 166]. This actually allows for
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Table 2.2: Effect of Differential GPS on Measurement Errors
Source Potential Size (m) Residual Error (m)
Ephemeris 2 0.1
Ionosphere 2-10 0.2
Troposphere 2.5 0.2
precise, continual tracking of ionospheric activity, as well as improving the position
solution [18].
2.2.6 Differential GPS. Given a GPS receiver in a known position, referred
to as a base station, it is possible to estimate the errors discussed in Section 2.2.4
that are present in the solution [33]. For a near real-time differential GPS correction,
it is necessary to have a datalink between the base station and the mobile receivers
to which the corrections are to be applied. Many commercial survey-grade receivers,
including those used in the tests described in Chapter III are capable of applying
differential corrections in near real-time. It is also possible to apply the corrections
to recorded data in post-processing. This can be done by software such as NovAtel
Waypoint GrafNavTM [40] or GPStk [51].
The use of differential GPS corrections significantly decreases the amount of
error in the position solution, as shown in Table 2.2. The errors estimated by the
base station are only valid for measurements made near the base station, but in
the case of an aircraft carrier flight deck all measurements would be made near the
base station. The use of differential GPS also provides measurements needed for
carrier phase integer ambiguity resolution, as discussed in Section 2.2.3.3. When
they are combined the solution is often referred to as Carrier-Phase Differential GPS
(CDGPS) [4, pg. 6].
2.2.7 Solution Quality. The geometry of the GPS satellites used by a re-
ceiver for its solution has a significant impact on its precision. GPS satellite geometry
refers to the configuration of the visible constellation, such as satellite elevation rel-
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ative to the horizon, angular separation, and total number of visible satellites. A
“good” satellite geometry would have 6 − 8 satellites all above 15 − 18◦ elevation,
and with at least 5 − 10◦ of angular separation between satellites. As discussed in
Section 2.2.4, measurements made using signals from satellites low on the horizon are
more susceptible to tropospheric error. The satellite geometry can be quantified by
the matrix H [33, pg. 207], calculated by
H =
(
GTG
)
−1
(2.7)
where G is given by Equation 2.4. The geometry quality measurement, or Dilution of
Precision2 (DOP) can be calculated from the elements of H by
D =
√
H11 +H22 +H33. (2.8)
DOP is useful as a simple, scalar measure of the satellite geometry used in the
solution. A lower DOP implies a better satellite geometry. The GPS Control Segment
provides maps showing nationwide and worldwide maximum DOP. An example is
given in Figure 2.6.
2.2.8 Limitations. There are many limitations to the use of GPS. Due to
the weak signal strength a receiver generally requires a clear, unobstructed view of the
sky. This generally prevents GPS from being used for indoor positioning. Another
limitation is the requirement for continual updating of GPS ephemeris data by the
Control Segment. The Control Segment has continuously updated ephemeris data for
over twenty years, but it is presented as a limitation because it is a single point of
failure.
A limitation which is the subject of much discussion by military users is the
jamming of GPS signals, especially intentional jamming by enemy forces. Simply
2For this research, the term DOP is synonymous with Position DOP, or PDOP.
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Figure 2.6: World DOP Assessment [52]
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broadcasting a high power signal on the L1 frequency can prevent the acquisiton of
GPS signals by all users in range.
2.2.9 Modernization. Efforts to modernize GPS, first announced in 1998,
have the potential to significantly improve its performance for all users, military
and civilian. For civilian users, an unencrypted signal will be broadcast on the L2
frequency, called L2C. The first satellite capable of broadcasting L2C was launched in
2005. This will allow for civilian receivers to eliminate ionospheric error in a manner
similar to military receivers. In addition, a new signal, L5 will be broadcast on 1176.45
MHz. It it a wider bandwidth signal, allowing for better carrier phase positioning,
and will be broadcast with more power than L1 or L2 signals [33, pgs. 73-77].
These improvements, when completed, will enable the mass production of re-
ceivers that have the capability of advanced military or civilian surveying systems.
Given the worldwide demand for precise positioning, it is likely that receivers with
dramatically increased position accuracy will be available in extremely small form
factors.
2.3 Pseudolite Positioning
As discussed in Section 2.2, precise positioning with GPS (ē ≤ 1 cm) requires a
carrier-phase solution and a differential correction. Pseudolites provide a method of
achieving precise positioning that does not depend exclusively on the GPS constella-
tion. This section will provide a brief description of the theory behind pseudolites,
their benefits, and limitations. A more thorough overview of pseudolites is provided
by Cobb [4].
2.3.1 Theory. Pseudolite is a term used to describe a radio broadcasting
system, not in orbit, which transmits signals capable of being used by a RTLS (gen-
erally GPS) receiver. Pseudolites operate on the same principle as GPS: trilateration.
When GPS was being developed pseudolites were used in place of unlaunched satel-
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lites [4, pg. 13]. Given sufficient pseudolites in known locations a code or carrier phase
solution can be computed using the same algorithms described in Sections 2.2.3.1 and
2.2.3.3, and differential corrections can be provided. A pseudolite can generate its
own PRN code, or simply rebroadcast a replica of a received signal [4, pg. 28]. Using
a pseudolite system with rebroadcasting, navigation is possible with three pseudolites
and only one GPS satellite [4, pg. 34].
2.3.2 Benefits. The primary advantage of pseudolites is that they don’t need
to be launched into orbit. Satellite launches cost millions of dollars, but a pseudolite
can be made operational for roughly $1,000 [4, pg. 9]. Furthermore, pseudolites are
not governed by orbital dynamics and can be placed in any configuration desirable, as
long as there is sufficient structure to support them. Pseudolites are able to provide
positioning indoors where GPS satellite signals cannot be received, and are even used
in subterranean mining operations [4, pg. 125].
Pseudolites do not have to transmit GPS compatible signals. Position solution
accuracy could be improved by increasing the chipping rate for code phase measure-
ments or the carrier frequency for carrier phase solutions. Increasing the frequency by
a factor of ten would allow for carrier phase accuracy at the sub-millimeter level [4, pg.
130].
2.3.3 Limitations. Recalling from Section 2.2.2 that GPS signals are re-
ceived with extremely low power levels, having a pseudolite nearby can overwhelm a
receiver with broadcast power. Cobb’s Near/Far Problem describes a scenario where
a receiver far away from the pseudolite cannot track its signals, but a receiver near
the pseudolite cannot receive signals broadcast by GPS satellites [4, pg. 50]. Be-
tween these near and far boundaries both GPS satellite and pseudolite signals can
be received. Most consumer GPS receivers, designed for the low power of GPS satel-
lites, do not possess the dynamic range needed to receive GPS and pseudolite signals
simultaneously [4, pg. 53].
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There are numerous methods to mitigate the Near/Far Problem. Pseudolite
signals can be transmitted outside of the L1 or L2 frequency bands, or simply offset [4,
pg. 58]. The pseudolite transmission frequency can also hop between different regions
of the L1 or L2 bands. The mitigation technique which can virtually eliminate the
constraints of the Near/Far Problem is to use pulsed pseudolite signals [4, pg. 6]. For
this method, the pseudolite is simply designed to transmit a certain percentage of the
time. According to Cobb, most existing receivers would track both GPS satellite and
pseudolite signals given the proper percentage [4, pg. 62].
One other limitation of pseudolites is geometry. While tropospheric errors aren’t
a concern due to the relatively short distances involved, the need for signals from high
above the horizon is still present. Using exclusively ground based pseudolites, altitude
could not be determined, and an altitude would need to be assumed to determine the
two-dimensional position.
Pseudolite receivers are also susceptible to multipath error. In reflective envi-
ronments, such as the flight deck of an aircraft carrier, the effect of multipath error
on the position solution may be increased, depending on the transmission power and
frequency used.
2.4 Blue Force Tracking
The persistent monitoring system proposed by this research shares many fea-
tures of the U.S. Army’s Blue Force Tracking (BFT) system. BFT uses GPS and
satellite communications to relay the positions of U.S. and coalition forces to each
other as well as command headquarters [45]. Similarly, the persistent monitoring sys-
tem proposed here would provide Flight Deck Control with an accurate measurement
of the state of the flight deck. There are significant differences in scale, communication
range, and accuracy required.
The Army planned to field 40,000 tracking systems by 2008 [45]. Each of these
systems communicate via L-band communication satellites to provide near real-time
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information to commanders anywhere in the world [50]. This presents a significant
use of the military’s available satellite communications capacity. To meet the goals
of BFT, precise GPS measurements are not required; the accuracy provided by pseu-
dorange measurements is sufficient. Additionally, since not all combat operations
take place outdoors, BFT units utilize an inertial measurement system when GPS is
unavailable.
One significant issue with BFT has been the lack of interoperability [45]. Sys-
tems used by ground vehicles and rotary-wing aircraft often can’t communicate [50].
An entirely different project, the Movement Tracking System (MTS), locates sup-
ply and maintenance vehicles and was not compatible with most BFT systems. The
United States Marine Corp (USMC) used the Mobile Data Automated Communica-
tions system and had to install BFT systems during Operation Iraqi Freedom so they
would be visible to coalition command centers [45].
The principle of BFT is “that if you could display your location, your buddies’
locations and, with intelligence, enemy locations, commanders and soldiers could
achieve a level of communication and information integration that would let you fo-
cus on your real jobs - commanding and warfighting.” [49]. Users of the system, from
the Army, USMC, and United Kingdom claim it saved lives and simplified coordina-
tion [45].
2.5 Determining Position and Orientation
The position and orientation of an aircraft relative to a fixed location on the
deck can be determined using two GPS receivers mounted on the wingtips. Since the
aircraft is not flying, its roll and pitch can be ignored and the problem can be treated
as two-dimensional. In Figure 2.7, the position of each receiver on the wingtips is
denoted by (x1, y1) and (x2, y2). The length of the wingspan b applies a constraint to
the receiver positions given by
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Figure 2.7: Determining Position and Orientation: Applicable to an aircraft with
wingtip mounted receivers.
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b2 = (x2 − x1)
2 + (y2 − y1)
2
. (2.9)
Using vector addition, the following relationships can be derived from Figure 2.7
(x1, y1) = (xa, ya) −
b
2
(cosψ, sinψ) (2.10)
and
(x2, y2) = (xa, ya) +
b
2
(cosψ, sinψ) (2.11)
where (xa, ya) is the location of the aircraft’s center and ψ is the aircraft’s heading
measured from the x-axis. Subtracting Equation 2.10 from Equation 2.11 yields
(x2 − x1, y2 − y1) = (b cosψ, b sinψ) . (2.12)
Rearranging Equation 2.12 provides
b sinψ
b cosψn
= tanψ =
y2 − y1
x2 − x1
(2.13)
and
ψ = arctan
(
y2 − y1
x2 − x1
)
. (2.14)
With ψ calculated by Equation 2.14 the center position (xa, ya) can be calculated
by rearranging Equation 2.10 which yields
(xa, ya) = (x1, y1) +
b
2
(cosψ, sinψ) . (2.15)
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2.6 Determining Distance - The Nearest Neighbor Problem
Given coordinate sets (x1, y1, z1) and (x2, y2, z2) describing the location of two
points in three-dimensional Euclidean space relative to some reference frame, the
distance between the points can be calculated by the Euclidean- or two-norm from
r =
√
(x2 − x1)
2 + (y2 − y1)
2 + (z2 − z1)
2
. (2.16)
When determining the distance between two three-dimensional objects, one must first
determine which point(s) describing the object should be used. For objects whose size
is much smaller than the distance between them, it may be desirable to use the center
of mass. For the case where personnel are moving in close proximity to an aircraft,
using the aircraft’s center of mass does not provide a useful solution. A more useful
calculation of distance between personnel and the aircraft requires the determination
of the closest point on the aircraft to the personnel. This is a common problem in
algorithms known as the Nearest Neighbor or Post Office Problem [1]. Figure 2.8
illustrates the concept of the Nearest Neighbor Problem in two dimensions.
To issue warnings to personnel in hazardous situations, it is necessary to know
when personnel are dangerously close to hazardous regions around an aircraft, such as
exhaust plumes, engine intakes, etc. Determining which point describing the outline
of an aircraft to use for the distance measurement creates a challenging problem. A
simple first approach at a solution, best described as a “brute force” approach, is to
calculate the distance to every point using Equation 2.16 and then use the smallest
resulting value as the distance between the personnel and aircraft. This is usable
for aircraft outlines with relatively few points, but as the resolution of the outline
increases, the computing power required for this solution will grow with it.
2.6.1 Nearest Neighbor Computation Time. According to Arya, et al. [1]
the amount of computation time required for the “brute force” approach is on the
order of O(dn) where d is the dimension of the vector representing each point, n is
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Figure 2.8: The Nearest Neighbor Problem: How to find which point on the aircraft
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Figure 2.9: Time to Calculate Euclidean Norm
the number of points to be evaluated, and O(d) is the time required to compute the
distance between two points. To determine O(d) for the MATLABr norm function, a
series of 500 norms were computed for vectors of increasing dimension and the time
to calculate measured and stored. This process was repeated 1,000 times, and the
mean calculation time for each size vector was computed. The results are presented in
Figure 2.93. Listing B.1 on page 151 provides the MATLABr source for this operation.
Fitting a polynomial to the collected data in a least-squares sense provides the
equation for O(d) plotted in Figure 2.9. The nonlinear coefficients of O(d) are ex-
tremely small, so the mean computation time required for a single distance calculation
measured in µs can be approximated by a linear function, given by
O(d) ≃ 0.0047 · d+ 7.5063. (2.17)
This research is primarily concerned with planar and spatial positioning, so only
the two- and three-dimensional nearest neighbor solutions are to be evaluated. From
3Calculations performed on 1.6 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo with 2 GB SDRAM
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Equation 2.17, the mean computation times for the two- and three-dimensional cases
are 7.5157 and 7.5204 µs, respectively. The three-dimensional case represents a 0.06%
increase in computation time. This is a trivial increase, so the use of three-dimensional
models does not incur a significant performance decrease over two-dimensional models.
The number of points used to describe the aircraft can have a significant impact
on the calculation time. For an aircraft model with n points, the time required for the
“brute force” approach is described by O(dn), and while the linear approximation of
Equation 2.17 holds for dn ≤ 500, for two- and three-dimensional models that is only
250 and 166 points, respectively. Given a higher resolution three-dimensional model,
where n = 100, 000, the mean computation time would be significant. Clearly, when
the motion of approximately 100 personnel around 65 aircraft is considered, this may
require extensive computational power.
2.6.2 Nearest Neighbor Algorithms. The Nearest Neighbor problem has
been discussed in computer science literature for decades, with much of the early
work being done by Friedman, et al. in 1975 [12]. Before discussing algorithms in
detail, it is important to describe the terms used and their relation to this research.
Prototypes are the set of points from which the nearest is desired, or in this research
the set of points describing the geometry of an aircraft or hazard. The test point
is the point from which the nearest neighbor distance is to be calculated, or in this
research the personnel on the flight deck.
The work of Friedman, et al. [12] provides an algorithm which projects each
point along one coordinate axis. Each prototype is examined based on its projected
distance, along the sorted coordinate, from the test point. If the distance of a proto-
type from the test point along this axis is greater than the full-dimensional distance
of previously analyzed prototypes, then no more prototypes need be considered.
As an example, consider the two-dimensional case with a test point at the origin
(x, y)tp = (0, 0). The prototypes described by projected points (x, y)p = (−3, 3),
(−1, 0), (0.5, 0.5), (2, 3), and (3, 2) are sorted in order of their x-values. It is possible
58
to start the algorithm with any point, but for this example the second point will be
selected. Computing the distance of the second prototype from the test point using
the Euclidean norm of Equation 2.16 yields a distance of 1. Now any prototypes
for which abs(x) > 1 can be eliminated. This leaves only one other prototype to
consider, (0.5, 0.5). Compute the distance of all remaining prototypes from the test
point and the prototype with the smallest distance value is the nearest neighbor.
Clearly (0.5, 0.5) is the nearest neighbor as its Euclidean distance from the origin is
√
1
2
. The efficiency of this algorithm comes from eliminating, in this example, three
of the five prototypes after only one distance calculation.
The result of tests performed by Friedman, et al. show that in a two-dimensional
case only 20% of the CPU time needed for a “brute force” search is required for 100
prototypes and 4.5% for 1000 prototypes. In the three dimensional case the percent-
ages of the “brute force” times required are 30% and 10%, respectively. Clearly, this
provides significant savings as the resolution of aircraft model geometry increases.
Current research on the Nearest Neighbor problem focuses on high-dimension
searching. Friedman, et al. showed in 1977 that computation times of O(logn) are
achievable, but only for lower dimensions. [1]. Since higher dimensions are not relevant
to this research, well established algorithms for lower dimension nearest neighbor
analysis can be used without sacrificing computational efficiency.
2.7 Path Planning
Path planning refers to the process of using a computer to calculate a path
from one state to another while following specified rules. For a persistent monitoring
system to warn of pending hazards, it would need to be able to predict the path
of aircraft taxiing or being towed on the deck. Path planning is usually presented
in literature as a two-dimensional translational motion problem. As an example, a
vehicle lies on a plane, such as a car in a parking lot, and starts at point (0, 0). It
is desired for the vehicle to go to point (100, 100). The obvious solution is a straight
line, but it is not always possible as there may be obstacles or boundaries the straight
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Figure 2.10: Path Planning Example Scenario
line crosses. For this example, there exists a circular obstacle of radius 10 with its
center at point (50, 50). This scenario is depicted by Figure 2.10.
This section will present an overview of path planning algorithms. A simple
example will be provided and its limitations will be discussed. A more robust and
powerful method, developed by Ross, et al. [29] will also be discussed.
2.7.1 Simple Example. Given the scenario depicted by Figure 2.10, it is
possible to plan a simple path which avoids the obstacle and attains the desired state
(x, y)f = (100, 100). The method presented here is described by Fox, et al. [11]. This
example will illustrate many of the basic principles of path planning as well as the
limitations of linear approaches.
The first step is to generate an initial path. This is simply a line from the start
point to the end point, described by y = mx+ b where m is the slope of the line and
b the y intercept. It is clear that in this simple example m = 1 and b = 0.
Next, the initial path must be checked for collisions with any obstacles. A series
of test points are chosen along the initial path. Starting with the test point nearest
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Figure 2.11: Path Planning Example Scenario: First Collision
the start point, the Euclidean distance, calculated using Equation 2.16, between each
test point and the center of each obstacle is calculated. If the calculated distance for
any point is less than or equal to the radius, then a collision has occurred at that
point. Figure 2.11 shows the first collision detected along the initial path for the
example scenario.
Since a collision was detected the initial path cannot be used and an alternative
must be found. The next step in this simple method is to attempt a navigation of
the object by setting a re-routing point some step distance from the detected collision
point along a line perpendicular to the initial path. For this example, the step distance
is 60% of the obstacle radius. For this, the obstacle size must be known a priori. Then
two straight lines are formed: one which connects the start and re-routing point, and
one which connects the re-routing point and the end point. The latter line must then
be checked for collisions with the obstacle. This is shown in Figure 2.12.
This process is repeated until no more collisions are detected. For this example,
only one more iteration is required using the same step distance. The final path is
shown in Figure 2.13. This algorithm can be extended to operate in three dimensions
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Figure 2.12: Path Planning Example Scenario: Second Collision
and with obstacles other than circles. It will find a path for a sufficiently simple
arrangement of obstacles.
This simple algorithm has many disadvantages and limitations. It requires com-
plete knowledge of the environment, and the environment must be stationary, and yet
this knowledge is not used to its full extent. It also makes no consideration for vehi-
cle dynamics. The step distance can be arbitrarily large or small, and may have no
basis in the capabilities of the vehicle for which the path is being planned. Addition-
ally, the inability of this simple algorithm to find a path which avoids all obstacles is
insufficient to prove a path does not exist.
2.7.2 Proposed Methods. The focus of much path planning research is in the
area of robotics. Areas of focus include wheeled mobile robots [28] and UAVs [56]. The
algorithm illustrated in Section 2.7.1 is used in the Strategic-Tactical-Execution Soft-
ware Control Architecture (STESCA) created by Fox, et al. [11]. Other approaches
utilize probabilistic knowledge of hazardous areas [10] or pick control inputs at ran-
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Figure 2.13: Path Planning Example Scenario: Collisions Avoided
dom [19]. Extensive research has been conducted to determine the optimal, or near-
optimal, path for vehicular travel [26, 56].
One of the best known path planning algorithms, introduced by Stentz in Op-
timal and Efficient Path Planning for Partially-Known Environments [48], is known
as D*. The path generated by D* will have the minimum cost associated with its tra-
verse. This cost can be defined in virtually any manner; travel time, fuel consumption,
and route distance are all valid components of cost.
2.7.3 DIDO. A similar approach to the path planning problem, solving
for the optimal path and the associated controls based upon vehicle dynamics, is
proposed by Ross, et al. [14, 29]. This method allows obstacles to be of arbitrary
size, number, and shape. It approaches the path planning problem as a constrained
nonlinear optimal control problem and solves it using pseudospectral computational
methods [29]. Ross, et al. have developed a MATLABr toolbox, called DIDO, to
determine the optimal path for a given scenario.4
4DIDO is available from http:\\www.elissar.biz.
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DIDO allows for the computation of an optimal state trajectory through an
n-dimensional state space. The states are not limited to location on a Cartesian
plane but can be any parameters used to describe the configuration of a dynamic
system such as angles, quaternions, and energy levels [46]. Given the dynamics of
the states, DIDO minimizes a cost function J (x̄, ū, t) such that hi (x̄) > 0 where x̄,
ū, and t represent the states, inputs, and time, respectively. For the two-dimensional
translational motion problem with states x(t) and y(t), Ross et al. represent an
obstacle by [30]
hi (x (t) , y (t)) = ln
(
∣
∣
∣
∣
(
x (t) − xo
a
)p∣
∣
∣
∣
+
∣
∣
∣
∣
(
y (t) − yo
b
)p∣
∣
∣
∣
)
(2.18)
where xo and yo are the center location of the obstacle, a and b are its width and
height, and p determines its shape. For p = 1, the resulting obstacle is a diamond,
p = 2 yields a circle, and p = ∞ results in a square [30]. Any point outside of the
obstacle areas will have a value of h > 0 [29].
The example problem of Section 2.7.1 can be solved quite easily by DIDO. The
optimal path as computed by DIDO is shown in Figure 2.14. This path was computed
using a set of MATLABr scripts provided in Appendix B. The problem definition file,
Listing B.2 on page 152, sets the constraints on the states as well as the location of the
obstacle. The events file, Listing B.3, sets the initial and final states. Path constraints
are determined by Listing B.4 and the system dynamics are set by Listing B.5. The
cost J to minimize is determined by Listing B.6 on page 157. For this example, the
goal is simply to minimize the final time as given by
J (x̄, ū, t) = tf (2.19)
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Figure 2.14: Path Planning Example Scenario: DIDO Sample
2.8 Articulated Vehicle Kinematics
When an aircraft is being towed, it is essentially a passive trailer of the tow
tractor. Its nose wheel is linked by a tow bar to the rear hitch of the tow tractor. The
system, comprised of the aircraft, tow bar, and tow tractor, is a three-body articulated
vehicle. As this research aims to study path planning for the towed aircraft system it
is vital to develop an expression for its kinematics.
2.8.1 Single-body. When an aircraft is taxiing, the motive force is provided
by engine thrust, and its direction is controlled by the angle of the nose wheel. Simi-
larly, a tow tractor is propelled by the rear axle and its direction of travel is controlled
by the forward wheel turn angle. The kinematics of each of these vehicles can be rep-
resented as a tricycle, with a velocity input applied at the rear axle and a nose wheel
angle input to provide heading control. It is assumed that the wheels roll without
slipping, to provide a non-holonomic constraint. This kinematic representation, de-
picted in Figure 2.15, allows the aircraft’s motion to be analyzed without a need for
the analysis of thrust levels, frictional forces, or inertial properties.
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Figure 2.15: Moving Aircraft Free Body Diagram
The aircraft’s ground kinematics can be represented by the set of first order,
nonlinear differential equations
ẋa = va cosψ
ẏa = va sinψ (2.20)
ψ̇ =
va
la
tanφ
where φ is the steering angle of the nose wheel relative to the heading angle ψ, la is
the aircraft wheel base length, and va is the velocity of the aircraft.
When an aircraft is being towed, the input force is not being applied to the
aircraft’s center, but is instead applied at the nose wheel. This makes the aircraft the
trailing member of an articulated vehicle, much like a trailer being pulled by a truck.
The location of the nose wheel (xw, yw) is calculated by
(xw, yw) = (xa + la cosψ, ya + la sinψ) (2.21)
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and if a velocity vw is applied at the nose wheel, then the resulting aircraft velocity
can be found by
va = vw cosφ. (2.22)
The aircraft kinematics given an input velocity at the nose wheel are given by
ẋa = va cosψ
ẏa = va sinψ (2.23)
ψ̇ =
vw
la
sin φ.
2.8.2 Multi-body. The study of the control of articulated vehicles requires
an understanding of their kinematics. There are numerous areas of research utilizing
articulated vehicle kinematics. Ng et al. propose a vehicle following system utilizing a
virtual trailer link [36]. Bolzern et al. have performed extensive studies of articulated
vehicles with off-axle hitching [3] and n-body articulated vehicles [2] where the inde-
pendent variable is distance traveled. Larsson et al. propose a nonlinear state space
representation of a two-body system (a tractor and one trailer) [27]. The two-body
system is insufficient to represent the towed aircraft system ashore, as a tow bar is
used. Onboard an aircraft carrier, towing is often performed by a tow tractor which
attaches directly to the nose wheel creating a two-body system.
Park et al. propose a kinematic representation of an n-body articulated vehicle
with time as the independent variable [41]. Utilizing and adapting this representation
allows for the development of kinematics to represent the three-body articulated towed
aircraft system as shown in Figure 2.16.
The kinematics of the three-body articulated towed aircraft system can be devel-
oped by combining the single-body kinematics of each component. Given the forward
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Figure 2.16: Three-Body Articulated Towed Aircraft System
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velocity of the tow tractor vc
5 applied at its rear axle and the steering angle of the
front wheels α as the system inputs, the tow tractor’s motion can be described by
ẋc = vc cos β
ẏc = vc sin β (2.24)
β̇ =
vc
lc
tanα
where (xc, yc) gives the location of the tow tractor, β is the heading of the tow tractor
measured from the x-axis, and lc is the length of the tow tractor’s wheel base.
The tow bar, attached to the tow tractor’s rear hitch, is the first passive vehicle
in the three-body articulated towed aircraft system. As this research is concerned with
only simulating the towed aircraft system, for simplification it is assumed that the
tow tractor’s rear hitch is at the center of the rear axle. To attempt dynamic control
of a towed aircraft system, it should be modeled with off-axle hitching which is fairly
straightforward to accomplish [3]. With the tow bar hitched to the tow tractor’s rear
axle, the tow bar’s input velocity vc, and the tow bar steering angle ζ the velocity at
the nose wheel vw is given by
vw = vc cos ζ (2.25)
where vw is aligned with the direction angle of the tow bar θ and the nose wheels are
assumed to rotate or translate without slipping. The tow bar’s kinematics are then
described by
ẋw = vw cos θ
ẏw = vw sin θ (2.26)
θ̇ =
vc
lb
sin ζ.
5The subscript c is utilized to denote cart.
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where θ is the heading of the tow bar measured from the x-axis and lb is the length
of the tow bar. Combining the towed aircraft kinematics of Equation 2.23, the tow
bar kinematics of Equation 2.26, and the tow tractor kinematics of Equation 2.24 it
is straightforward to describe the motion of the three-body articulated towed aircraft
system by
x̄ =
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where x̄ is the state vector, ū is the input vector, and
ζ = β − θ
φ = θ − ψ. (2.28)
It is also desired to implement some physical constraints of the towed aircraft
system. The tow bar can only rotate about the tow tractor’s hitch so far before it
collides with the tow tractor’s structure. Similarly, the structure of the aircraft’s
nose wheel places a constraint on its maximum rotation angle. DIDO is capable of
enforcing bounds on parameters, but it requires that they be represented as states.
The heading of each element of the towed aircraft system should also be able to make
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as many complete revolutions, in either direction, as the path requires. Representing
the headings simply as angles will force DIDO to “unwind” the headings if they are
a full rotation from the goal. To enable this, the headings can be represented by two
states containing the sin and cos of the angle. The nonlinear kinematics are then
given by
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(2.29)
These equations could enable a persistent monitoring system to propagate the
motion of a towed aircraft forward in time based upon the measured locations and
orientations of the vehicles involved. They can also be used with DIDO, providing the
dynamics upon which to plan the optimal path to the desired position on the flight
deck.
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2.9 Aircraft Tow Procedures
Towing aircraft on the flight deck or hangar bay of an aircraft carrier is a care-
fully planned procedure with standardized practices outlined by the CV NATOPS
Instruction (00-80t-120) [6]. This instruction calls for the following minimum person-
nel when towing an aircraft:
1. Director
2. Tractor Driver
3. Plane Captain
4. Two Plane Handlers
5. Two Wing Safeties (when required)
6. Tail Safety (when required)
For a fixed-wing aircraft, such as an FA-18C Hornet, this means that nine
personnel are required to move the aircraft. The Director is responsible for the entire
procedure. The Plane Captain provides braking control for the aircraft. The Plane
Handlers insert the chocks whenever the aircraft is at rest6. The Wing and Tail
Safeties walk in a fixed position relative to the wingtip or tail to ensure that no
collisions occur in that area [6].
The Director is required to maintain visual contact with the Plane Captain at
all times and all personnel are equipped with whistles, which they must hold in their
mouths, to signal each other [6].
6The Plane Handler and Wing Safety roles are typically fulfilled by the same personnel when
ashore.
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III. Data Collection
This chapter describes a series of tests conducted at the Air Force Institute ofTechnology (AFIT) and Naval Air Station (NAS) Oceana designed to determine
if position and velocity measurements provided by the Global Positioning System
(GPS) are capable of supporting a system to monitor the position, orientation, and
velocity of aircraft, equipment, and personnel on the flight deck of a U.S. Navy aircraft
carrier. The equipment used in these tests is also described.
3.1 AFIT Tests
This section describes the tests conducted at AFIT. These tests were performed
to gain experience using the hardware, analyzing the collected data prior to testing
with aircraft, and to provide the data necessary to create and evaluate simulations.
Conducting these tests at AFIT allowed for an estimate of the requirements and risks
associated with the tests, prior to performing them with actual aircraft.
3.1.1 Vehicle Measurements. The first test was designed to determine the
position and orientation of a small vehicle using two GPS receivers. From the recorded
GPS data, the geometry of the vehicle, and the location of each receiver on the vehicle,
the position of the vehicle and its orientation can be calculated.
The goal of this test was to determine the level of precision that can be achieved
in the position and orientation calculations and to observe the effect of measurement
noise of the resulting calculations. Additionally, the software written to analyze the
recorded data can be used again with data recorded at NAS Oceana. Figure 3.1
illustrates the notional setup of this test.
3.1.1.1 Requirements. The following equipment was required for this
test:
1. Golf cart
2. Mobile GPS recorders (quantity: 2)
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Figure 3.1: Notional Setup of AFIT Vehicle Measurements Test
3. Dual-frequency GPS antenna (quantity: 2)
4. Stationary GPS recorder
The GPS recorders were attached to right and left side of the golf cart with
the antennae supported away from the body of the golf cart. The stationary GPS
recorder measured the position of the AFIT Advanced Navigation Technology (ANT)
center roof antenna for differential corrections.
3.1.1.2 Procedure. This test was conducted in two phases. The first
phase, static measurements, tests the accuracy and precision of the recorders’ mea-
surements while at rest. The second phase, dynamic measurements, tests the recorders
while in motion.
For static measurements, the vehicle was kept in a parked position for at least
five minutes. The dynamic phase involved driving the vehicle around the field behind
AFIT at a walking pace in straight lines or smooth curves. The recorded data can
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Figure 3.2: Vehicle and Personnel Simulating Aircraft Movement
be used to analyze the noise in the measurement signal and the ability of software to
predict the path of the vehicle.
3.1.1.3 Expected Results. This test provides results for the accuracy
of the position (eg: ±2 cm) and orientation (eg: ±2 degrees) of the GPS data as well
as its precision (eg: ±1 cm 97% of time). Additionally, it should allow observation of
the effect of multipath error on measurements.
3.1.2 Vehicle and Personnel Movement. This test recorded the movements
of both the vehicle used in Section 3.1.1 and personnel simultaneously. It was de-
signed to simulate the towing of an aircraft with its required personnel, allowing the
development of analysis software prior to conducting the test in Section 3.2.1. Fig-
ure 3.2 illustrates the configuration for this test. Images recorded from the test are
provided in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Photographs from Simulated Aircraft Move at AFIT
3.1.2.1 Requirements. The following equipment was required for this
test:
1. Golf cart
2. Helmet (quantity: 4)
3. Backpack (quantity: 4)
4. Mobile GPS recorder (quantity: 6)
5. Stationary GPS recorder
6. Dual-frequency GPS antenna (quantity: 6)
The golf cart was configured with two mobile GPS recorders as in Section 3.1.1.1.
The backpacks, helmets, and remaining mobile GPS recorders were carried by per-
sonnel wearing the helmets with dual-frequency antenna attached. This test required
four personnel to walk with the vehicle, all volunteers were AFIT students or faculty.
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3.1.2.2 Procedure. For this test the golf cart was driven slowly along a
path behind AFIT. The personnel walked with the cart in an imitation of an aircraft
movement crew, as depicted in Figure 3.2.
3.1.2.3 Expected Results. From the data collected in this simulation,
software was developed which will be used to analyze the data collected at NAS
Oceana, described in Section 3.2.1.
3.2 NAS Oceana Tests
The tests to be performed at NAS Oceana build upon those described in Sec-
tion 3.1. The purpose is to observe the movement of U.S. Naval aircraft and sailors as
they perform tasks similar to those performed on the flight deck of an aircraft carrier.
By observing these tasks, a better understanding of the motion of aircraft, equip-
ment, and personnel on the flight deck can be gained. These tests were conducted
at a shore installation, but the differences in aircraft handling between sea and shore
are minimal.
Collecting data with aircraft presents a greater risk than the simpler tests con-
ducted at AFIT. Even without power being applied to the aircraft, it is vital that
proper flight line procedures be observed for the safety of both the aircraft, SE, and
personnel involved.
The Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP) [5] requires that tools used
on aircraft be accounted for at all times. This is done to prevent Foreign Object
Damage (FOD) from occurring to aircraft or personnel. During these tests, AFIT
property was placed temporarily on and around Naval aircraft and personnel. All
equipment used for this test was therefore inspected before and after each test to
ensure that no parts, such as nuts or bolts, were lost during testing.
3.2.1 Aircraft Towing Observation. This test recorded the position, orienta-
tion, and velocity of an aircraft as it was towed from one spot to another on the NAS
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Oceana flight line as well as the position and velocity of the personnel required for the
towing. This procedure is virtually identical to that performed onboard an aircraft
carrier. Figure 3.4 illustrates the towing procedure to be observed. A photograph of
the test being conducted is presented in Figure 3.5 depicting the antennae mounted
on USN cranials1 and wingtip mounted GPS recorders.
The purpose of this test was to gather data which fully describes the motion of
an aircraft being towed and the personnel around it. This data can then be analyzed
for a better understanding of flight deck operations and used in simulations for hazard
prediction and UAV incorporation.
3.2.1.1 Requirements. The following equipment was required for this
test:
1. Cranial (quantity: 6)
2. Backpack (quantity: 6)
3. Nylon GPS recorder pouch (quantity: 2)
4. Mobile GPS recorders (quantity: 8)
5. Stationary GPS recorder
6. Dual-frequency GPS antenna (quantity: 9)
7. Video camera (quantity: 2)
8. Aircraft (quantity: 1)
9. Tow Tractor and bar
10. Elevated support platform (B-1 stand)
11. Laptop computer
1Cranial is the term used to describe the helmet used in Naval Aviation which contains hearing
and vision protection.
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Figure 3.4: Example Aircraft Tow Plan
Figure 3.5: Photograph of Aircraft Being Towed at NAS Oceana
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Two mobile GPS recorders were affixed on the wingtips of the aircraft using the
nylon pouches made by squadron personnel, depicted in Figure 3.6. This mounting
was designed to be completely non-permanent involving no modification to the aircraft
or metal on metal contact.
The remaining mobile GPS recorders were provided to the tow personnel to
record their movements with cranial mounted antennae and backpacks. The Plane
Captain in the cockpit was not provided with a GPS recorder as their position was
fixed relative to the aircraft during the entire procedure. The Tow Tractor and bar
was used to move the aircraft. A video record of the test was made with a video
camera placed atop the elevated support platform and another was used at ground
level.
The stationary GPS recorder was used to record data for differential correction
in post-processing. It was placed near the flight line atop the elevated support plat-
form. The laptop computer was used to store the recorded data after each portion of
the test.
A sufficient number of trained USN personnel were needed to perform the towing
procedure. NAS Oceana instructions require a minimum of six trained personnel to
tow an aircraft. The squadron’s maintenance department provided a sufficient number
of qualified volunteers to perform the tow procedure.
3.2.1.2 Procedure. After mounting the GPS recorders as described in
Section 3.2.1.1, the aircraft was towed from one spot to another on the flight line,
similar to the tow plan depicted in Figure 3.4. The tow personnel were directed to
park the aircraft multiple times, with both forward and reverse motion. This test
was conducted with two different groups of personnel: one group during the day, the
other at night.
3.2.1.3 Expected Results. The data provided by this test allows a
more thorough understanding of the movement of aircraft, equipment, and personnel
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Figure 3.6: Nylon Pouch Made for Leica Recorder With Antenna Mount: Nylon
webbing with velcro bands was used to lash the recorder to aircraft wingtip pylons.
Pouches were made and provided by sailors of Strike Fighter Squadron Three Four -
The Blue Blasters.
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Figure 3.7: GPS Receiver Placement and Desired Motion of Wingfold Test
involved in Naval Aviation. By analyzing this data, it should be possible to develop
a system to predict the motion of aircraft under tow and the personnel involved.
3.2.2 Wingfold Detection. At the conclusion of the evening aircraft tow,
the personnel were directed to fold and unfold the wings. This allowed the mounted
recorders to observe the motion of an aircraft’s wingtips as they fold and unfold.
Folding the wings of an aircraft leads to a reduced footprint on the deck of an aircraft
carrier, but if they unfold inadvertently they can damage nearby aircraft. The goal of
this test was to collect data on the folding and unfolding of wings so that an algorithm
can be developed to detect this motion. Figure 3.7 illustrates the placement of GPS
recorders and wingfold process of an FA-18C Hornet.
3.2.2.1 Requirements. The following equipment was required for this
test:
1. Cranial (quantity: 6)
2. Backpack (quantity: 6)
3. Nylon GPS recorder pouch (quantity: 2)
4. Mobile GPS recorders (quantity: 8)
5. Stationary GPS recorder
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6. Dual-frequency GPS antenna (quantity: 9)
7. Video camera
8. Aircraft (quantity: 1)
9. Speed Handles (quantity: 2)
10. Laptop computer
Two mobile GPS recorders were affixed to the wingtip of an aircraft in the
same manner described in Section 3.2.1.1. The stationary GPS recorder was used for
differential correction. The laptop computer was used to record the data from the
receivers. A visual record of the test was made with the video camera. Speed handles
were used to manually fold and unfold the wings.
3.2.2.2 Procedure. This test was started with the wings in the unfolded
position at the conclusion of the evening aircraft tow procedure. Personnel on either
side of the aircraft were directed to use the speed handles to fold and then unfold the
wings. Following the test, the GPS recorders were removed from the wingtips, and
the aircraft was returned to its normal parking configuration.
3.2.2.3 Expected Results. Analysis of the data collected in this test
helps in the development of an algorithm to detect a change in the wingfold status of
an aircraft.
3.2.3 Personnel Tracking Near Aircraft. During flight operations on an
aircraft carrier, it is routine for authorized personnel to approach a powered aircraft
quickly and remain in close proximity. This test explores the ability of GPS position
data to monitor such motion of personnel. The motion of personnel near an aircraft
and the hazardous areas near it is depicted by Figure 3.8. The preparations made to
tow an aircraft provide many opportunities to record the motion of personnel near
the aircraft.
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Figure 3.8: Tracking Personnel Near an Aircraft
3.2.3.1 Requirements. The following equipment was required for this
test:
1. Cranial (quantity: 6)
2. Backpack (quantity: 6)
3. Nylon GPS recorder pouch (quantity: 2)
4. Mobile GPS recorders (quantity: 8)
5. Stationary GPS recorder
6. Dual-frequency GPS antenna (quantity: 9)
7. Video camera (quantity: 2)
8. Aircraft (quantity: 1)
9. Tow cart and bar
10. Elevated support platform (B-1 stand)
11. Laptop computer
Six mobile GPS recorders were carried by personnel, as in Section 3.1.2, who
were involved in the aircraft tow procedure. Two mobile GPS recorders were affixed
to the aircraft wingtips. A stationary GPS recorder was used to collect data for
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differential correction. The video camera was used to create a visual record of the
test. The computer was used to collect data from the GPS receivers.
3.2.3.2 Procedure. Throughout the test described in Section 3.2.1,
it was often necessary for the personnel involved to approach the aircraft closely.
The recorded data in these situations allows the simulation of maintenance personnel
approaching hazard areas, such as the engine intake and exhaust.
3.2.3.3 Expected Results. As maintenance personnel often get very
near aircraft, even crawl underneath them, during pre-launch procedures it is expected
that the accuracy of the GPS solution will degrade significantly due to the effect of
multipath and other factors. At times, the GPS receivers may even lose lock and be
unable to compute a solution.
The final result of this test demonstrates the ability of small GPS receivers to
track the motion of personnel near aircraft on the flight deck of an aircraft carrier.
The algorithms developed from data collected in the test described by Section 3.1
should be able to determine if personnel enter the simulated engine “hazard” areas.
3.3 Equipment
This section describes the GPS equipment used during the tests of Sections 3.1
and 3.2.
3.3.1 Custom GPS Recorders. Two of the GPS recorders provided by the
ANT center, referred to as the Custom GPS Recorders, are comprised of a NovAtel
OEMV-3 card, a Gumstix computer, and a 12V lithium-polymer battery. They are
contained within an aluminum enclosure with power switch, status indicator light,
Ethernet port, and antenna jack as depicted in Figure 3.9.
The system is wired so that the NovAtel OEMV-3 and Gumstix computer are
both started when the switch is turned to the on position. The OEMV-3 takes
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Figure 3.9: Diagram of Custom GPS Recorder
Figure 3.10: NovAtel OEMV-3
approximately five seconds to begin transmitting messages, while the computer takes
approximately 30 seconds to boot and run the logging software.
3.3.1.1 NovAtel OEMV-3. The NovAtel OEMV-3, depicted in Fig-
ure 3.10 [39, pg. 28] is a triple frequency GPS receiver capable of computing code and
carrier phase solutions as well as processing differential GPS error corrections. It can
utilize GPS signals broadcast on L1, L2, and the upcoming L5 as well as the Russian
GLONASS L1 and L2 signals. For these tests, it was configured to track only GPS
L1 and L2. It is capable of tracking 14 GPS satellites simultaneously. [39, p. 27].
For this research, the NovAtel OEMV-3 is configured to transmit satellite rang-
ing (RANGECMPA) and ephemeris (RAWEPHEMA) data as well as its best position
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Table 3.1: NovAtel ASCII Message Header Format
Field Name Description
1 Sync “#” symbol starts every message.
2 Message Type of message. For this
research only RANGECMPA,
RAWEPHEMA, or BESTPOSA.
3 Port Communications port transmit-
ted on. For this research only
COM2.
4 Sequence Number Used for multiple related logs.
Normally 0.
5 Percent Idle Time Minimum percent of time proces-
sor is idle between successive logs.
6 GPS Time Status Indicates the quality of GPS time
solution.
7 Week GPS Week Number.
8 Seconds Seconds since start of GPS week.
9 Receiver Status Eight digit hexadecimal number
reporting status of hardware/-
software components.
10 Reserved Not described by NovAtel.
11 Version Receiver software build number.
12 ; Semi-colon describes end of mes-
sage header.
solution (BESTPOSA) to its second serial communications port (COM2). This infor-
mation is transmitted in an ASCII message, and is therefore directly human readable.
Each of the messages is transmitted with a header using the format described in Ta-
ble 3.1 [38, pg. 22].
Following the message header, the RANGECMPA, RAWEPHEMA, and BEST-
POSA message each contain different information. RANGECMPA contains hexadec-
imal information on the calculated range to each satellite, on each frequency the
receiver has acquired. RAWEPHEMA is an ephemeris message for each satellite the
receiver has acquired. BESTPOSA is the best possible position the receiver can cal-
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Figure 3.11: Onboard Computer, Exploded View
culate from available data. RANGECMPA is transmitted at 5 Hz, BESTPOSA at 1
Hz, while RAWEPHEMA is transmitted every five minutes.
A description of the contents of each navigation message is provided by the
OEMV Family Firmware Reference Manual [38, pgs. 250, 401, 408].
3.3.1.2 Onboard Computer. The onboard computer runs an embed-
ded version of the Linux operating system. It executes the program provided in
Listing B.14 on page 178 to record the data transmitted by the NovAtel receiver on
COM2 to a file located on a removable MultiMediaCard (MMC) flash chip.
The motherboard is a Gumstix “Connex” series with a Marvellr PXA-255 400
MHz processor, 64 MB of RAM, and onboard Flash storage of 16 MB for the operating
system. It is configured with two daughterboards: a “breakout-gs” for serial commu-
nications and a “netMMC” for Ethernet and MMC connections. Figure 3.11 provides
an exploded view of the Gumstix computer and its daughterboard with Ethernet and
MMC connections [17].
It is possible to communicate with the onboard computer over its serial port
or its Ethernet port. When connecting over Ethernet, the computer is configured to
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announce which remote connection services are running using the Network Zerconf
Protocol2 software. Conveniently, this means a computer connected to it can tell if its
remote connection processes are running. The Secure Shell3 allows for both a remote
terminal connection and copying of files over the network.
The computer is configured to boot the Linuxr OpenEmbedded operating sys-
tem from its onboard Flash storage. The startup scripts of the operating system have
been configured to execute the logging program of Listing B.14 at the conclusion of
the boot sequence.
The logging program runs from and only manipulates files on the MMC storage.
It first determines which run number it is on to create sequential file names for the
recorded data. It reads this data from run file.txt, and each receiver is configured to
start at a different number (1000, 2000).
3.3.2 Leica GX1210. The ANT center also provided six Leica GX1210 GPS
receivers. The default GX1210 is only capable of single frequency (L1) measurements,
but the six units owned by the AFIT ANT center have been upgraded to support dual
frequency (L1 and L2) measurements. They have 14 channels for each frequency.
There are two RX1200 controllers which attach to the GX1210 and provide a
touch-screen graphical user interface. Figure 3.12 shows a GX1210 with an attached
RX1200.
Measurements are stored to an internal 2 GB CompactFlash card. Technical
specifications claim 20 mm accuracy when differential corrections are applied in post-
processing. They are powered by up to two rechargeable Lithium Ion batteries (4.2
Ah / 7.4 V). One battery powers the receiver for approximately 30 hours.
2http://avahi.org
3http://openssh.com
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Figure 3.12: Leica GX1210 With RX1200 Interface
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3.3.3 Antennae. Three different models of antenna were used during test-
ing at AFIT and NAS Oceana. Every antenna used was capable of dual-frequency
reception. During the NAS Oceana tests personnel were equipped with one of two
antennae: the ANT-A72GA-TW-N or the ANT-35C2GA-NW, both distributed by
NovAtel and manufactured by Antcom. The primary difference is the connector: the
former using a TNC connector and the latter a N-connector. The Leica recorders
mounted on the aircraft wingtips were equipped with a Leica AX1202 GG antenna,
also using a TNC connector.
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IV. Results
This chapter describes the results of the tests conducted in Chapter III. TheAFIT tests were designed to demonstrate the capacity of mobile GPS recorders
mounted at fixed distances to allow the position and heading of a moving vehicle
to be calculated. Algorithms used to calculate the results are also explained in this
chapter. The NAS Oceana tests provide highly accurate measurements of procedures
very similar to those performed aboard U.S. Navy aircraft carriers. Results from the
tests at NAS Oceana include aircraft tow velocities (translational and rotational) as
well as the distance personnel maintain from the aircraft.
4.1 AFIT Test Results
This section provides the results of preliminary testing conducted at AFIT. The
performance differences between the Custom and Leica GPS recorders are discussed.
4.1.1 Test Vehicle Antenna Distance. With two GPS antennae mounted on
a rigid aluminum bar on the test vehicle, as described in Section 3.1.1 on page 73,
the first data collected was analyzed to determine the accuracy and precision of the
measurements. As an initial test, the two Custom GPS recorders were attached to
the test vehicle antennae. Figure 4.1 shows the distance between the antennae, made
using the BESTPOSA solution, for both static and kinematic regimes, provided by
the Custom GPS Recorders, described in Section 3.3.1 on page 85. The BESTPOSA
solution, referred to as a Single Point Solution (SPS), is calculated solely by the
receiver and does not include any differential corrections, so ephemeris and tropo-
spheric errors should be present. Additionally, without a base station present only
code phase measurements can be computed. The measured distance (using a tape
measure) between the antennae phase centers was 0.464 m.
When a third receiver was made available, the same two receivers were mounted
to the test vehicle but a stationary receiver was used to collect data for differential
correction. From this point forward the data collected in all tests has differential
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Figure 4.1: Custom GPS Fixed Antenna Distance - SPS
corrections applied. Figure 4.2 shows the antenna distance with differential corrections
applied by the NovAtel Waypoint GrafNavTM [40]1 software in post-processing.
There is a large region of accurate distance measurement in Figure 4.2, made
when the test vehicle was stationary. From this information, it is clear that once the
test vehicle began its motion the accuracy of the solution for the position of each
custom GPS receiver was no longer reliable. Table 4.1 provides the error statistics,
including the max, mean, and standard deviation, for each portion of the tests con-
ducted at AFIT.
There are many possible explanations for the high levels of measurement error in
Figure 4.2. The first place to look is the number of satellites used for the solution and
the quality of the satellite geometry, or DOP, represented numerically as D. These
are presented in Table 4.2, and are well within the range of values expected for a good
solution. Multipath is the next most likely cause as the worst variations occur when
the test vehicle is near the AFIT building or driving through the AFIT parking lot,
1The NovAtel Waypoint GravNavTM software is hereafter referred to simply as Waypoint.
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Figure 4.2: Custom GPS Fixed Antenna Distance - CDGPS
both being highly reflective areas. This is an unlikely cause as multipath error should
be fairly random, and in a video playback of the recorded data the measurement
errors are consistently in the direction of motion. Another possibility considered was
that the NovAtel OEMV receivers were changing which satellites were used in the
solution during the kinematic phase, a common practice for receivers with a small
number of channels. This possibility was discarded as the OEMV has 14 channels
on each frequency which is more than sufficient for the number of available satellites.
Additionally, the determination of which satellites to use in the solution is performed
by Waypoint during post-processing, which should eliminate discontinuities.
Another possibility, inherent to the receiver construction and not the calcula-
tion of the solution, is a constraint in available bandwidth in the system bus linking
the MMC card and the serial port. While the serial port was capable of handling
RANGECMPA message at 5 Hz, BESTPOSA messages at 1 Hz, the bursting of
RAWEPHEMA every five minutes may have overloaded the bus and caused ephemeris
messages to be lost. This does not appear to be the case, as valid solutions are ob-
tained with multiple satellites as depicted in Table 4.2, but it should be left open as
a possibility.
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Table 4.1: AFIT Antenna Distance Measurement Statistics
Date Regime Device emax (m) ē (m) σe (m)
21-Oct-2008 All Custom 2.5184 0.2877 0.3096
22-Oct-2008 Static Custom 0.0159 0.0068 0.0024
22-Oct-2008 Kinematic Custom 12.0174 0.3941 0.8969
23-Oct-2008 Static Leica 0.0467 0.0134 0.0102
23-Oct-2008 Kinematic Leica 0.0763 0.0098 0.0104
Table 4.2: AFIT Antenna Distance Satellite Statistics
Date Regime Device Dmax D̄ kmax k̄
22-Oct-2008 Static Custom 1.7300 1.3759 11 9.7926
22-Oct-2008 Kinematic Custom 2.1900 1.3557 9 8.9045
23-Oct-2008 Static Leica 6.0300 3.5071 8 6.8342
23-Oct-2008 Kinematic Leica 6.3100 2.7097 9 7.5575
The results from the Leica recorders are depicted in Figure 4.3 with the error
statistics in Table 4.1. There is much less disparity between the static and kinematic
solutions using the Leica recorders. With the low error measurements, it was decided
to use Leica recorders for the aircraft wingtips in the NAS Oceana tests.
The results of the tests using the Custom GPS recorders were disturbing. The
high level of inaccuracy when corrected using Waypoint made their measurements
almost useless. It was decided, as a total of eight mobile GPS recorders were necessary
to record all personnel involved in towing an aircraft at NAS Oceana, that they would
be provided to those personnel whose distance relative to the aircraft varies the most
during the procedure.
The relative accuracy of the Leica receivers also merits some discussion. There
are many possible explanations, but among the most likely are multipath rejection and
data message format. The Leica recorders, being commercial products designed for
surveying, likely include advanced multipath rejection algorithms which reduce (but
not eliminate) the effect of multipath on its measurements. Given the high demand for
precision in the surveying industry and the high cost of these receivers, it is difficult
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Figure 4.3: Leica Fixed Antenna Distance - CDGPS
to imagine multipath rejection is not incorporated. Another possible explanation is
the use of a binary message format, alleviating the bandwidth concerns. The ASCII
message used by the NovAtel receivers is a relatively inefficient method of transmitting
the measurement data.
4.1.2 Test Vehicle Heading. The heading of the test vehicle is calculated
using the equations derived in Section 2.5 on page 52. The MATLABr script created to
perform this calculation is provided as Listing B.7 in Appendix B on page 158. The
MATLABr command atan2 is used to provide quadrant resolution when determining
the heading.
Considering the inaccuracy of the position measurements from the Custom GPS
recorders, it was expected that the heading calculation would contain significant levels
of noise, making it unusable for proper attitude determination. As seen in Figure 4.4,
the actual heading is virtually impossible to determine at any given time due to
the rapid fluctuations. When the same calculations are performed using the Leica
recorders the results contain significantly less noise. This allows the heading at any
given moment to be accurately measured. In fact, using the Leica recorders allows
the turns taken by the test vehicle to be clearly identified.
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Figure 4.4: AFIT Test Vehicle Heading
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4.2 NAS Oceana Test Results
This section describes the results of the tests conducted at NAS Oceana, VA.
Topics include the measurement of aircraft wingspan b, calculation of position (xa, ya)
and heading ψ, and the path along which the aircraft was towed.
4.2.1 Aircraft Wingspan. The two Leica recorders mounted on the wingtips
provide an excellent indicator of the accuracy and precision of the GPS solution.
The recorders were strapped to the inboard side of the wingtip missile pylons using
the nylon pouches made by squadron personnel depicted in Figure 3.6 on page 81.
The distance between these pylons is fixed when the wings are spread, so the only
variation should result from the placement of the recorders along the length of the
pylon. According to Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, the wingspan of an FA-18C
Hornet is b = 11.43 m [23].
Figure 4.5 shows the wingspan measurements taken during the morning and
evening tow procedures. Of note is the increased noise level in the latter phase of the
evening test. In this portion, the wingspan measurement varies about the actual, but
does approach it. The difference in distance measurements may also be attributable
to the location of the phase center of the antennae.
The morning and evening wingspan error statistics are provided in Table 4.3.
There are many factors which may explain the increased error during the evening
portion, but the most likely explanation is increased multipath due to the increased
number of aircraft on the flight line. During the day portion, there were approximately
four total aircraft on the area of flight line used. Twice that number were present
during the evening portion.
4.2.2 Aircraft Heading and Heading Rate. The heading of the aircraft ψ
is determined by the same algorithm as the AFIT test vehicle, with the MATLABr
script provided in Listing B.7 on page 158. To determine the heading rate, it was
necessary to numerically differentiate the calculated heading data, a process which
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Figure 4.5: NAS Oceana Aircraft Wingspan Measurements
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Table 4.3: NAS Oceana Aircraft Wingspan Measurement Statistics
Time emax (m) ē (m) σe (m)
Morning 0.1842 0.0535 0.0140
Evening 0.9808 0.1333 0.1727
often introduces noise into measurements. The diff command, included with MATLABr
was used for the heading rate calculation and the resulting array was padded with
a leading zero to maintain array length. Since the aircraft was initially at rest this
leading zero does not affect the results.
One potentially useful element of information that can be derived from the
observation of an aircraft tow procedure is the maximum turn rate used. This can
be used to provide a motion planning algorithm with more realistic estimates of the
vehicle capabilities. The maximum turn rate is a function of the nose wheel angle
and the maximum tow cart velocity. While the maximum turn rate used in these
tests ashore may not be the maximum capable, it should be on the same order of
magnitude. The heading and heading rate of the tow procedure conducted at NAS
Oceana are provided in Figure 4.6.
By calculating the heading rate of an aircraft, it would be possible to predict
the change of hazard areas with time. As an example, the motion of the area behind
a taxiing aircraft containing hazardous exhaust can be predicted. If the hazard area
will intersect a sailor within a short time horizon, a warning could be issued to the
sailor and pilot.
4.2.3 Aircraft Position and Velocity. Analyzing the route taken with the
towed aircraft allows for analysis of safe distances between aircraft (ashore) and route
preferences. Figure 4.7 shows the path taken for both morning and evening tow
procedures. It is clear from this data that there are set routes between the rows of
aircraft parking spaces, and that during this test two of them were used. There were
in fact painted taxiway markings on the flight line which were used between rows of
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Figure 4.6: NAS Oceana Towed Aircraft Heading and Heading Rate
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Table 4.4: NAS Oceana Aircraft Motion Statistics
Time ψ̇max (deg/s)
¯̇
ψ (deg/s) va,max (m/s) v̄a (m/s)
Morning 8.1480 0.7015 0.5117 0.1338
Evening 8.5982 0.2999 0.5929 0.1146
Table 4.5: NAS Oceana Personnel Roles
Personnel Equipment Morning Role Evening Role
p1 Leica Director Tail Safety
p2 Leica Wing Safety Wing Safety
p3 Leica Tail Safety Wing Safety
p4 NovAtel Tractor Driver Tractor Driver
p5 NovAtel Supervisor Director
aircraft. The location of parked aircraft is an estimate based upon visual observations
of the aircraft present.
The velocity of the towed aircraft va, calculated by numerical differentiation of
the position data, is provided in Figure 4.8. Aircraft motion statistics are presented
in Table 4.4. Note that the heading rate statistics presented for the evening tow
procedure are only for the first 600 s. Following that period the increased position
error causes rapid variations in the heading rate.
4.2.4 Personnel Position. The accuracy of the measurements taken presents
an opportunity to analyze the behavior of trained personnel performing a routine
procedure. The distance pn maintained by the n
th personnel from the towed aircraft,
in the nearest neighbor sense, is presented as Figure 4.9. This calculation is performed
by the script provided in Listing B.8 on page 159. The role fulfilled by each person
during the move, discussed in Section 2.9 is presented in Table 4.5. The Supervisor
role listed for p5 in the morning is an additional role required by the squadron when
the Director is below the rank of E-6.
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Figure 4.7: NAS Oceana Aircraft Tow Route: Locations of parked aircraft are
estimates.
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Figure 4.8: NAS Oceana Aircraft Tow Velocity
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Table 4.6: NAS Oceana Personnel Distance Statistics
Time Type p1 (m) p2 (m) p3 (m) p4 (m) p5 (m)
Morning Max 27.0057 4.5079 8.2550 26.5641 16.9151
Mean 7.3512 2.3953 4.2892 2.8061 7.2944
Evening Max 5.9548 3.7441 4.0742 7.9871 30.4477
Mean 3.8124 1.8905 2.5317 2.3566 6.4603
While six personnel were equipped with receivers during both the morning and
evening tow procedures, one of the Leica recorders failed to record its measurements.
This recorder had been provided to the starboard wing safety for the morning pro-
cedure, so there are no measurements available for this position. This failure was
noticed following the morning procedure and the device was reconfigured in hopes
of providing functionality for the evening procedure. In anticipation of a repeated
failure, the malfunctioning recorder was provided to a trainee acting as a secondary
in the wing safety role. The reconfiguration was unsuccessful and no evening data
was recorded by the malfunctioning device either.
It is also useful to observe the position of personnel involved relative to the
aircraft. Many of the mishaps discussed in Chapter I involve personnel being injured
by contact with aircraft landing gear or standing in a jet exhaust area. Figures 4.10
through 4.16 show the relative position for each phase of the morning tow procedure.
During this procedure, there were three phases where no motion of the aircraft oc-
curred. Figure 4.10 shows the motions of personnel preparing the aircraft to be towed
while Figures 4.12 and 4.14 show periods where the Director was consulting with the
Supervisor on the best course to take. The relative positions for the evening tow
procedure are provided in Figures 4.17 through 4.20.
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Figure 4.9: NAS Oceana Personnel Distance
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Figure 4.10: Relative Personnel Position - Morning - Setup
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Figure 4.11: Relative Personnel Position - Morning - First Move
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Figure 4.12: Relative Personnel Position - Morning - Preparing to Reverse
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Figure 4.13: Relative Personnel Position - Morning - Reversing
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Figure 4.14: Relative Personnel Position - Morning - Deliberating
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Figure 4.15: Relative Personnel Position - Morning - Moving Forward
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Figure 4.16: Relative Personnel Position - Morning - Reverse Parking
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Figure 4.17: Relative Personnel Position - Evening - Setup
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Figure 4.18: Relative Personnel Position - Evening - First Move
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Figure 4.19: Relative Personnel Position - Evening - Deliberating
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Figure 4.20: Relative Personnel Position - Evening - Second Move
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Figure 4.21: Relative Personnel Position - Wing and Tail Safeties
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It is also possible to examine the relative position of both the Wing and Tail
Safeties throughout all the movement phases. The position of the Tractor Driver is
excluded as, during motion, they never leave the cart and the relative inaccuracy
present in the NovAtel measurements would cause too many errors in a similar anal-
ysis. The Director is excluded as only one individual fulfilling that role was measured
with a Leica recorder and as seen in Figures 4.10 through 4.20 their position can vary
greatly. The Supervisor is excluded as the position is not required onboard a U.S.
Navy aircraft carrier.
Figure 4.21 provides the relative location of the Wing and Tail Safeties through-
out all movement phases, both morning and evening. The data shows the aggregate
positions of five personnel, three as Wing Safety and two as Tail Safety. Using this
data it was straightforward to create bounding boxes as shown. With further study,
these bounding boxes could be treated as required positions for personnel towing an
aircraft. Bounding boxes for the Director and Tractor Driver could be created with
more data on their positions during an aircraft tow procedure. If a sailor leaves the
bounding box while the aircraft is in motion, the Director could be alerted.
4.2.5 Measurement Quality. The measurement quality statistics for both
the morning and evening phases are presented as Table 4.7. The mean DOP D̄ is
fairly consistent across the devices during each phase. This is to be expected as
the satellite geometry shouldn’t have changed dramatically during each phase, but
may have between the phases. The high maximum DOP Dmax seen for some devices
corresponds to the personnel traveling underneath the aircraft’s wings.
4.2.6 Aircraft Wingfold. Following the conclusion of the evening tow proce-
dure, the personnel involved manually folded the wings of the aircraft. The wingspan
calculated from the recorder positions during this period are presented in Figure 4.22.
It is difficult, due to the noise in this data, to pick out the exact moment when the
wingfold procedure started. While it is possible to get a better approximation of the
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Table 4.7: NAS Oceana Measurement Quality Statistics
Device Time Dmin Dmax D̄ σD kmin kmax k̄ σk
Left Morning 1.72 2.90 2.33 0.37 6 7 6.54 0.50
Right Morning 1.72 2.90 2.35 0.37 6 7 6.52 0.50
p1 Morning 1.77 7.28 2.45 0.54 4 7 6.48 0.56
p2 Morning 1.43 2.90 2.22 0.32 6 8 6.74 0.45
p3 Morning 1.30 8.06 2.45 0.78 4 8 6.49 0.57
p4 Morning 1.77 10.95 2.79 0.92 4 7 6.44 0.60
p5 Morning 1.77 7.17 2.86 0.66 6 7 6.51 0.50
Left Evening 1.78 6.07 3.64 1.46 5 8 6.47 0.79
Right Evening 1.47 3.81 2.81 0.93 5 8 6.24 0.95
p1 Evening 1.46 13.08 2.95 1.61 4 9 6.24 1.29
p2 Evening 1.62 9.82 3.02 1.44 4 9 6.47 1.05
p3 Evening 1.46 10.98 3.03 1.38 4 9 6.53 1.09
p4 Evening 1.40 9.69 3.55 1.51 4 9 6.31 1.02
p5 Evening 1.40 9.98 3.93 1.78 4 9 6.04 0.96
Table 4.8: Wingfold Measurement Quality Statistics
Location Dmin Dmax D̄ σD kmin kmin k̄ σk
Left 4.11 11.99 5.46 1.27 4 6 5.37 0.56
Right 3.70 13.32 4.42 0.89 4 7 5.22 0.70
time from personnel positions, this is of little use as the wingfolds this research is
concerned with are not performed manually.
Table 4.8 provides the measurement quality statistics for the wingfold proce-
dure. The mean DOP D̄ is significantly higher during this procedure than during the
movement phases. This is likely due to the antenna direction as the wings are folded.
With the wings fully folded, the antennae pointed towards the center of the aircraft
rather than towards the sky.
4.2.7 Path Planning. In order for a persistent monitoring system to provide
early warnings of hazardous situations, it must be capable of predicting the path of
objects on the flight deck. If DIDO, the path planning software discussed in Sec-
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Figure 4.22: Wingfold Wingspan Measurements
tion 2.7.3 on page 63, is provided a cost function J (x̄, ū, t) which, when minimized,
simulates the objectives of the personnel involved in the towing procedure, then DIDO
should predict a path similar to the one taken. In the simulation, only forward motion
of the aircraft was allowed for simplification, however, this constraint could easily be
removed. The desired path, taken from the first portion of the evening phase, is shown
in Figure 4.23 and contains only forward motion. It is the first half of the movement
shown in Figure 4.7 but with the coordinate axes rotated so that the rows of parked
aircraft are aligned with the figure’s x-axis.
The procedures for towing aircraft are designed to minimize the risk to aircraft
and personnel. The decisions made by the personnel performing the tow procedure
should also be to minimize risk. From the path shown in Figure 4.23, it was observed
that straight paths are desired over long curves. This is likely due to greater risk of
collision with other aircraft or personnel during turns. The motion of the aircraft, two
articulated linkages behind the trailer, is more difficult for the Director and Tractor
Driver to predict while the system is turning. It is also more challenging for the Wing
and Tail Safeties to walk in a curve, rather than a straight line. So the tow tractor
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Figure 4.23: Path Planning: Desired Path
steering angle as a function of time α(t) should be minimized. A cost function which
simulates this desire for straight paths is given by
J (x̄, ū, t) =
∫
|α(t)| dt. (4.1)
Other parameters could be used in the cost function as well. Minimizing ζ and φ
may provide even closer results. Using DIDO to find a path and minimizing this cost
provides the path shown in Figure 4.24. This path was generated by the MATLABr
scripts provided as Listings B.9 through B.13 on pages 160-177. The scripts used
for this problem were based on work by Hurni, et al. [20–22]. Over 30 minutes of
computation time was required to solve for the optimal path. While the paths do
not match exactly, this system can be used to warn personnel of potential mishaps
outside their field of view.
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Figure 4.24: Path Planning: Predicted Path
4.3 Summary
The ability of a radio-navigation based positioning system to measure the state
of the flight deck has been demonstrated using precision GPS recorders. The errors
observed in the measurements taken at NAS Oceana are consistent with expected GPS
errors. The position errors on the wingtips observed in the evening portion caused
measurement noise in the heading of the vehicle. Having observed the consistency
of personnel positions relative to the aircraft it is straightforward to envision how a
persistent monitoring system could recognize a potential mishap involving personnel.
The optimal path planning results, which closely match the actual path taken, could
enable a persistent monitoring system to recognize mishaps further ahead in time
than distance measurements alone.
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V. Conclusions
The subject of this research was the feasibility of a persistent monitoring systemoriginally discussed in Section 1.3. Such a system would continually monitor
the position and orientation of all aircraft and support equipment, the position of
all personnel on the flight deck, and the state of critical flight deck systems such
as the up/down status of the jet blast deflectors. Such a system would provide this
information in a format easily understandable by decision makers, such as the Aircraft
Handling Officer, so that they can improve the safety and overall efficiency of flight
deck operations. The system should also autonomously notify personnel if they are
approaching a hazardous area or situation. The goal of such a system is a more
efficient flight deck which can
1. reduce the occurrence of flight deck mishaps and
2. provide accurate recordings of flight deck operations for analysis.
This chapter presents an overview of the research performed, how the knowledge
gained can be applied to the development of a persistent monitoring system, and
recommendations for future work in this area.
5.1 Overview
Chapter I provided a detailed analysis of the aviation mishap records provided
by the Naval Safety Center. This study showed that Interest Mishaps, those which are
potentially preventable by a persistent monitoring system, account for $92,486,469, or
5.55% of the cost of all recorded mishaps in the data provided. These Interest Mishaps
were categorized by cause and four successive levels of monitoring were proposed to
help mitigate their occurrence.
Prior research towards improving flight deck operations was explored in Chap-
ter II as well as related topics such as GPS, pseudolite positioning, and Blue Force
Tracking. Algorithms necessary to implement a persistent monitoring system were dis-
cussed including position and orientation determination as well as the nearest neighbor
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problem. Multiple path planning methods were presented with the goal of predicting
the trajectory of a towed or taxiing aircraft.
The data collected for this research, discussed in Chapter III, involved mea-
suring the position and orientation of a towed aircraft as well as the position of the
personnel required for the procedure. Preliminary tests were conducted at AFIT to
ensure the proper operation of the GPS recorders and their ability to provide precision
measurements.
An analysis of the data collected, presented in Chapter IV, demonstrated the
ability of precision GPS recorders to measure the position and orientation of an air-
craft, both stationary and in motion, as well as the positions of personnel around it.
Significant error was observed in the evening tests, most likely caused by multipath.
The path planning software DIDO was used to find an optimal trajectory for the
towed aircraft system based upon the measured data.
From the results of this research, some overall conclusions can be made about
the feasibility of a persistent monitoring system:
1. Due to a number of factors, such as the high multipath error observed, the
high cost of dual frequency GPS receivers, the need for indoor functionality,
and the risks involved in relying on satellite transmissions, the measurement
system should not exclusively rely on GPS for the highly accurate measurements
required.
2. Substantial computing power is required to predict the path of a towed aircraft
and process state information from potentially hundreds of positioning devices.
The ability to closely match the actual path could significantly improve the
system’s ability to recognize potential mishaps.
5.2 Preventing Mishaps
With the knowledge and experience gained from the tests at NAS Oceana de-
scribed in Chapter III, it is possible to discuss how a persistent monitoring system
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Barricade Stanchion
(a) Precise Measurement: The barricade stan-
chion will impact the aircraft when raised.
Barricade Stanchion
(b) Imprecise Measurement: It is unknown if
the barricade stanchion will impact the aircraft
when raised.
Figure 5.1: Recognizing Spotting Mishaps
could be designed in order to prevent mishaps. Recalling the primary mishap classifi-
cations of Section 1.2.2, this section provides an example for each classification. Each
example is taken from the narratives of Table 1.4 on page 12.
5.2.1 Spotting Mishaps. An extremely common spotting mishap is a parked
aircraft being struck by a Jet Blast Deflector (JBD) or Barricade Stanchion. Fig-
ure 5.1 illustrates an aircraft parked such that the raising of a Barricade Stanchion
will impact the aircraft. A Level One system, one which measures aircraft position
and orientation, could potentially prevent such a mishap if the measurements are
sufficiently accurate.
A distance measurement between the aircraft and the barricade stanchion could
be used to recognize a potential mishap. If the distance between an aircraft’s center
and the barricade stanchion is below a certain threshold, then a nearest neighbor
search should be conducted to determine if any point on the aircraft is near zero
distance, in two-dimensions, from any point on the stanchion. If this is true, then a
persistent monitoring system could be set to handle the situation in different ways.
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Having determined there is potential for a spotting mishap, the system could
warn the Taxi or Tow Director that the aircraft is parked in an undesirable location.
Alternately, the system could warn Flight Deck Control that the aircraft was parked
in a hazardous location, leaving it to the Handling Officer to determine whether it
should be moved. If the decision is made to park the aircraft in a potentially hazardous
position, for whatever reason, then the system could alert Flight Deck Control of this
hazard again if the Barricade Stanchions are set to be raised.
Considering the prevention of this type of mishap also allows an analysis of the
level of accuracy required for both position and orientation measurements. Figure 5.1
shows the effect of just 5◦ of heading angle measurement error. With this error a
monitoring system could not determine whether the stanchion would collide with the
aircraft.
The results of the heading calculations, presented in Figure 4.6 on page 101,
demonstrate the ability of precision GPS to provide accurate and low-noise headings.
Any radio navigation system with centimeter-level accuracy should be able to provide
similar results.
5.2.2 Towing Mishaps. Potential towing mishaps, such as a collision with a
parked aircraft in the hangar bay, could be recognized by a Level One system. A path
planning system, such as one that uses DIDO, discussed in Section 2.7.3 on page 63,
could continuously compute a reasonably close prediction of the path of the towed
aircraft system. If a Level Two system is implemented, it could monitor both aircraft
and support equipment.
Many towing mishaps listed in Appendix A involve a towed aircraft being parked
in close proximity to a stationary aircraft. Figure 1.16 on page 32 provides a visual-
ization of this close proximity. In this case, the persistent monitoring system could
continuously calculate the nearest neighbor distance to surrounding aircraft, equip-
ment, and personnel. If this distance is less than a pre-determined threshold, the
system could alert all personnel involved to the risk of collision.
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Recognizing towing mishaps will be dependent upon the position measurement
accuracy of the system. As increased multipath errors were seen in the measurements
during the evening phase of the tests at NAS Oceana, described in Sections 4.2.1
and 4.2.2, this type of mishap may also dictate the requirements for maximum allow-
able multipath error. Figure 4.7 on page 103 shows that GPS can accurately measure
the location of the aircraft while Figure 4.9 on page 106 and Figure 4.21 on page 112
demonstrate the ability of GPS measurements to be utilized for personnel position
and nearest neighbor determination.
5.2.3 Taxiing Mishaps. A Level One system, measuring the position and
orientation of all aircraft on the flight deck, should be able to recognize a poten-
tial taxiing mishap. Typically, this type of mishap involves a collision between two
aircraft. While it could be possible to warn of such a potential mishap simply by
calculating the distance between the aircraft and their relative velocity, the use of
a path planning system, such as one that uses DIDO, discussed in Section 2.7.3 on
page 63, could significantly increase the time that personnel would be given to react
to the warning and reduce the occurrence of false warnings.
If a potential mishap is detected, the pilot of one aircraft could be directed to
stop while the other moves beyond the collision event horizon. In the case of a path
becoming obstructed, the Taxi Director and pilot could be provided with a new path
to follow.
5.2.4 Exhaust Mishaps. With the heading rate and personnel position mea-
surements from Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.4 it is possible for a Level Three system to
recognize a potential exhaust mishap. In a typical scenario, the system could watch
for a taxiing aircraft performing a turn on deck with a sailor standing still in a location
the exhaust will pass through. Such a scenario is depicted in Figure 5.2.
To prevent injury or damage from resulting from this type of mishap, the sys-
tem could utilize not only the position and orientation measurements, but a desired
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Personnel
Figure 5.2: Recognizing Exhaust Mishaps
location as determined by Flight Deck Control. A taxiing aircraft is generally heading
towards a catapult, a de-arming location, or a parking spot, and the desired locations
are set by Flight Deck Control. Starting from the aircraft’s measured position and
orientation a path planning system, such as DIDO, should provide a reasonable esti-
mate of the path if a desired final position and orientation are known. The heading
rate calculations can be used to determine the speed with which the exhaust hazard is
approaching the sailor. With this information, it would be possible to determine the
amount of time before the aircraft’s exhaust poses a hazard to the sailor. The sailor
could be alerted to this hazard with time to move out of the way or duck to avoid the
exhaust. In a Level Four system, where the status of aircraft systems is reported to
the persistent monitoring system via a datalink, the actual throttle status could be
utilized to determine the dimensions of the exhaust hazard area.
The ability of a persistent monitoring system to predict this kind of mishap
would depend greatly upon the position measurement accuracy and precision. If
position measurements are noisy, the heading rate calculations would be useless. Ad-
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ditionally, the rapid pace of events on the flight deck could require the system to have
a particular measurement update rate to be fully effective.
5.2.5 Contact Mishaps. The contact mishap presented in Table 1.4 on
page 12 describes a Plane Handler, identified by the color of jersey worn, being run
over by the main mount of an aircraft. If a Level Three persistent monitoring system
is implemented it could issue warnings of such a situation. One potential prevention
method is to use the personnel bounding boxes shown in Figure 4.21 on page 112.
These bounding boxes are areas surrounding the aircraft where the personnel involved
are expected to remain throughout the procedure. The system could inform the
Director, Tractor Driver, and Plane Captain when all personnel are positioned within
the bounding boxes, and only then would they start moving the aircraft. If the pilot
is operating the aircraft, then the pilot could be given permission to move once all
personnel are positioned within their respective bounding boxes.
Preventing this type of mishap imposes requirements on the accuracy of both
aircraft and personnel position measurements. As personnel often travel underneath
the wing or fuselage of an aircraft during flight deck operations, it also presents
requirements for signal re-acquisition time for radio measurements or drift rate for
inertial measurements.
5.2.6 Engine Mishaps. As previously discussed, it is easy for a sailor to
walk directly into a turning propeller. With a Level Three system monitoring the
movements of personnel, the distance between a person and the propellor could be
measured and a warning issued if the distance is below a certain threshold. It would
also be possible to create a hazard zone directly in front of the propeller. If a person
enters the zone then the system would alert them to leave it immediately. Figure 5.3
illustrates notional hazard zones around the propellers of an E-2C Hawkeye.
The propeller hazard zones only exist when the propellers are turning. Mainte-
nance must be performed on the propellers, so the persistent monitoring system must
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Figure 5.3: Recognizing Engine Mishaps
somehow be aware of this status. An aircraft scheduled for a flight within a speci-
fied time, for instance, could automatically be checked for engine hazard violations.
Alternately, a supervisor on the flight deck could be required to inform Flight Deck
Control to disable the engine hazard violation warnings for maintenance purposes. If
a Level Four system is in place, then the engine status reported by the aircraft could
be utilized to determine hazard zone status.
5.2.7 Wingfold Mishaps. One method to potentially prevent wingfold
mishaps is a Level Four system, where the aircraft have been modified to report
their wingfold switch status to the persistent monitoring system. If the measured
position and orientation of the aircraft would force its unfolding wings to impact an-
other object, then the system would not allow the wings to unfold. This modification
could be prohibitively expensive, but future aircraft could have it included earlier in
the acquisition process at a reduced cost.
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Another method to detect a potential wingfold mishap is to measure the distance
between wingtip mounted receivers as part of a Level One system. The rate at which
the wings were folded at NAS Oceana, presented in Section 4.2.6, was slow because the
fold was performed manually. When an FA-18C is powered, the wingfold process is
significantly faster. The magnitude of the wingspan measurement slope in Figure 4.22
on page 115 would be greater for a powered wingfold, and therefore easier to detect.
A persistent monitoring system’s performance specifications such as accuracy
and update rate will greatly affect its ability to recognize this type of mishap. Using
wingtip mounted receivers to detect the wingfold motion may also impose constraints
on the physical design of the receiver. Significant multipath was observed when the
wings were folded and the antennae were pointed towards the aircraft.
5.2.8 Non-aviation Mishaps. A non-aviation mishap, such as an aircraft
being struck by a forklift during an underway replenishment, is very similar to a
towing mishap. The same processes to recognize a potential mishap, path prediction
and distance calculation, should be applicable.
The challenge inherent to non-aviation mishaps is that they don’t exclusively
involve aviation assets or personnel. The forklifts and pallet jacks used by the supply
department would need to be monitored, and the personnel operating them would
have to be trained to respond to hazard warnings. Attempting to prevent this type
of mishap leads to considerations on the pervasiveness and simplicity of a persistent
monitoring system, as non-aviation personnel would only occasionally be required to
use it.
5.3 Measurement System Implementation
This section discusses the requirements for implementing methods to measure
the position and orientation of objects on the flight deck based upon the research
described in Chapter III. The equipment necessary to measure position and commu-
nicate hazard warnings is discussed.
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5.3.1 Position Measurement. As discussed in Section 2.1.2 on page 36, the
Navy currently plans to use video analysis to measure the position and orientation of
each aircraft on the flight deck, although with less accuracy than the measurements
made in this research using GPS. To reduce the occurrence of flight deck mishaps,
one of the major goals of a persistent monitoring system, it is vital to not only
have accurate measurements of aircraft position and orientation but to measure the
position and orientation of support equipment as well as the position of personnel.
It may be possible to use additional cameras to measure these positions, but there
are numerous challenges. One challenge is identifying, via video recordings, a person
who may be standing up straight, crawling under an aircraft, or lying injured on
the deck. If this can be achieved, it is likely to require extensive computational
power. Radio navigation provides a simpler alternative and, as shown in Chapter IV,
the accuracy is significantly better than that expected of the planned video analysis
system. This section will focus on the methods of implementing a radio navigation
system to measure the location of aircraft, equipment, and personnel on the flight
deck and hangar bay.
5.3.1.1 Measurement Source. This research focused on using GPS
for position measurements. As discussed in Section 5.1, the exclusive use of GPS
is not desirable for a persistent monitoring system. The functionality of a system
reliant on GPS is at risk of degradation from multiple sources: satellite constellation
issues, atmospheric disturbance, as well as jamming or spoofing by an opposing force.
Furthermore, it is desired for this system to measure locations both on the flight deck
and the hangar bay. Given that the hangar bay is essentially one large Faraday cage,
and external radio transmissions cannot be received inside, it is impossible to use
GPS inside of it.
To achieve centimeter-level accuracy it is required to use a dual frequency GPS
receiver. Dual frequency antennae are expensive (each of the antennae used in this
research cost approximately $1,000), and a dual frequency receiver must either have
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the classified decryption key for P(Y) code or, like the receivers used in this research,
advanced algorithms to utilize the L2 signal without decrypting P(Y), potentially
costing thousands of dollars per receiver. These costs are currently decreasing and
could potentially be further reduced given the mass production required to equip the
fleet.
Pseudolite positioning provides a promising alternative. With multiple trans-
mitters mounted on the flight deck and in the hangar bay the persistent monitoring
system should have observability of both areas. Pseudolites also provide the ability
to select the frequency and chipping rate of the transmission. With a higher chipping
rate or frequency transmission than GPS, highly accurate measurements could be
made using either code or carrier phase solutions, even on a single frequency. The
system would be organic to the ship enabling these parameters to be reconfigured
as the mission requires as well as eliminating the dependency on satellites. With
sufficient pseudolite transmitters around the perimeter of the flight deck, it could be
possible to avoid most scenarios where a receiver would be prevented from receiving
a signal due to another object’s obstruction.
Both GPS and pseudolite measurements are susceptible to multipath errors, as
observed in the wingspan and heading measurements of Chapter IV. This error will
likely be amplified onboard an aircraft carrier due to the large metal deck, metal su-
perstructure, and prevalence of other aircraft. To mitigate this, it may be necessary to
integrate inertial measurements with the code or carrier phase measurements through
a Kalman filter.
While this research has addressed the measurement accuracy needed for mishap
recognition, the measurement integrity of the system is critical to the proper operation
of a persistent monitoring system. Since the system is intended to enhance the safety
of personnel, it is vital that it be aware of any significant errors in the measurements.
5.3.1.2 Measurement Device. Position measurements are to be made
for three different objects: aircraft, support equipment, and personnel. If orientation
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measurements are also desired, then the object would require two devices (or at least
two antennae). A common core device could be designed with additional compo-
nents specific to each object. The core device needs to make position measurements
and communicate these to a central computer onboard the ship wirelessly and in
near real-time. It would be possible for the core device to simply make pseudorange
measurements and transmit them via a packetized network protocol (such as IEEE
802.11) which would allow for the use of public/private key authentication to prevent
spoofing and allow identification. A centralized computer could then apply any error
corrections and calculate the actual relative flight deck positions and velocities. The
measurement device used must not add significant complication to flight deck oper-
ations. Battery management is likely to be a major user concern unless addressed
early in the design phase.
Simplifications can be included in the design of the measurement devices be-
cause they will operate primarily onboard the aircraft carrier. When a device can
communicate with the central onboard computer it needs only transmit the range in-
formation: no position computations need to be performed in the device. Offloading
computations would reduce the device’s processing power requirement and power con-
sumption. This centralization will also allow updates to the measurement algorithm,
including error corrections, to be applied centrally.
For aircraft position and orientation, the Navy must decide whether it is more
effective to modify the aircraft and install permanent receivers or to temporarily
mount them while the aircraft is on deck, similar to the method described in Sec-
tion 3.2.1 on page 77. In either case, it is vital that they are capable of transmitting
measurements whether the aircraft is powered or not. Support equipment presents a
unique challenge, as there are dozens of different types. It may be advantageous to
measure position and orientation only for SE over a certain threshold size. Position
measurements may also be needed for smaller SE such as ordnance carts and aircraft
jacks.
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To enhance the safety of personnel, their device would require the largest num-
ber of features. It must not only collect and transmit range measurements but be
capable of providing warnings to the person using it. The device should not hinder
the movements of personnel any more than current flight deck protective equipment
does. The ideal device would integrate into existing helmets and/or float coats. Aural
warnings could be provided through noise-cancelling headphones, which could even
enable the wearer to be steered away from a hazardous area. The Navy and Air Force
are currently investigating active noise cancelling technology for use in high-noise
aviation environments which could be adapted to support this capability [55].
5.3.2 Flight Deck Status. It would be necessary to measure the elements
of flight deck state presented in Table 1.8 on page 23. Many of these are already
measured but it would be necessary to tie all of the measurements to a centralized
system.
5.3.3 Obstacles to Implementation. The single greatest obstacle to physical
implementation would likely be training personnel to use it properly. If decision
makers are not familiar with its capabilities, they will not use it to the full extent. If
sailors are not aware of its limitations they may rely on it too much for their safety.
Shipboard frequency allocation is a significant obstacle which would need to
be resolved. With multiple frequencies needed for pseudolite and wireless packetized
data transmission, it is vital that the system not interfere with existing systems or
pose a risk to electromagnetically sensitive equipment, such as ordnance.
5.4 Monitoring System Implementation
With a computer capable of collecting the position and state measurements of
objects on the flight deck, it is essential that software be created to fully utilize this
information. Many of the methods and algorithms discussed to recognize mishaps,
such as path planning and nearest neighbor searching, are computationally inten-
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sive, requiring a high-performance computing infrastructure. The monitoring system
will also need to be highly reliable and survivable, able to withstand malfunctioning
components and damage. The monitoring system must be able to clearly and effec-
tively communicate with personnel in a variety of ways such as accepting inputs for
flight schedules and maintenance requests, displaying the current status and projected
configuration, and alerting personnel concerned to potential hazards.
5.4.1 Computational Requirements. Modern computers are significantly
more advanced than when CADOCS, discussed in Section 2.1.1, was proposed. The
tasks CADOCS was to perform, such as storing flight schedules, displaying a map of
the flight deck, and recording aircraft fuel and maintenance information, pushed the
limits of computational capacity. For a modern computer, these tasks are trivial.
Providing the ability to recognize and potentially prevent mishaps for a large
number of aircraft, equipment, and personnel requires a significant amount of com-
puting power. The central computer must calculate positions and orientations from
the ranges reported by each measurement device, perform hundreds of nearest neigh-
bor searches, and update path predictions at a rate which enables these calculations
to be useful. The measurements data for this research was collected at 5 Hz, which
is a reasonable requirement for the onboard computer system. As discussed in Sec-
tion 2.6.1, the nearest neighbor calculation time is dependent upon the number of
points composing the model, so the system developers will have to trade model reso-
lution, calculation rate, and computational power.
The path planning algorithm is orders of magnitude more computationally in-
tensive than the other algorithms discussed. Using DIDO in MATLABr to calculate
the results presented in Section 4.2.7 required over 30 minutes on a computer with a
dual-core processor. Implementing this for a real-time operational system will require
rewriting an optimal solver in a lower-level language, such as C or C++, utilizing
multiple computers in a massive parallel system, or both. While this is the most com-
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putationally intensive portion of the hazard recognition process, it has the potential
to provide the greatest benefit.
Another consideration that should be taken into account in the development of a
persistent monitoring system is the need for redundancy, reliability, and maintainabil-
ity. If the central computer ceases to function, for whatever reason, the entire system
would cease to function. Parallel computing provides a straightforward solution to
this problem. Multiple spaces, spread throughout the ship, could be utilized to house
the computers for this system. This has the added advantage of making the system
highly maintainable as a single faulty computer could be replaced without disabling
the system.
5.4.2 Human-Computer Interaction. No matter how well the system is
able to recognize and potentially prevent mishaps, it won’t be used if the personnel
concerned can’t fully interact with it. The input method for providing schedules,
requests, and orders must be intuitive. A user should be able to immediately recognize
and understand the information provided by a display. Warnings need to be effective
without hindering flight deck operations.
A touch-sensitive table computer, depicted in Figure 2.3 on page 36, seems to
be the perfect method for human-computer interaction within flight deck control.
Movement orders can be provided simply by touching, dragging, and rotating the
icon for an aircraft. Multiple users can even use the system simultaneously. Critical
information, such as fuel state, maintenance status, and next scheduled flight could
be accessed with the touch of a finger.
Maintenance personnel throughout the ship could be provided with flight deck
and hangar bay information through a web browser based system. This could allow
maintenance requests to be communicated effectively to flight deck control and aircraft
movement schedules to be accessed directly by the personnel directed to perform
maintenance. The web browser based interface would allow access without any special
software and updates to be applied only to a central computer.
132
5.4.3 Data Recording. Part of preventing mishaps is studying the exact
events that occurred. The monitoring system could record all of its information for
later access in the case of a mishap, much as an aircraft records data to the “black
box.” This data could be archived with organizations concerned, such as the Naval
Safety Center and Naval Air Systems Command, for thorough study to improve not
just safety, but the performance of flight deck operations.
In the event of a mishap, the ship or squadron would be able to review the
events in detail with the personnel involved. This provides an objective recording of
mistakes from which to learn. Simply reviewing the data collected could potentially
be of greater value than the real-time monitoring provided by the system.
5.5 Future Work
The persistent monitoring system proposed by this research is complex, and
no off-the-shelf product can provide its capabilities. Since the proposed system is
modular, with independent subsystems for measurement and monitoring, future work
in this area can explore each simultaneously.
The development of the measurement system requires more study of radio posi-
tioning in an environment similar to the flight deck. Further research into integrating
inertial and radio navigation measurements for multipath error mitigation should be
performed. The use of pseudolites, near ground level, to provide two-dimensional
positioning on a moving platform also requires significant research.
Further research in using path planning to match the movements of aircraft on
the flight deck is critical to the monitoring system. Determining the correct param-
eters to calculate the cost function could significantly improve the accuracy of the
predicted path. Other research should focus on the best methods of interacting with
personnel, and what functionality experienced personnel would find useful.
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5.6 Final Thoughts
This research set out to determine the feasibility of utilizing a persistent mon-
itoring system to potentially prevent mishaps onboard a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier.
From the data collected it is clear that radio navigation can provide the accuracy to
collect the information necessary to recognize a hazardous situation. Actually im-
plementing a system to provide this functionality is a complex and challenging task.
Arguments have been provided that significant cost savings could be achieved by im-
plementing such a system. It is up to Naval leadership to determine if the operational
and safety benefits outweigh the costs.
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Appendix A. Interest Mishaps
The records provided by the Naval Safety Center contained information on 3,228mishaps. Those that were identified by the author as potentially preventable,
here labelled Interest Mishaps, are those in which a persistent monitoring system for
the flight deck could have provided some warning.
Many of the data elements provided, described in Table 1.1 on page 6, are
provided here. If multiple aircraft were involved in the mishap, only the first is listed
under Type/Model/Series. The Fatalities and Major Injuries columns were generated
by reading the narratives. A tally was made only when the narrative specifically
stated a sailor was injured or killed. The category column represents the mishap
classification as described in Section 1.2.2 on page 9.
Narratives are presented exactly as contained in the data provided by the Naval
Safety Center. Some commonly used abbreviations not previously explained which
may be unclear to readers without Naval experience are:
1. P/C or PC: Plane Captain
2. GSE: General Support Equipment
3. STBD: Starboard
4. MLG: Main Landing Gear
5. SQN: Squadron
6. ABH-2: Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (Handling) Second Class
7. CQ: Carrier Qualifications
8. LEF: Leading Edge Flap
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Interest Mishaps.
Event
Serial
Fiscal
Year
Event Class Type Model
Series
Total Event
Cost ($)
Fatalities Major Injuries Narrative Category
31164 1980 A GROUND F004N 2,679,830 0 0 ACFT ROLLED OFF FLT DECK AND SANK WHILE SHIP
WAS PERFORMING PORT TURN.
Spotting
31266 1980 B GROUND F014A 34,000 0 1 CHOCK WALKER SUSTAINED MAJ INJURY WHEN FOOT
WAS RUN OVER BY TOWED ACFT
Contact
31656 1980 B GROUND E002B 34,000 0 1 P/C SUSTAINED MAJOR INJURIES WHEN HE WALKED
INTO ARC OF TURNING PROP.
Engine
31708 1980 B FLIGHT A007E 273,102 0 0 CHOCK CART AND CHOCKS BLOWN INTO TURNING
PROPS BY JET BLAST.
Exhaust
31720 1980 B FLIGHT A007E 151,789 0 0 A/C TAXIING ON CV STRUCK SECOND A/C AND 2 FLT
DK PERSONNEL CAUSING INJ
Taxi
31739 1980 B GROUND S003A 120,064 0 0 ACFT BACKED INTO PARKED ACFT WING BUTT DUR-
ING DECK RESPOT.
Towing
31740 1980 B GROUND S003A 128,636 0 0 ACFT BACKED INTO WING BUTT OF PARKED ACFT
DURING DECK RESPOT.
Towing
29567 1981 A FLIGHT S003A 106,937 1 0 ACFT JET ENG INGESTED MAINT TROUBLESHOOTER
DURING TURN-UP ON CV. FATAL
Engine
29757 1981 C GROUND F014A 22,760 0 0 ACFT SUSTAINED DAMAGE TO A/B SUPPORT DURING
DECK RESPOT.
Spotting
29763 1981 C FLTREL A007E 285 0 0 GSE OPERATOR INJURED WHEN BLOWN OFF POWER
CART BY JET BLAST.
Exhaust
30143 1981 A FLTREL A006E 151,000 0 1 JET BLAST STRUCK FINAL CHECKER ON FLT DECK
RESULTING IN MAJOR INJURIES
Exhaust
30222 1981 B FLIGHT HH046A 337,050 0 0 ACFT ROLLED ONTO SIDE AFTER STBD MLG BECAME
FOULED IN CV ELEV COMBING.
Towing
30345 1981 B FLIGHT TE002A 107,171 0 0 PROP STRUCK BY JBD PANEL AS ACFT TAXIIED INTO
POSITION FOR CAT LAUNCH
Taxi
30422 1981 A FLTREL A007E 37,000 1 0 LINE DIV DAY SUPER BLOWN OVER THE SIDE BY JET
BLAST. FATALLY INJURED.
Exhaust
31798 1981 A GROUND RF008G 500,000 0 0 AIRCRAFT UNDER TOW STRUCK WING OF PARKED
AIRCRAFT ON FLIGHT DECK.
Towing
31865 1981 A GROUND F014A 13,997,000 0 0 ACFT SPOTTING DOLLY LOST OVERBOARD DURING
ACFT SPOTTING OP AT SEA.
Spotting
31915 1981 A GROUND F014A 724,000 0 0 PARKED ACFT SUSTAINED ALPHA DAMAGE WHEN
STRUCK BY CLOSING HGR BAY DOOR
Spotting
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31921 1981 B FLIGHT F004J 136,240 0 0 NOSE OF ACFT STRUCK UNMANNED ACFT DUE TO
JET BLAST FROM TAXIING ACFT.
Exhaust
27205 1982 B GROUND F014A 108,834 0 0 ACFT STRUCK 2 OTHER ACFT DURING FLIGHT DECK
RESPOT.
Towing
27299 1982 A FLTREL F004N 47,000 1 0 FLT DECK COORDINATOR BLOWN INTO PARKED A/C
BY JET EXHAUST.FATAL INJS.
Exhaust
27355 1982 B GROUND F004 43,000 0 1 CHOCK WALKER SUSTAINED INJ TO BOTH FEET
WHEN RUN OVER BY TOWED ACFT.
Contact
27475 1982 B FLTREL A007E 0 0 1 FLT DECK PERS SUSTAINED LEG INJ WHEN LEG WAS
TRAPPED UNDER TAXIING A/C
Contact
30779 1982 B GROUND F014A 186,518 0 0 TRACTOR DRIVER INJURED, 3 ACFT DAMAGED DUR-
ING NIGHT FLT DECK RESPOT.
Towing
24867 1983 B GROUND SH003H 98,643 0 1 UNMANNED TOW TRACTOR ROLLED ACROSS FLT
DECK CAUSING INJURY/DAMAGE.
Spotting
25348 1983 B GROUND F014A 43,000 0 1 CHOCK HANDLER HAD FOOT RUN OVER BY MOVING
ACFT.
Contact
25439 1983 B FLTREL F014A 43,000 0 1 FLIGHT DECK PERSON LEG WAS RUN OVER BY ACFT. Contact
25489 1983 B FLTREL A007E 43,000 0 1 ORDNANCEMAN LEFT FOOT RUNOVER AS AIRCRAFT
WAS BEING TAXIED TO CATAPULT
Contact
26044 1983 A GROUND A007E 47,000 1 0 AIRMAN LOST AT SEA AFTER BEING BLOWN FROM
FLT DECK BY TURNING ACFT.
Exhaust
26193 1983 B FLIGHT EA006B 177,669 0 0 ACFT STRUCK OTHER ACFT DURING NIGHT CATA-
PULT SHOT
Spotting
28890 1983 A FLIGHT S003A 137,638 1 0 MAINT PERSON FATALLY INJURED WHEN HE WAS
SUCKED INTO ENGINE INTAKE.
Engine
23104 1984 A GROUND S003A 190,000 0 1 GND PERSON RUN OVER BY ACFT MLG DURING
RESPOT. PERM TOTAL DISABILITY.
Contact
23628 1984 A GROUND F014A 16,250,225 0 0 ACFT ROLLED OVERBOARD SHIP FROM ELEVATOR
DURING FLIGHT DECK RESPOT.
Spotting
26976 1984 A FLTREL A007E 47,000 1 0 PHONE TLKR BLWN OVRBRD BY JET BLAST.VICTIM
LOST AT SEA DURING RESCUE.
Exhaust
27085 1984 B FLIGHT S003A 147,458 0 0 ACFT ON FLT DECK WAS HIT BY AN ACFT BEING
RAISED TO DECK ON ELEVATOR.
Spotting
21424 1985 B GROUND E002C 43,000 0 1 CHOCK WLKR INJURED AS HE FELL WHEN FOOT WAS
RUN OVER BY PUSHED ACFT.
Contact
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24264 1985 B GROUND F014A 257,102 0 0 ACFT STRUCK PARKED ACFT DURING RESPOT EVO-
LUTION.
Taxi
24447 1985 A GROUND KA006D 47,000 1 0 GND PERSON RECEIVED FATAL INJ WHEN BLOWN
OVERBD DURING NIGHT LAUNCH.
Exhaust
17534 1986 A FLTREL A007E 47,000 1 0 FLT DECK PERS BLOWN OVERBOARD BY JET BLAST
DUR LAUNCH W/FATAL INJURY.
Exhaust
18846 1986 A FLIGHT S003A 209,954 1 0 ACFT HIT GROUND PERSON DURING NIGHT CATA-
PULT LAUNCH WITH FATAL INJURY.
Contact
18952 1986 B GROUND A006E 43,000 0 1 ACFT UNDER TOW ROLLED OVER ORDNANCEMAN’S L
LEG DURING DECK RESPOT.
Contact
19051 1986 C FLIGHT F018A 89,142 0 0 ACFT UNDER TOW RUNS OVER ACFT HANDLER’S LEG. Contact
22273 1986 B GROUND SH003H 129,932 0 0 PARKED ACFT SUSTAINED DAMAGE WHEN BARRI-
CADE STANCHION STRCK HORIZ STAB
Spotting
22622 1986 B GROUND F018A 43,000 0 1 CHOCK WALKER HAD FOOT RUN OVER BY ACFT DUR-
ING SPOTTING OPERATION.
Contact
14396 1987 B FLIGHT E002C 328,404 0 0 ACFT DAMAGE/PERS INJURIES RESULT FROM DECK
RAMP BLOWN BY JET EXHAUST
Exhaust
15008 1987 B FLTREL A007E 43,000 0 1 ACFT TAXIED OVER FINAL CHECKER’S LEGS. Contact
15258 1987 B GROUND KA003B 43,000 0 1 ACFT HANDLING CREWMAN’S LEG WAS RUN OVER
DURING ACFT RESPOT ON CV.
Contact
15881 1987 A GROUND F014A 553,839 0 0 ACFT HIT MULTIPLE ACFT WHILE BEING PUSHED TO
RESPOT POSITION.
Towing
19749 1987 A FLIGHT A007E 2,839,435 0 0 ACFT WENT OVER PORT SIDE OF SHIP DURING TAXI.
ACRW EJECTED.
Taxi
7671 1988 A GROUND A007E 2,877,000 1 0 DUR RESPOT SLID OFF FLT DECK WHILE UNDER TOW.
P/C MISSING.
Towing
8158 1988 A FLIGHT C002A 78,204 1 0 SQN PLANE CAPTAIN WALKED INTO ACFT PROP FOL-
LOWING NORMAL RECOVERY.
Engine
8368 1988 B FLIGHT F014A 105,761 0 0 INADVERTENT WINGSWEEP ON DECK. WING STRUCK
ANOTHER ACFT.
Wingfold
8739 1988 B FLTREL EA006B 45,700 0 1 MAIN MOUNT STRUCK SHUTTLE, TIRE EXPLODED IN-
JURING YELLOW SHIRT.
Misc
16200 1988 B GROUND A006E 43,000 0 1 ACFT RAN OVER PLANE CAPT TRAINEE’S LEG DUR-
ING NIGHT FLT DECK RESPOT.
Contact
16384 1988 A FLIGHT E002C 77,199 1 0 DURING PREP FOR LAUNCH, GROUND PERSON
WALKED INTO TURNING PROPELLER.
Engine
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16519 1988 B FLIGHT E002C 116,404 0 0 ACFT UNDER DIRECTOR CONTROL TAXIIED INTO
TURNING PROP. NO INJURIES.
Taxi, engine
1408 1989 B GROUND E002C 344,390 0 0 ACFT TAXIIED INTO TURNING PROP OF ANOTHER
ACFT.
Taxi, engine
5630 1990 A GROUND EA006B 1,310,570 0 0 ECM POD INADVERTENTLY FIRED DUE TO EXHAUST
EXPOSURE.
Exhaust
32216 1991 B GROUND F014B 320,962 0 0 TAXIING ACFT STRUCK TWO OTHER ACFT ON CAR-
RIER FLIGHT DECK.
Taxi
33679 1991 B GROUND S003B 294,597 0 0 PARKED ACFT SLID INTO CATWALK DURING SHIPS
TURN.
Spotting
40078 1991 C GROUND F018C 98,524 0 0 ACFT HORIZ STAB, DOORS WERE BURNT BY EXHAUST
OF ANOTHER ACFT
Exhaust
35370 1992 A GROUND F014A 500,000 0 1 BLUE SHIRT RUN OVER BY ACFT MAIN MOUNT. Contact
35480 1992 B GROUND EA006B 115,000 0 0 DUR ACFT TAXI JET BLAST BLEW ABH-2 FROM FLT
DECK TO LOWERED ELEVATOR.
Exhaust
37767 1993 B GROUND F014A 115,000 0 1 FLIGHT DECK PERSON PULLED INTO ACFT INTAKE. Engine
37867 1993 C GROUND SH060F 31,338 0 0 ACFT WING SPREAD INTO HELO ON HANGAR BAY. Wingfold
38669 1993 A GROUND A006E 270,000 0 1 MAINT PERS BLOWN OVERBD BY JET EXHAUST
WORKING ON FLT DECK.
Exhaust
38778 1993 C GROUND EA006B 57,809 0 0 CATAPULT 2 JBD STRUCK ACFT LEFT WING TIPE DUR-
ING ACFT TAXI.
Taxi
39865 1994 C GROUND A006E 13,048 0 1 ACFT TAXIED ONTO FINAL CHECKER’S ANKLE DUR-
ING ACFT SPOT ON CATAPULT.
Contact
40106 1994 C GROUND EA006B 63,166 0 0 PARKED AIRCRAFT STRUCK BY TOW TRACTOR ON
FLIGHT DECK.
Spotting
40139 1994 C GROUND F018C 50,438 0 0 DEPLOY OPS/UNDER FLT DECK DIR/NIGHT POST RE-
COVERY, ACFT HIT PARKD ACFT
Taxi
40155 1994 C GROUND F018C 15,828 0 0 PARKED ACFT WAS STRUCK BY ACFT UNDER TOW
DURING FLT DECK RESPOT.
Towing
40431 1994 C GROUND SH003H 155,979 0 0 DURING NIGHT FLT DECK RESPOT ACFT UNDER TOW
HIT HELO PARKED ON SPOT 5.
Towing
40688 1994 C GROUND F014D 50,336 0 0 ACFT UNDER TOW IN HANGAR DECK BAY COLLIDED
WITH PARKED ACFT.
Towing
40775 1994 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
A006E 0 0 0 ACFT PORT OUTBOARD WING TIP WAS HIT BY JET
BLAST DEFLECTOR.
Unknown
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40832 1994 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
E002C+ 0 0 0 HYD JENNY ROLLED INTO HAWKEYE DAMAGING
FUSELAGE.
Spotting
40910 1994 C GROUND F018C 15,852 0 0 ACFT UNDER TOW AND CONTROL OF FLT DECK DI-
RECTORS HIT ANOTHER ACFT.
Towing
41057 1994 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
F018C 0 0 0 ACFT WITH CAPTIVE TRNG ORD CONTACTED GSE ON
CV FLT DECK ON CQ OPS
Unknown
40888 1995 B GROUND F018C 115,000 0 1 ACFT UNDER TOW RAN OVER AIRMAN ON FLIGHT
DECK.
Contact
40990 1995 B GROUND EA006B 115,000 0 1 ORDNANCEMAN SUFFERED CRUSHED FOOT FROM
TAXIING ACFT ON FLIGHT DECK.
Contact
41428 1995 B GROUND F014A 456,386 0 0 ACFT BLOWN INTO CATWALK BEHIND CAT 4; AIR-
CREW EJECTED SAFELY.
Exhaust
41451 1995 C GROUND C002A 16,569 0 1 ENG NAC PANELS LOST OVRBD & MAINT MAN BLOWN
DOWN BY JET BLAST ON DECK.
Exhaust
41501 1995 C GROUND F018C 40,000 0 0 ACFT RADOME DAMAGED AFTER COLLISION WITH
ANOTHER ACFT ON FLT DECK.
Unknown
42144 1995 C GROUND EA006B 0 0 1 DURING NIGHT FRS CQ AIRCRAFT TAXIED OVER AIR-
MAN’S FOOT.
Contact
42699 1995 C GROUND F018C 13,177 0 0 ACFT RADOME STRUCK RIGHT HORIZ STAB OF AN-
OTHER ACFT DURING TAXI.
Taxi
42963 1996 C GROUND ES003A 31,904 0 0 GSE HIT ACFT PORT SIDE CAUSING DAMAGE TO ENG
INLET COWL & ARS RAT
Spotting
43036 1996 C GROUND S003B 21,300 0 0 ACFT RUDDER HIT CVN ISLAND, PLAT PLATFORM,
WHILE BEING TAXIED ON DECK.
Taxi
43137 1996 FLT HZ: GEN-
ERAL
EA006B 0 0 0 FLT DECK HATCH ON UPPER STAGE WEAPONS ELEV
2 OPENED DAMAGING ALQ-99.
Spotting
43424 1996 C GROUND F018C 94,029 0 0 CAT 2 JBD WAS RAISED INTO LEFT WING OF ACFT IN
DEARMING AREA.
Spotting
43473 1996 C GROUND F018A 48,966 0 0 DURING NIGHT FLIGHT DECK OPERATIONS, ACFT
TAXIED INTO PARKED ACFT.
Taxi
43581 1996 C GROUND F018C 26,930 0 0 AIRCRAFT UNDER TOW ON FLIGHT DECK IMPACTED
LSO PLATFORM WINDSCREEN.
Towing
43641 1996 C GROUND F018C 29,417 0 0 FORKLIFT OPERATOR STRUCK HORIZ STAB OF
PARKED ACFT DURING VERTREP.
Misc
43970 1996 B GROUND F018C 245,252 0 0 CRANE OPERATOR INADVERTENTLY LIFTED ACFT
WHILE STILL CHAINED DOWN.
Misc
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44056 1996 C GROUND EA006B 1,875 0 0 TAILHOOK LOWERED ONTO FUEL HANDLER MAN-
NING REFUELING STA IN CATWALK.
Contact
44099 1996 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
EA006B 0 0 0 TOW TRACTOR COLLIDED WITHALQ-99 POD
RADOME.
Towing
44447 1996 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
S003B 0 0 0 ACFT CARRIER JET BLAST DEFECTOR RAISED INTO
TAXIING ACFT.
Taxi
44458 1996 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
E002C+ 0 0 0 UHF SATCOM ANTENNA DAMAGED WHILE TOWING
ACFT IN HANGAR BAY
Towing
44473 1996 A GROUND F014A 500,000 0 1 GROUND HANDLER RUN OVER BY ACFT UNDER TOW.
PERM TOTAL DISABILITY.
Contact
45407 1996 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
EA006B 0 0 0 ACFT TAXIED INTO NOSE RADOME OF ANOTHER
ACFT. FOD INGESTED BY STBD ENG
Taxi
45035 1997 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
F018C 0 0 0 WINGS WERE INADVERTENTLY SPREAD DURING
START UP, DAMAGING CATM9 MISSIL
Wingfold
45403 1997 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
F018C 0 0 0 WINGS WERE INADVERTENTLY SPREAD DURING FLT
DECK MAINT, DAMAGING AIM9.
Wingfold
45554 1997 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
S003B 0 0 0 ACFT STRUCK TOW TRACTOR DURING RESPOT ON
SLIPPERY DECK & HIGH SEAS.
Towing
45584 1997 C GROUND S003B 58,504 0 0 TOW TRACTOR STRUCK ACFT DURING FLIGHT DECK
RESPOT.
Towing
45629 1997 C GROUND F018 25,940 0 0 DURING TAXI, ACFT HIT PARKED ACFT ON FLIGHT
DECK.
Taxi
45766 1997 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
E002C 0 0 0 MAINT PERSONNEL BLOW INTO FANTAIL SAFETY NET
DURING ACFT MAINT TURN.
Exhaust
46014 1997 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
E002C 0 0 1 FINAL CHECKER TRAINEE BLOWN OVER JBD DURING
AIRCRAFT RUN-UP ON CAT.
Exhaust
46047 1997 C GROUND F014A 13,110 0 0 DURING HANGAR BAY RESPOT, ACFT COLLIDED
WITH ADJACENT CHANIED ACFT.
Towing
46119 1997 C GROUND F018A 44,528 0 0 ACFT SUSTAINED DAMAGE TO RADOME DURING
HANGAR DECK RESPOT.
Towing
46203 1997 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
F018C 0 0 0 ACFT AT HIGH POWER DURING TAXI BLEW PRE-
FLIGHTING AIRCREW INTO CATWALK
Exhaust
46269 1997 C GROUND F018C 54,417 0 0 ACFT SUSTAINED DMG TO LEADING EDGE FLAP
WHEN JBD WAS RAISED INTO IT.
Spotting
46536 1997 C GROUND F018C 199,522 0 0 ACFT RADOME STRUCK BY WING BUTT OF TAXIING
ACFT ON FLIGHT DECK.
Taxi
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46704 1997 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
S003B 0 0 0 TOW TRACTOR HIT AERIAL REFUELING STORE ON
FLT DECK.
Towing
46852 1997 C GROUND E002C+ 61,073 0 0 ACFT 01 TAXIED INTO TURNING ACFT 02 PROP DAM-
AGING BOTH ACFT.
Taxi, engine
47263 1998 C GROUND F018C 25,940 0 0 ACFT UNDER TOW STRUCK LSO PLATFORM DURING
NIGHT FLIGHT DECK RESPOT.
Towing
47376 1998 C GROUND EA006B 18,965 0 0 TOW TRACTOR COLLIDED WITH ACFT AND INJURED
TROUBLESHOOTER
Towing
47618 1998 C GROUND F018C 66,670 0 0 AIRCRAFT TOWED INTO PARKED AIRCRAFT. Towing
47643 1998 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
E002C+ 0 0 1 PLANE CAPTAIN STRUCK BY TURNING PROPELLER. Engine
47673 1998 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
F018C 0 0 0 ACFT RADOME IMPACTED BY AILERON OF SECOND
ACFT WHICH WAS TAXIING ON DK
Taxi
47772 1998 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
EA006B 0 0 0 CAT CREW RETRACTED SHUTTLE INTO ACFT PORT
MAIN TIRE;INADEQ COORDINATIO
Spotting
47870 1998 C GROUND F018C 45,676 0 0 STARBOARD HORIZONTAL STABILIZER DMGD WHEN
STRUCK BY FORKLIFT.
Misc
47904 1998 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
F018C 0 0 0 RIGHT HORIZONTAL STAB STRUCK ANOTHER ACFTS
LEF DUR FLT CNTRL CAS CKS.
Spotting
48805 1999 C FLIGHT S003B 22,406 0 0 FLIGHT DECK PERSONNEL DROVE TOW TRACTOR
INTO BUDDY STORE OF AIRCRAFT.
Towing
48838 1999 C GROUND E002C 33,739 0 0 WING TIP OF TAXIING ACFT STRUCK PROP OF
PARKED ACFT ON FLIGHT DECK.
Taxi, engine
49159 1999 C GROUND C002A 23,256 0 0 TAILSKID HIT SCUPPER, BREAKING ACTUATOR FIT-
TING.
Unknown
49612 1999 C GROUND F018C 16,241 0 0 DUR LOW PWR TURN, INADVERTENT WINGSWEEP
CAUSED STBD WING TO HIT AILERO
Wingfold
49753 1999 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
C002A 0 0 0 STBD WING TIP HIT TOP OF COMBAT HATCH DURING
WINGSPREAD EVOLUTION.
Wingfold
49776 1999 C GROUND HH060H 22,900 0 0 TAIL ROTOR BLADE OF PARKED AIRCRAFT DAMAGED
BY CRASH CRANE.
Misc
49853 1999 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
F018C 0 0 0 MISPOSITIONED WINGFOLD HANDLE RESULTED IN IN-
ADVERT WINGSPREAD ON START
Wingfold
49899 1999 C GROUND F014D 177,287 0 0 AIRCRAFT STRUCK BY JET BLAST DEFLECTOR
WHILE TAXIING TO CATAPULT.
Taxi
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50089 1999 B FLIGHT F018C 318,479 0 0 LAUNCHED W/CAT TRACK BUTTON IN PLACE. ENG
FODDED. NIGHT BARRICADE.
Misc
50092 1999 C GROUND MH053E 140,400 0 0 DUR ONBOARD CARGO DELIVERY FORKLIFT LIFTED
CAGE & STRUCK ACFT CARGO DR
Misc
50097 1999 A GROUND F018C 1,202,804 0 0 EXHAUST FM ACFT ON CAT 4 BLEW A TURNING ACFT
INTO A PARKED ACFT.
Exhaust
50477 1999 C GROUND F018C 21,299 0 0 ACFT TAXIING OUT OF LDG AREA STRUCK JET
STARTING UNIT.
Taxi
50538 1999 C GROUND F018C 64,150 0 0 NOSE RADOME DAMAGED WHEN ACFT TAXIED INTO
FLIGHT DECK FIRE TRUCK
Taxi
50609 1999 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
E002C 0 0 0 MISSILE CARARD ATTACHED TO HORNET HIT PORT
PROP WHILE HORNET WAS TOWED
Towing
50631 1999 C GROUND F018C 64,150 0 0 AIRCRAFT RADOME WAS STRUCK BY P-25 MOBILE
FIRE FIGHTING VEHICLE.
Misc
50548 2000 FLT HZ: GEN-
ERAL
F018C 0 0 0 UNCOMMANDED WING SPREAD CAUSED WINGS TO
STRIKE ACFT IN CLOSE PROXIMITY
Wingfold
50566 2000 C GROUND C002A 57,116 0 0 DURING CV QUALS, #1 JBD HIT ACFT STBD VERTICAL
STABILIZER. NO INJURIES
Spotting
50865 2000 C GROUND F018C 44,150 0 0 ACFT PORT HORIZ STAB STRUCK LSO WINDSCREEN
DURING FLIGHT DECK RESPOT.
Towing
50919 2000 C GROUND T045C 1,875 0 1 ACFT SAFETY OBSERVER BROKE LEFT ARM WHILE
SPOTTING ACFT ON CAT 2 OF CV
Unknown
51020 2000 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
UNK 0 0 0 INADVERTENT WING SPREAD CAUSED AIM-9 CONT
FIN TO STRIKE ADJACENT ACFT
Wingfold
51046 2000 C GROUND F014A 40,031 0 0 TWO AIRCRAFT SUSTAINED DAMAGE DURING FLIGHT
DECK RESPOT EVOLUTION
Towing
51063 2000 C GROUND F018C 41,265 0 0 UNINTENTIONAL WING SPREAD/WINGTIP LAU7
STRUCK/DAMAGED ADJACENT AC CPY
Wingfold
51070 2000 C GROUND F014B 18,105 0 0 AIRCRAFT TAXIING ON FLIGHT DECK COLLIDED
WITH PARKED, UNMANNED ACFT.
Taxi
51127 2000 C GROUND F018C 55,960 0 0 ACFT LEFT LEADING EDGE FLAP STRUCK BELKNAP
POLE WHILE TAXIING ON DECK.
Taxi
51154 2000 C GROUND F014B 16,704 0 0 TOWED AIRCRAFT STRUCK PARKED AIRCRAFT DUR-
ING CARRIER FLT DECK RE-SPOT.
Towing
51243 2000 A GROUND E002C 156,338 1 0 FLIGHT DECK CREWMAN FATALLY INJURED WHEN
STRUCK BY ACFT’S TURNING PROP
Engine
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51352 2000 C GROUND F018C 46,004 0 0 PORT LE FLAP HIT STBD HORIZ STAB OF PARKED
ACFT DUR TAXI ON FLT DECK.
Taxi
51369 2000 FLT HZ: GEN-
ERAL
E002C 0 0 0 TECHNICIAN CROSSED FOUL LINE WITH APPROACH-
ING AIRCRAFT OVER THE RAMP.
Misc
51477 2000 C GROUND F018C 56,858 0 0 AIRCRAFT SLID WHILE TAXIING AND COLLIDED WITH
PARKED AIRCRAFT.
Taxi
51539 2000 B GROUND SH060F 310,607 0 0 UNMANNED ACFT ROLLED ACROSS FLIGHT DECK
COLLIDING WITH PARKED ACFT.
Spotting
51572 2000 C GROUND E002C 18,318 0 0 PORT STAB OF TOWED ACFT HIT NOSE CAP OF
PARKED ACFT ON FLIGHT DECK.
Towing
51673 2000 C GROUND F018C 38,232 0 0 PORT HORIZONTAL STABILIZER DAMAGED WHEN HIT
BY FORKLIFT.
Misc
51676 2000 C GROUND F018C 34,015 0 0 ACFT 02 CANOPY DAMAGED WHEN ACFT 01’S WINGS
WERE SPREAD DURING MAINT.
Wingfold
51691 2000 C GROUND F018C 73,171 0 0 TAXIING ACFT’S WINGTIM CATM-9 STRUCK & DAM-
AGED PARKED ACFT’S RADOME.
Taxi
51741 2000 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
EA006B 0 0 0 HOT EXHAUST FROM TURNING ACFT CAUSED DAM-
AGE TO ACFT TAXIING FROM LDG.
Exhaust
51762 2000 C GROUND F014 0 0 1 CV FLT DECK CAT OFFICER KNOCKED DOWN BY JET
BLAST;SUSTAINED BKN FIBULA
Exhaust
51888 2000 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
F018B 0 0 0 JBD CONTROL BOX TOGGLE SWITCH INADVER-
TANTLY ACTUATED.
Spotting
52346 2000 FLT HZ: GEN-
ERAL
E002C 0 0 0 DURING THREE EVENTS FLGHT DECK PERSONNEL
APPROACHED TURNING PROPS.
Warning
52348 2000 FLT HZ: GEN-
ERAL
E002C+ 0 0 0 EMBARKED CHOCKING PROCEDURES HAZARDOUS TO
CHOCK WALKERS DUR TOW OPS.
Warning
53111 2000 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
C002A 0 0 0 TOWED ACFT TAILSKID DAMAGED WHEN ACFT SLID
INTO ELEVATOR COMBING.
Towing
51729 2001 C GROUND S003B 97,030 0 0 RIGHT HORIZ STAB OF TOWED ACFT COLLIDED
W/LEFT AILERON OF PARKED ACFT.
Towing
51778 2001 C GROUND F018C 151,710 0 0 NAVY ACFT TAXIED INTO PARKED NAVY ACFT ON FLT
DECK.
Taxi
51788 2001 C GROUND S003B 22,694 0 0 TAXIING ACFT SLID AND COLIDED WITH A PARKED
ACFT.
Taxi
51789 2001 C GROUND F018C 81,036 0 0 ACFT SUSTAINED STAB DAMAGE WHEN STRUCK BY
ACFT UNDER TOW. 1 INJURY
Towing
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51848 2001 C GROUND F018C 23,772 0 0 ACFT’S WING STRUCK PARKED AIRCRAFT DURING
WING SPREAD EVOLUTION.
Wingfold
51854 2001 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
S003B 0 0 0 ACFT W/PARKING BRAKE ENGAGED SLID INTO JBD
WHILE OTHER ACFT IN TENSION
Spotting
51862 2001 C GROUND F018C 76,563 0 0 ACFT #1 TAXIED INTO PARKED ACFT #2 ON FLIGHT
DECK.
Taxi
51874 2001 C GROUND F018C 22,363 0 0 TAXIING ACFT HORIZ STAB STRUCK OUTBD LEF OF
PARKED ACFT ON FLT DECK.
Taxi
51892 2001 C GROUND F014B 39,204 0 0 ACFT 01 STBD WINGTIP STRUCK ACFT 02 RADOME
DUR WINDMILL FOR AN OP CHK.
Wingfold
51914 2001 C GROUND F018C 16,659 0 0 ACFT TAXIED INTO PARKED ACFT FOLLOWING
NIGHT CV LANDING
Taxi
51920 2001 C GROUND F014B 20,000 0 0 STBD HORIZ STAB OF TAXING ACFT STRUCK PORT
OTBD LE FLAP OF PARKED ACFT
Taxi
51949 2001 C GROUND F014D 72,746 0 0 ACFT BEING TOWED ONTO ELEVATOR IN HNGR BAY
STRUCK PARKED ACFT.
Towing
51975 2001 C GROUND F018C 32,570 0 0 AIRCRAFT RADOME WAS STRUCK BY JET BLAST DE-
FLECTOR.
Spotting
52028 2001 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
S003B 0 0 0 ACFT BEHIND RAISED JBD SLID WHEN ACFT ON CAT
3 WENT INTO TENSION.
Spotting
52047 2001 C GROUND F018A 48,000 0 0 LEFT LEF ACFT 01 TAXIING W/WING FOLDED STRUCK
HORIZ STAB OF PARKED A/C
Taxi
52048 2001 C GROUND F014A 100,921 0 0 AIRCRAFT STRUCK DECK EDGE ELEVATOR CABLES
DURING HANGAR DECK RESPOT.
Towing
52070 2001 C GROUND S003B 64,594 0 0 CATAPULT 3 JBD WAS RAISED INTO ACFT RIGHT
WING TIP.
Spotting
52085 2001 C GROUND F014D 52,072 0 0 DUR CV NIGHT RESPOT, ACFT UNDER TOW COLLIDED
WITH PARKED ACFT ON DECK.
Towing
53357 2001 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
F018 0 0 1 FLIGHT SURGEON BLOWN OVERBOARD DURING CQ
OPERATIONS.
Exhaust
65655 2001 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
A006B 0 0 0 WHILE DRIVING ACFT AFT THROUGH HANGAR BAY,
TRACTOR STRUCK PARKED ACFT.
Towing
65756 2001 GRND HZ: GEN-
ERAL
E002C 0 0 0 DAMAGE TO ACFT DURING SHIPBOARD ACFT TOW-
ING EVOLUTION.
Towing
52207 2002 A GROUND F014A 2,358,190 0 0 ACFT UNDER TOW STRUCK 2 UNMANNED, CHAINED
ACFT DURING DECK ROLL AT NGT
Towing
Continued on next page
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52228 2002 C GROUND S003B 20,000 0 0 HANGAR BAY AMMUNITION ELEVATOR HATCH
OPENED AND STRUCK ACFT RADOME.
Spotting
52251 2002 C GROUND F018C 27,510 0 0 DURING ACFT TIEDOWN, OUTBD WING PYLON HIT
ADJACENT ACFT HORIZ STAB.
Towing
52361 2002 C GROUND F018E 125,318 0 0 ACFT1 STBD AILERON STRUCK ACFT2 STBD HORIZ
STAB DUR FLT DECK ACFT MOVE
Towing
52710 2002 C GROUND S003B 23,865 0 1 FLIGHT DECK TROUBLESHOOTER BLOWN DOWN ON
FLIGHT DECK BY ACFT EXHAUST.
Exhaust
52868 2002 C GROUND F014B 55,950 0 0 TOW TRACTOR IMPACTED STBD DROP TANK DURING
RESPOT EVOLUTION.
Towing
52953 2002 C GROUND F014B 20,000 0 0 ACFT UNDER TOW DURING FLIGHT DECK RESPOT
STRUCK BY NR 3 JBD.
Towing
52956 2002 C GROUND F018E 28,860 0 0 PORT HORIZ STAB DAMAGED BY ENGINE EXHAUST OF
LIKE ACFT DUR ENG START.
Exhaust
53356 2003 C GROUND F018C 22,940 0 0 AIRCRAFT SLID INTO ANOTHER AIRCRAFT DURING
CHOCKING & CHAINING.
Spotting
53395 2003 C GROUND SH060F 37,419 0 0 WHILE MOVING ACFT CRANE FOR FLT DECK DRILLS,
SLING HIT MRB AND TRB’S.
Misc
53403 2003 C GROUND F018E 179,580 0 0 AIRCRAFT #1 TAXIED INTO PARKED AIRCRAFT #2. Taxi
53447 2003 C GROUND F018E 90,268 0 0 STBD HORIZ STAB DAMAGED BY LANTERN POD ON
SKID BEING MOVED ON FLT DECK
Misc
53482 2003 C GROUND F018C 47,010 0 0 TOWED AIRCRAFT #1 BACKED INTO RADOME OF AIR-
CRAFT #2.
Towing
53692 2003 C GROUND F018C 134,760 0 0 WINDSHIELD DAMAGED AFTER EXPOSURE TO ACFT
ENG EXHAUST DUR LAUNCH CYCLE
Exhaust
53695 2003 B GROUND E002C+ 505,760 0 0 ACFT SLID INTO PARKED ACFT DAMAGING BOTH
ACFT & DEBRIS HIT 3RD ACFT.
Spotting
64733 2003 C GROUND EA006B 22,856 0 0 TOW TRACTOR IMPACTED BAND RADOME ON ACFT
STA WHILE TRYING TO TRANSIT.
Towing
64749 2003 C GROUND F018C 79,215 0 0 ACFT #1 TAXIED INTO ACFT #2 ON FLIGHT DECK. Taxi
64794 2003 B GROUND C002A 286,298 0 0 2 ACFT PARKED ON SHIP’S ELEVATOR DAMAGED DUR
ELEVATOR DOWNWARD TRAVEL.
Spotting
64851 2003 C FLIGHT F018A 22,021 0 0 AIRCRAFT #1 DAMAGED ON FLIGHT DECK WHEN IT
WAS TOWED INTO AIRCRAFT #2.
Towing
64852 2003 C GROUND F018C 64,610 0 0 ACFT #1 TAXIED INTO ACFT #2 ON FLIGHT DECK UN-
DER YELLOW SHIRT CONTROL.
Taxi
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64855 2003 C FLIGHT EA006B 22,856 0 0 TOW TRACTOR COLLIDED WITH AND CRUNCHED
ACFT’S ALQ-99 POD RADOME.
Towing
64898 2003 A FLIGHT S003B 25,877,600 0 0 ACFT ROLLED OFF PORT SIDE OF SHIP AFTER SUC-
CESSFUL ARRESTED LANDING.
Unknown
64939 2003 C GROUND F018F 35,696 0 0 WHILE BEING TAXIED, ACFT STRUCK A PARKED DIS-
SIMILAR ACFT ON FLT DECK.
Taxi
65047 2003 C GROUND F018C 57,952 0 0 ACFT ROLLED ON FLIGHT DECK AND STRUCK A
PARKED DISSIMILAR TYPE ACFT.
Spotting
65193 2003 C GROUND F018A 0 0 0 AIRCRAFT ON DECK PUSHED BACKWARDS INTO
OTHER AIRCRAFT.
Towing
65614 2003 C GROUND S003B 21,755 0 0 TAXIING ACFT SLID INTO UNMANNED PARKED ACFT
ON WET FLIGHT DECK.
Taxi
65620 2003 C GROUND F014A 39,667 0 0 ACFT PORT WING STRUCK FLIGHT DECK WHILE BE-
ING LOWERED ON ELEVATOR.
Spotting
65717 2004 C GROUND F014A 113,682 0 0 TOWED ACFT STBD WINGTIP STRUCK AILERON &
FLAP OF CHOCKED & CHAIN ACFT.
Towing
65866 2004 C GROUND S003B 56,259 0 0 DUR TAXI EVOLUTION, ACFT TURNED BEHIND
RAISED JET BLAST DEFLECTOR.
Taxi
66061 2004 C GROUND F014B 73,350 0 0 AIRCRAFT #1 TAXIED INTO ACFT #2 DISSIMILAR
ACFT PARKED ON FLIGHT DECK.
Taxi
66328 2004 C GROUND F018F 263,551 0 0 WHILE BEING TAXIED, AIRCRAFT STRUCK PARKED
AIRCRAFT EMBARKED ON SHIP.
Taxi
66409 2004 C GROUND F018C 50,222 0 0 LEF OF ACFT BEING TOWED ON DECK STRUK
CHOCKED/CHAINED ACFT P HORIZ STB
Towing
66568 2004 C GROUND F018C 49,537 0 0 CHOCKED AND CHAINED AIRCRAFT STRUCK BY MOV-
ING FORKLIFT.
Misc
66975 2004 C GROUND F018E 138,056 0 0 ACFT PORT WING STRUCK FLT DECK WHILE BEING
LOWERED ON ELEVATOR #2.
Spotting
67061 2004 C GROUND F018C 1,875 0 0 MAINTAINER BLOWN INTO TOW TRACTOR BY ACFT
TAXIING TO CATAPULT ONE.
Exhaust
67103 2004 C GROUND F014B 27,673 0 0 TAXIING ACFT WINGTIP STRUCK RADOME OF
PARKED ACFT ON CVN FLIGHT DECK.
Taxi
67149 2004 C GROUND F014B 48,156 0 0 ACFT WAS TOWED INTO SPN-46 CALIBRATION AN-
TENNA DURING FLT DECK RESPOT.
Towing
67178 2004 C FLIGHT S003B 96,012 0 0 TAXIING ACFT STRUCK PARKED ACFT ON FLT DECK
DUR START-UP PHASE.
Taxi
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67255 2004 C GROUND F014B 27,673 0 0 ACFT RADOME DMG WHEN A PALLET JACK CARRY-
ING ISOPODS PULLED INTO RADOME
Misc
67423 2004 C GROUND F014B 47,673 0 0 TOWED AIRCRAFT WING STRUCK RADOME OF
PARKED ACFT ON SHIP FLIGHT DECK.
Towing
67595 2004 C GROUND E002C+ 25,944 0 0 PARKED HELO TAIL RTR STRUCK BY TAXIING FIXED
WING ACFT W/WING FOLDED.
Taxi
67604 2004 C GROUND F018F 63,632 0 0 ACFT BACKED INTO VERTICAL LIGHT FIXTURE DUR-
ING ACFT FLT DECK MOVE.
Towing
67605 2004 C GROUND T045C 351,008 0 0 JET BLAST DEFLECTOR STRUCK ACFT WHILE BEING
DIRECTED FOR CVN LAUNCH.
Taxi
68030 2004 C GROUND F018F 43,695 0 0 ACFT #1 WING PANEL IMPACTED ACFT #2 STABI-
LIZER DURING TAXI ONBOARD CVN
Taxi
68057 2004 C GROUND EA006B 23,464 0 0 ALQ-99 TACT JAMMING POD STRUCK BY TOW TRAC-
TOR ON CVN FLIGHT DECK.
Towing
68091 2004 C GROUND F018E 83,031 0 0 DUR TOW, ACFT’S PORT WING STRUCK STBD HORIZ
STABILATOR OF PARKED ACFT.
Towing
68160 2004 C GROUND E002C+ 182,189 0 0 AFT’S RUDDER TRIM TAB STRUCK STATIC P PROP OF
PARKED ACFT ON FLT DECK
Unknown
68161 2004 C GROUND F018E 0 0 0 DURING FLT DECK VERTREP, FORCKLIFT STRUCK
PORT HORIZ STAB OF PARKED AC
Misc
68369 2005 C FLTREL F018F 2,796 0 0 AS ACFT CAT LAUNCHED, IT’S CATM-9 FINS STRUCK
CATAPULT CREWMAN’S HEAD.
Contact
68370 2005 B GROUND F018C 115,000 0 1 SQN ACFT UNDER TOW DIRECTION OF YELLOW SHIRT
RAN OVR SHIP’S BLUE SHIRT
Contact
68480 2005 C FLIGHT MH053E 176,372 0 0 LDG ACFT’S DWNWASH BLEW PARKED ACFT’S RTR
BLADES INTO FLT DECK.
Exhaust
68506 2005 C GROUND F018E 51,760 0 0 ACFT AND TOW TRACTOR DAMAGED DUR ACFT
MOVE ON FLIGHT DECK. NO INJURIES
Towing
68707 2005 C FLTREL EA006B 25,630 0 0 ACFT’S TJS POD RADOME DAMAGED IN CVN HANGAR
BAY.
Unknown
69023 2005 C GROUND F018F 169,752 0 0 ACFT UNDER FLT DECK TAXI DIR CTRL STRUCK A
LIKE ACFT ON ELEVATOR FOUR.
Taxi
69123 2005 C GROUND HH060H 35,208 0 0 TOW TRACTOR STRUCK HELO TAIL PYLON PARKED
CHOCKED/CHAINED IN HELO HOLE
Towing
69133 2005 C GROUND F018C 35,699 0 0 AIRCRAFT UNDER TOW PUSHED BACK IN TO
NAVPOLE.
Towing
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69140 2005 C GROUND F018F 65,394 0 0 ACFT #1 STAB STRUCK PARKED ACFT #2 STBD
AILERON DUR TAXI FOR CV LAUNCH
Taxi
69153 2005 C GROUND F018F 63,500 0 0 STBD HORIZ STAB DAMAGED FM CONTACT WITH HYD
GEN DUR TOW TRACTOR MOVE.
Towing
69200 2006 C GROUND F018E 25,000 0 0 ACFT’S WING SPREAD INTO OTHER ACFT DAMAGING
RIGHT AILERON.
Wingfold
69202 2006 A GROUND T045C 1,050,699 0 0 AIRCRAFT ENGINE FOD BY INGESTION OF FLIGHT
DECK CREWMAN’S CRANIAL.
Engine
69213 2006 B GROUND F018C 115,000 0 1 ACFT RAN OVER AIRMAN’S RIGHT LEG DURING TAXI
ON FLIGHT DECK.
Contact
69270 2006 C GROUND F018F 38,767 0 0 EXT FUEL TANK DAMAGED FROM COLLISION WITH
TOW TRACTOR DURING ACFT TOW.
Towing
69279 2006 C GROUND F018E 46,400 0 0 ACFT TAXIED LEFT STABILATOR INTO STATIONARY
ACFT’S LEADING EDGE FLAP.
Taxi
69291 2006 C GROUND EA006B 95,058 0 0 ACFT UNDER FLT DECK TAXI DIR CONTROL TAXIED
INTO PARKED ACFT ON DECK.
Taxi
69310 2006 B GROUND F018F 368,328 0 0 RT WING OF ACFT #1 STRUCK THE L WING OF A
PARKED ACFT #2 DURING TAXI.
Taxi
69332 2006 C GROUND F018E 175,042 0 0 ACFT PARKED ON CV DECK DAMAGED BY ANOTHER
SQN’S LIKE ACFT JET EXHAUST.
Exhaust
69348 2006 C GROUND F018C 76,418 0 0 AIRCRAFT CANOPY DAMAGED BY ANOTHER AIR-
CRAFT’S EXHAUST.
Exhaust
69377 2006 C GROUND F018F 35,883 0 0 ACFT PARKED ON FLT DECK STRUCK BY FORK LIFT
TRACTOR DUR REPLENISHMENT.
Supply
69378 2006 C GROUND F018E 47,498 0 0 ACFT#1 TAXIED INTO ACFT#2 WHILE ACFT #2 WAS
STOPPED ON THE FLT DECK.
Taxi
69382 2006 C GROUND F018F 49,887 0 0 PARKED ACFT’S STBD HORIZ STAB DAMADED BY
TAXIING ACFT ON FLIGHT DECK.
Taxi
69385 2006 C GROUND F018F 122,406 0 0 TWO LIKE ACFT STRUCK EACH OTHER’S HORIZ STA-
BILIZER DUR FLT DECK TOWING
Towing
69415 2006 A GROUND S003 1,544,320 0 0 PORT STAB OF ACFT TAXIING STRUCK STBD TURN-
ING PROP OF PARKED ACFT.
Taxi, engine
69481 2007 C GROUND F018C 46,437 0 0 ACFT # 1 RIGHT STABILATOR WAS STRUCK BY ACFT
#2 LEFT STABILATOR.
Unknown
69504 2007 C GROUND F018E 61,203 0 0 GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT STRUCK PORT HORI-
ZONTAL STABILATOR.
Unknown
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69517 2007 C GROUND F018E 23,996 0 0 A/C UNDER TOW DUR NIGHT RESPOT STBD STABILA-
TOR IMPACTED TOW TRACTOR.
Towing
69553 2007 C GROUND F018F 90,983 0 0 PORT AILERON OF ACFT UNDER TOW STRUCK PORT
HORZL STAB OF STA ACFT.
Towing
69566 2007 C GROUND EA006B 20,000 0 0 ALQ-99 POD RADOME DAMAGED ON FLT DECK. ACFT
RETURNED TO FLIGHT STATUS
Unknown
69590 2007 C GROUND F018F 74,096 0 0 PORT HORZL STABILATOR DAMGED ON ELEVATOR 4
STANCHION WHILE BEING TOWED
Towing
69602 2007 C GROUND F018F 23,936 0 0 ACFT SUSTAINED DAMAGE TO THE LEFT HRZL STAB
AFTER BEING TOWED.
Towing
69604 2007 C GROUND F018C 46,437 0 0 ACFT UNDER TOW ONBOARD SHIP STRUCK THE LDG
SIGNAL OFCR PLATFORM.
Towing
69607 2007 C GROUND F018F 151,220 0 0 JBD 3 WAS RAISED AND IMPACTED NG-111 WHILE UN-
DER TOW.
Towing
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Appendix B. Source Code Listings
This appendix contains MATLAB
r and C source code used throughout this re-
search. It is provided as an example for future work.
B.1 MATLABr
Listing B.1: Determining time to calculate two-norms for different dimensions.
1 %% LT Jeff Johnston
%
% 30 OCT 2008
% Determining time to calculate two -norms for different dimensions
6 clear all; close all; clc;
%% Generate times
max_dimension = 500;
11 max_runs = 1000;
times = zeros(max_dimension , max_runs);
for run_ctr = 1:1: max_runs
for ctr = 1:1: max_dimension
x = 1:1:ctr;
16 tic;
d = norm(x, 2);
times(ctr , run_ctr) = toc;
end
end
21
%% Get mean time of each operation
mean_times = zeros(size(times ,1) ,1);
for ctr = 1:1:size(times ,1)
26 mean_times(ctr) = mean(times(ctr ,:))*1E6;
end
%% Find a best -fit polynomial
31 p = polyfit(x’, mean_times , 3);
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Listing B.2: DIDO Sample: Problem Definition.
%% Example Script File for DIDO Path Planning Demonstration
% LT Jeff Johnston
% AFIT ENY
4 % 13JAN09
clear all; close all; clc;
%% Define OBSTACLES Variable (Structure)
9 global OBSTACLES;
% Each element of OBSTACLES structure is a nx1 column vector where...
n is the
% number of obstacles.
OBSTACLES.xo = [50]; % center location on x-axis
14 OBSTACLES.yo = [50]; % center location on y-axis
OBSTACLES.a = [10]; % width
OBSTACLES.b = [10]; % height
OBSTACLES.p = [2]; % norm: 1-diamond , 2-circle, 100-square, etc...
...
OBSTACLES.c = [1];
19
%% Define state and control parameter boundaries
xL = 0; xU = 100;
yL = 0; yU = 100;
psiL = -3*pi; psiU = 3*pi;
24
vL = 0; vU = 0.8;
phiL = -pi/2; phiU = pi/2;
bounds.lower.states = [xL; yL; psiL];
29 bounds.upper.states = [xU; yU; psiU];
bounds.lower.controls = [vL; phiL];
bounds.upper.controls = [vU; phiU];
34 t0 = 0;
tfMax = 500;
bounds.lower.time = [t0; t0];
bounds.upper.time = [t0; tfMax];
39
%% Define desired initial and final states
x0 = 0;
y0 = 0;
psi0 = -45*pi/180;
44
xf = 100;
yf = 100;
psif = -45*pi/180;
49 bounds.lower.events = [x0; y0; psi0; xf; yf; psif];
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bounds.upper.events = [x0; y0; psi0; xf; yf; psif];
bounds.lower.path = zeros(size(OBSTACLES.xo))+0;
bounds.upper.path = zeros(size(OBSTACLES.xo))+1000;
54
%% Assign necessary variables to structure
Project.cost = ’SampleCost’;
Project.dynamics = ’SampleDynamics’;
Project.events = ’SampleEvents’;
59 Project.path = ’SamplePath’;
Project.bounds = bounds;
%% Set DIDO Options
64
algorithm.mode = ’spectral’;
algorithm.nodes = [40];
%% Call DIDO
69 tStart= cputime;
[cost , primal, dual] = dido(Project , algorithm);
runTime = cputime -tStart
%% Create output variables from DIDO solution structures
74
x = primal.states (1,:);
y = primal.states (2,:);
psi = primal.states (3,:);
79 t = primal.nodes;
%% Plot the resultant path
figure;
hold;
84 plot(x, y, ’:o’);
for ctr = 1:1:length(OBSTACLES.xo)
ezplot(strcat(’((x-’,num2str(OBSTACLES.xo(ctr)) ,...
’)/’,num2str(OBSTACLES.a(ctr)) ,...
’)^’,num2str(OBSTACLES.p(ctr)) ,...
89 ’+ ((y-’, num2str(OBSTACLES.yo(ctr)) ,...
’)/’,num2str(OBSTACLES.b(ctr)) ,...
’)^’,num2str(OBSTACLES.p(ctr)) ,...
’-’, num2str(OBSTACLES.c(ctr))) ,...
[xL , xU , yL, yU]);
94 end
axis([xL , xU , yL, yU]);
grid on;
xlabel(’x’);
ylabel(’y’);
99 title(’’);
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Listing B.3: DIDO Sample: Events.
1 function endpointFunction = ProjectEvents(primal)
% Event function for DIDO Path Planning Demonstration
% LT Jeff Johnston
% AFIT ENY
% 13JAN09
6
x0 = primal.states (1,1); xf = primal.states(1,end);
y0 = primal.states (2,1); yf = primal.states(2,end);
psi0 = primal.states (3,1); psif = primal.states (3,end);
11
endpointFunction = zeros(6,1);
endpointFunction(1) = x0;
endpointFunction(2) = y0;
endpointFunction(3) = psi0;
16 endpointFunction(4) = xf;
endpointFunction(5) = yf;
endpointFunction(6) = psif;
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Listing B.4: DIDO Sample: Path.
function pathFunction = ProjectPath(primal)
2 % Path constraint function for DIDO Path Planning Demonstration
% LT Jeff Johnston
% AFIT ENY
% 13JAN09
7 global OBSTACLES;
x = primal.states (1,:);
y = primal.states (2,:);
12 % Allow a border around the obstacle
border = 0.5; % m
xo = OBSTACLES.xo;
yo = OBSTACLES.yo;
17 a = OBSTACLES.a + border;
b = OBSTACLES.b + border;
p = OBSTACLES.p;
for ctr = 1:1:length(xo)
22 pathFunction(ctr ,:) = log(((x-xo(ctr))./(a(ctr))).^p(ctr) +...
((y-yo(ctr))./(b(ctr))).^p(ctr));
end
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Listing B.5: DIDO Sample: Dynamics.
1 function XDOT = ProjectDynamics(primal)
% Dynamics function for DIDO Path Planning Demonstration
% LT Jeff Johnston
% AFIT ENY
% 13JAN09
6
% States
x = primal.states (1,:);
y = primal.states (2,:);
psi = primal.states (3,:);
11
% Controls
v = primal.controls(1,:);
phi = primal.controls(2,:);
16 % Tricycle wheelbase
L = 0.5; % m
% Kinematic Equations
xdot = -v.*sin(psi).*cos(phi);
21 ydot = v.*cos(psi).*cos(phi);
psidot = (v./L).*sin(phi);
XDOT = [xdot; ydot; psidot ];
156
Listing B.6: DIDO Sample: Cost.
1 function [EndpointCost , RunningCost] = ProjectCost(primal)
% Cost function for DIDO Path Planning Demonstration
% LT Jeff Johnston
% AFIT ENY
% 13JAN09
6
tf = primal.nodes(end);
EndpointCost = tf;
RunningCost = 0;
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Listing B.7: Determine vehicle position and orientation from measured antenna
locations.
function [ rc, heading ] = det_pos_heading( r1, r2 )
%DET_POS_HEADING Returns center position and heading from wingtip
%coordinates
%
5 % LT Jeff Johnston
% AFIT/ENY
% 21OCT2008
%
%Usage: [rc, heading] = det_pos_heading( r1 , r2 )
10 %
% r1: 1x2 vector containing coordinates of port receiver [x_1 , ...
y_1]
% r2: 1x2 vector containing coordinates of stbd receiver [x_2 , ...
y_2]
%
% rc: Returns 1x2 vector containing coordinates of center [x_c , ...
y_c]
15 % heading: Returns angle from north in degrees
r3 = r2 - r1;
L = norm(r3);
20 heading = atan2(r3(2), r3(1));
rc = r1+(L/2)*[cos(heading), sin(heading)];
heading = heading*180/ pi;
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Listing B.8: Calculate nearest neighbor distance.
function [ dist ] = dist_from_object( loc , rc , heading , threshold ,...
wingspan , object )
%[ dist ] = DIST_FROM_OBJECT ( loc , rc , heading)
3 %Calculates the distance of a point from an object described by a ...
patch
%
% LT Jeff Johnston
% AFIT/ENY
% 29OCT2008
8 %
% loc: 1x2 vector containing coordinates of point [x, y]
% rc: 1x2 vector containing coordinates of object center point [...
x_c , y_c]
% heading: object angle from heading north (in degrees)
% threshold: minimum safe distance from center of object
13 % wingspan: length of wingspan tip -to -tip
% object: string containing file name of object outline
% First let ’s just try calculating the distance to the center ...
point
dist = norm(rc -loc);
18
% If the distance to the center is less than the threshold given , ...
use the
% nearest neighbor method
if dist < threshold
% Load object outline and apply coordinate transformations
23 load(object);
heading_rad = -heading*pi/180;
scaling = wingspan / ( 2 * max(outline(:,1)));
object_outline = outline*[cos(heading_rad) ,...
-sin(heading_rad); sin(heading_rad) cos( heading_rad)];
28 shifting_points = zeros(size(object_outline));
for ctr = 1:1:size(shifting_points ,1)
shifting_points(ctr ,:) = rc;
end
33 object_outline = object_outline*scaling + shifting_points;
% BRUTE FORCE NEAREST NEIGHBOR
temp_dist = zeros(size(object_outline , 1) ,1);
for ctr = 1:1:size(object_outline , 1)
38 temp_dist(ctr) = norm(loc -object_outline(ctr ,:));
end
dist = min(temp_dist);
end
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Listing B.9: DIDO Aircraft Towing Problem: Problem Definition.
%% Problem file for the Aircraft Towing Problem
% LT Jeff Johnston , USN
3 % Lt. Col. Eric Swenson , USAF
% AFIT ENY
% 15JAN09
%
% Adapted from files provided by CDR Michael Hurni , USN , NPS
8
clear all; close all; clc;
path(path ,’../scripts’);
%% Define Global Variables
13
global LC LB LA OBSTACLES X;
% Global Scaling Factor
% Location states need scaling to be closer to order of magnitude ...
of other
18 % states
X = 50;
% Articulated Vehicle Dimensions
% Dimensions in meters, scaled by X
23 LC = 3/X; % Tow Tractor Wheel Base Length
LB = 5/X; % Tow Bar Length
LA = 8/X; % Aircraft Wheel Base Length
% Measured Data Plotting Switch
28 % When plot_meas_data==1 the measured data recorded at NAS Oceana ...
will be
% plotted with the planned path.
plot_meas_data = 1;
% Measured Data Guess Switch
33 % When guess_meas_data==1 the measured data recorded at NAS Oceana...
will be
% used to provide an initial guess for the DIDO solution.
guess_meas_data = 1;
guess_start_end = 0;
38
% Measured Data Guess Plotting Switch
% When plot_guess_meas_data ==1 the guess generated from the ...
measured data
% recorded at NAS Oceana will be plotted to all for verification
plot_guess_meas_data = 1;
43
% Animate Optimal Solution
% When animate_soln==1 the resultant path will be animated
animate_soln = 0;
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48 % Rotate Axes
T = [ cosd(48) -sind(48) ;sind(48) cosd(48)];
% Obstacle Locations and Configurations
OBSTACLES.xo = [ 81.0362; 140.2932; 103.8932; 116.8932; 90.8932; ...
77.8932; 64.8932; 51.8932; 50; 20]/X;
53 OBSTACLES.yo = [109.2882; 100.8977; 64.4977; 77.4977; 51.4977; ...
38.4977; 25.4977; 12.4977; 100; 100]/X;
rotated_OBSTACLES = [OBSTACLES.xo OBSTACLES.yo]*T;
OBSTACLES.xo = rotated_OBSTACLES(:,1);
OBSTACLES.yo = rotated_OBSTACLES(:,2);
OBSTACLES.a = [ 14; 14; 14; 14; 14; ...
14; 10; 10; 15; 10]/X; % width
58 OBSTACLES.b = [ 22; 22; 22; 22; 22; ...
22; 10; 10; 15; 10]/X; % height
OBSTACLES.p = [ 4; 4; 4; 4; 4; ...
4; 2; 2; 2; 2];
OBSTACLES.c = [ 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; ...
1; 1; 1; 1; 1];
OBSTACLES.border = 0.5/X;
OBSTACLES.d_des = 20/X;
63 OBSTACLES.idx = [1 2 3 4 5];
% Obstacle On/Off Switch
% When OBSTACLES.switch ==1 the obstacles will be present in the ...
path
% planning scenario
68 OBSTACLES.switch = 1;
%% Bound State and Control Variables
%
% The states for this problem are as follows (14):
73 % xc: Tow Tractor Horizontal Location (c stands for cart)
% yc: Tow Tractor Vertical Location
% beta_s
% beta_c: SIN and COS of Tow Tractor Heading Relative to ...
Horizontal
% xw: Nose Wheel Horizontal Location (w stands for wheel)
78 % yw: Nose Wheel Vertical Location
% theta_s
% theta_c: SIN and COS of Tow Bar Heading Relative to ...
Horizontal
% zeta: Tow Bar Turn Angle , beta -theta
% xa: Aircraft Horizontal Location (a stands for aircraft)
83 % ya: Aircraft Vertical Location
% psi_s
% psi_c: SIN and COS of Aircraft Heading Relative to ...
Horizontal
% phi: Aircraft Turn Angle , theta -psi
%
88 % The controls for this problem are as follow (2):
% vc: Tow Tractor Velocity
161
% alpha: Tow Tractor Turn Angle
%
% All angles in radians
93 % All distances in meters scaled by X
% All velocities in meters/second scaled by X
% Lower and Upper Bounds for Locations
xmin = 50/X; xmax = 200/X; ymin = -200/X; ymax = 59/X;
98 xcL = xmin; xcU = xmax; xwL = xmin; xwU = xmax; xaL = xmin; xaU = ...
xmax;
ycL = ymin; ycU = ymax; ywL = ymin; ywU = ymax; yaL = ymin; yaU = ...
ymax;
% Lower and Upper Bounds for Headings
% -1 <= SIN(*), COS(*) <= 1, for all *
103 beta_sL = -1; beta_sU = 1;
beta_cL = -1; beta_cU = 1;
theta_sL = -1; theta_sU = 1;
theta_cL = -1; theta_cU = 1;
psi_sL = -1; psi_sU = 1;
108 psi_cL = -1; psi_cU = 1;
% Lower and Upper Bounds for Turn Angles
turn_angle_max = 4*pi/8;
zetaL = -turn_angle_max; zetaU = turn_angle_max;
113 phiL = -turn_angle_max; phiU = turn_angle_max;
% Lower and Upper Bounds for Inputs
vcL = 0/X; vcU = 0.5/X;
alphaL = -pi/2; alphaU = pi/2;
118
bounds.lower.states = [xcL; ycL; beta_sL; beta_cL; xwL; ywL; ...
theta_sL; theta_cL; zetaL; xaL; yaL; psi_sL; psi_cL; phiL];
bounds.upper.states = [xcU; ycU; beta_sU; beta_cU; xwU; ywU; ...
theta_sU; theta_cU; zetaU; xaU; yaU; psi_sU; psi_cU; phiU];
bounds.lower.controls = [vcL; alphaL ];
123 bounds.upper.controls = [vcU; alphaU ];
%% Bound the Initial and Final Times
t0 = 0;
128 tfMax = 600;
bounds.lower.time = [t0; t0];
bounds.upper.time = [t0; tfMax];
133 %% Set the Initial and Final Conditions
% Measured Start Location of Aircraft
xa0 = 129.2289/X;
ya0 = 89.8569/X;
162
138 rotated_xy0 = [xa0 ya0]*T;
xa0 = rotated_xy0(1);
ya0 = rotated_xy0(2);
psi0 = ( -130.6658+90 -48)*pi/180;
% xa0 = 0;
143 % ya0 = 50/X;
% psi0 = 0;
psi_s0 = sin(psi0);
psi_c0 = cos(psi0);
148
% Calculated Start Location of Nose Wheel (and Tow Bar)
xw0 = xa0+LA*cos(psi0);
yw0 = ya0+LA*sin(psi0);
theta0 = psi0;
153 theta_s0 = sin(theta0);
theta_c0 = cos(theta0);
phi0 = theta0-psi0;
% Calculated Start Location of Tow Tractor
158 xc0 = xw0+LB*cos(theta0);
yc0 = yw0+LB*sin(theta0);
beta0 = psi0;
beta_s0 = sin(beta0);
beta_c0 = cos(beta0);
163 zeta0 = beta0 -theta0;
% Measured Final Location of Aircraft
xaf = 29.0362/X;
yaf = 57.2882/X;
168 rotated_xyf = [xaf yaf]*T;
xaf = rotated_xyf(1);
yaf = rotated_xyf(2);
psif = (49.2842+90-48)*pi/180;
% xaf = 100/X;
173 % yaf = 150/X;
% psif = 0;
psi_sf = sin(psif);
psi_cf = cos(psif);
178
% Calculated Final Location of Nose Wheel (and Tow Bar)
xwf = xaf+LA*cos(psif);
ywf = yaf+LA*sin(psif);
thetaf = psif;
183 theta_sf = sin(thetaf);
theta_cf = cos(thetaf);
phif = thetaf -psif;
% Calculated Final Location of Tow Tractor
188 xcf = xwf+LB*cos(thetaf);
ycf = ywf+LB*sin(thetaf);
163
betaf = psif;
beta_sf = sin(betaf);
beta_cf = cos(betaf);
193 zetaf = betaf -thetaf;
% Upper and Lower Boundaries for Initial and Final States
%
% Force aircraft to attain its exact final state but allows cart ...
and tow bar
198 % to be at an offset. DIDO requires [2*n x 1] column vector where...
n is the
% number of states.
%
% Define maximum allowable offsets
x_off = 5/X;
203 y_off = 5/X;
a_off = pi/8;
sc_off = 0.4;
%
% Create bounds vector
208 bounds.lower.events = [xc0; yc0; beta_s0; beta_c0; xw0; yw0; ...
theta_s0; theta_c0; zeta0; xa0; ya0; psi_s0; psi_c0; phi0; xcf -...
x_off; ycf -x_off; beta_sf -sc_off; beta_cf -sc_off; xwf; ywf; ...
theta_sf -sc_off; theta_cf -sc_off; zetaf -a_off; xaf; yaf; psi_sf...
; psi_cf; phif -a_off];
bounds.upper.events = [xc0; yc0; beta_s0; beta_c0; xw0; yw0; ...
theta_s0; theta_c0; zeta0; xa0; ya0; psi_s0; psi_c0; phi0; xcf+...
y_off; ycf+y_off; beta_sf+sc_off; beta_cf+sc_off; xwf; ywf; ...
theta_sf+sc_off; theta_cf+sc_off; zetaf+a_off; xaf; yaf; psi_sf...
; psi_cf; phif+a_off];
% bounds.lower.events = [xc0; yc0; beta_s0; beta_c0; xw0; yw0; ...
theta_s0; theta_c0; zeta0; xa0; ya0; psi_s0; psi_c0; phi0; xcf;...
ycf; beta_sf; beta_cf; xwf; ywf; theta_sf; theta_cf; zetaf; ...
xaf; yaf; psi_sf; psi_cf; phif];
% bounds.upper.events = [xc0; yc0; beta_s0; beta_c0; xw0; yw0; ...
theta_s0; theta_c0; zeta0; xa0; ya0; psi_s0; psi_c0; phi0; xcf;...
ycf; beta_sf; beta_cf; xwf; ywf; theta_sf; theta_cf; zetaf; ...
xaf; yaf; psi_sf; psi_cf; phif];
213
bounds.lower.path = zeros(length(OBSTACLES.idx), 1)+0;
bounds.upper.path = zeros(length(OBSTACLES.idx), 1)+100;
%% Plot the Initial/Final Conditions
218 draw_switch = 1;
if draw_switch == 1;
figure;
hold on;
223 draw_aircraft([xa0*X, ya0*X], (psi0 -pi/2)*180/pi , 11.43 , ’...
fa18c’, ’g’);
164
draw_aircraft([xc0*X, yc0*X], (beta0 -pi/2)*180/pi , 4, ’cart’, ...
’w’);
plot([xw0*X xc0*X],[yw0*X yc0*X],’r’);
draw_aircraft([xaf*X, yaf*X], (psif -pi/2)*180/pi , 11.43 , ’...
fa18c’, ’g’);
228 draw_aircraft([xcf*X, ycf*X], (betaf -pi/2)*180/pi , 4, ’cart’, ...
’w’);
plot([xwf*X xcf*X],[ywf*X ycf*X],’r’);
meas_xy_rot = meas_xy*T;
233 if plot_meas_data == 1
plot(meas_xy_rot(1:3000 ,1), meas_xy_rot(1:3000 ,2), ’m-.’);
end
if OBSTACLES.switch == 1
238 for ctr = 1:1: length(OBSTACLES.idx)
ezplot(strcat(’((x-’,num2str(OBSTACLES.xo(OBSTACLES....
idx(ctr))*X) ,...
’)/’,num2str(OBSTACLES.a(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr))*X)...
,...
’)^’,num2str(OBSTACLES.p(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr))) ,...
’+ ((y-’, num2str(OBSTACLES.yo(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr))...
*X) ,...
243 ’)/’,num2str(OBSTACLES.b(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr))*X)...
,...
’)^’,num2str(OBSTACLES.p(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr))) ,...
’-’, num2str(OBSTACLES.c(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr)))) ,...
[ -200 ,200 , -200 ,200]);
end
248 end
title(’’);
xlabel(’x’);
ylabel(’y’);
253 axis([55 205 -95 55]);
grid on;
end
%% Define DIDO Constraints
258
Project.cost = ’ProjectCost’;
Project.dynamics = ’ProjectDynamics’;
Project.events = ’ProjectEvents’;
Project.path = ’ProjectPath’;
263
Project.bounds = bounds;
%% Provide a Trajectory Guess
268 if guess_meas_data==1
165
load meas_data.mat;
meas_xy = meas_xy*T;
meas_hdg = meas_hdg+90 -48;
273
% Indices of measured data to use for guess generation
idx_use = [1; 1320; 1520; 1620; 1920; 2120; 2220; 3000];
idx_start = 800;
guess.controls = zeros(2,length(idx_use));
278 guess.states = zeros (14, length(idx_use));
guess.time = zeros(1,length(idx_use));
for ctr = 1:1:length(idx_use)
guess.controls(:,ctr) = [vcU; 0];
guess.states (10,ctr) = meas_xy(idx_use(ctr), 1)/X;
283 guess.states (11,ctr) = meas_xy(idx_use(ctr), 2)/X;
guess.states (12,ctr) = sin((meas_hdg(idx_use(ctr)))*pi...
/180);
guess.states (13,ctr) = cos((meas_hdg(idx_use(ctr)))*pi...
/180);
guess.states (14,ctr) = 0;
guess.states(5, ctr) = guess.states (10,ctr)+LA*guess....
states (13,ctr);
288 guess.states(6, ctr) = guess.states (11,ctr)+LA*guess....
states (12,ctr);
guess.states(7, ctr) = guess.states (12,ctr);
guess.states(8, ctr) = guess.states (13,ctr);
guess.states(9, ctr) = guess.states (14,ctr);
guess.states(1, ctr) = guess.states (5, ctr)+LB*guess....
states (8, ctr);
293 guess.states(2, ctr) = guess.states (6, ctr)+LB*guess....
states (7, ctr);
guess.states(3, ctr) = guess.states (7, ctr);
guess.states(4, ctr) = guess.states (8, ctr);
guess.time(ctr) = (ctr -1)*500/ length(idx_use);
end
298 algorithm.guess = guess;
if plot_guess_meas_data ==1
hold on;
for ctr = 1:1: length(idx_use)
303 draw_aircraft([guess.states (10,ctr)*X, guess.states...
(11,ctr)*X], (meas_hdg(idx_use(ctr)) -90), 11.43 , ’...
fa18c’, ’g’);
draw_aircraft([guess.states (1, ctr)*X, guess.states(2,...
ctr)*X], (meas_hdg(idx_use(ctr)) -90), 4, ’cart’, ’...
w’);
plot([guess.states(5, ctr)*X guess.states(1, ctr)*X],[...
guess.states (6, ctr)*X guess.states (2, ctr)*X],’r’)...
;
plot(meas_xy(1:3000 ,1), meas_xy(1:3000 ,2), ’m-.’);
166
text(guess.states (1, ctr)*X,guess.states (2, ctr)*X,...
strcat(’t=’,num2str(guess.time(ctr))),’FontSize’...
,10,’FontName’,’Arial’);
308 text(guess.states (1, ctr)*X,guess.states (2, ctr)*X-5,...
strcat(’hdg=’,num2str(meas_hdg(idx_use(ctr)))),’...
FontSize’,10,’FontName’,’Arial’);
end
title(’Measured Data and Generated Guesses’);
xlabel(’x’);
ylabel(’y’);
313 end
end
if guess_start_end == 1
guess.controls = [vcU vcU; 0 0];
318 guess.states (:,1) = [xc0; yc0; beta_s0; beta_c0; xw0; yw0; ...
theta_s0; theta_c0; zeta0; xa0; ya0; psi_s0; psi_c0; phi0];
guess.states (:,2) = [xcf; ycf; beta_sf; beta_cf; xwf; ywf; ...
theta_sf; theta_cf; zetaf; xaf; yaf; psi_sf; psi_cf; phif];
guess.time = [0 tfMax];
algorithm.guess = guess;
end
323
%% Set DIDO Run Options
algorithm.mode = ’spectral’;
328 % Number of Nodes
algorithm.nodes = 50;
%% Execute DIDO
333 tStart= cputime; % start CPU clock
[cost , primal, dual] = dido(Project , algorithm);
runTime = cputime -tStart;
disp(strcat(’Run Time is: ’, num2str(runTime)));
338 %% Store Trajectory Results
% Define the States for Readability
xc = primal.states (1,:)*X;
yc = primal.states (2,:)*X;
343 beta_s = primal.states (3,:);
beta_c = primal.states (4,:);
xw = primal.states (5,:)*X;
yw = primal.states (6,:)*X;
theta_s = primal.states (7,:);
348 theta_c = primal.states (8,:);
zeta = primal.states (9,:);
xa = primal.states (10 ,:)*X;
ya = primal.states (11 ,:)*X;
psi_s = primal.states (12 ,:);
167
353 psi_c = primal.states (13 ,:);
phi = primal.states (14 ,:);
% Define the Controls for Readability
vc = primal.controls(1,:)*X;
358 alpha = primal.controls(2,:);
% Resolve Angles Stored as SIN and COS
beta = atan2(beta_s, beta_c);
theta = atan2(theta_s , theta_c);
363 psi = atan2(psi_s , psi_c);
% Define the Time Vector
t = primal.nodes;
368 save kinematics.mat;
%% Plot Resultant Path
figure;
373 hold on;
draw_aircraft([xa0*X, ya0*X], (psi0 -pi/2)*180/pi , 11.43 , ’fa18c’, ...
’g’);
draw_aircraft([xaf*X, yaf*X], (psif -pi/2)*180/pi , 11.43 , ’fa18c’, ...
’g’);
378
if OBSTACLES.switch == 1
for ctr = 1:1:length(OBSTACLES.idx)
ezplot(strcat(’((x-’,num2str(OBSTACLES.xo(OBSTACLES.idx(...
ctr))*X) ,...
’)/’,num2str(OBSTACLES.a(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr))*X) ,...
383 ’)^’,num2str(OBSTACLES.p(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr))) ,...
’+ ((y-’, num2str(OBSTACLES.yo(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr))*X)...
,...
’)/’,num2str(OBSTACLES.b(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr))*X) ,...
’)^’,num2str(OBSTACLES.p(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr))) ,...
’-’, num2str(OBSTACLES.c(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr)))) ,...
388 [ -200 ,200 , -200 ,200]);
if OBSTACLES.idx(ctr) == 1
draw_aircraft([ OBSTACLES.xo(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr))*X, ...
OBSTACLES.yo(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr))*X], (psif -pi/2)...
*180/pi , 11.43 , ’fa18c’, ’w’);
else
draw_aircraft([ OBSTACLES.xo(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr))*X, ...
OBSTACLES.yo(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr))*X], (psi0 -pi/2)...
*180/pi , 11.43 , ’fa18c’, ’w’);
393 end
end
end
168
if plot_meas_data == 1
398 plot( meas_xy_rot(1:3000 ,1), meas_xy_rot(1:3000 ,2), ’m-.’);
end
axis([55 205 -95 55]);
xlabel(’x’);
403 ylabel(’y’);
title(’’);
grid on;
print -depsc -r300 ’~/ Documents/workspace/AFIT Thesis/src/Chapter4...
/img/mlplot_naso_path_planning_1.eps’;
408 for ctr = 1:1:length(xa)
draw_aircraft([xa(ctr), ya(ctr)], (psi(ctr)-pi/2)*180/pi, ...
11.43 , ’fa18c’, ’g’);
draw_aircraft([xc(ctr), yc(ctr)], (beta(ctr)-pi/2)*180/pi , 4, ...
’cart’, ’w’);
plot([xw(ctr) xc(ctr)],[yw(ctr) yc(ctr)],’r’);
end
413
plot(xa, ya ,’-o’);
plot(xw, yw ,’b*’);
plot(xc, yc ,’rx’);
print -depsc -r300 ’~/ Documents/workspace/AFIT Thesis/src/Chapter4...
/img/mlplot_naso_path_planning_3.eps’;
418
xlabel(’X-axis (m)’);
ylabel(’Y-axis (m)’);
title(’Vehicle Trajectory’);
423 %% Plot the states vs. time
%Plot the states and controls vs time
figure;
subplot(2,1,1); plot(t, xa, ’-o’, t, ya, ’-x’);
428 title(’Aircraft Postion’);
xlabel(’time (s)’);
ylabel(’x-y position’);
legend(’x (m)’, ’y (m)’);
grid;
433 subplot(2,1,2); plot(t, psi*180/pi, ’-ro’);
title(’Aircraft Angle From Global Y-Axis’);
xlabel(’time (s)’);
ylabel(’states ’);
legend(’\psi (deg)’);
438 grid;
%
%Plot the hamiltonian vs time
figure;
plot(t, dual.Hamiltonian , ’-o’);
443 title(’Hamiltonian Evolution’);
xlabel(’time (s)’);
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ylabel(’Hamiltonian Value’);
grid;
448 %Plot the costates
figure;
plot(t, dual.dynamics(1,:), ’-o’ ,...
t, dual.dynamics(2,:), ’-x’ ,...
t, dual.dynamics(3,:), ’-.’ ,...
453 t, dual.dynamics(4,:), ’-+’ ,...
t, dual.dynamics(5,:), ’-x’ ,...
t, dual.dynamics(6,:), ’-.’ ,...
t, dual.dynamics(7,:), ’-+’ ,...
t, dual.dynamics(8,:), ’-x’ ,...
458 t, dual.dynamics(9,:), ’-.’ ,...
t, dual.dynamics(10 ,:), ’-+’ ,...
t, dual.dynamics(11 ,:), ’-x’ ,...
t, dual.dynamics(12 ,:), ’-.’ ,...
t, dual.dynamics(13 ,:), ’-+’ ,...
463 t, dual.dynamics(14 ,:), ’-*’);
title(’Costates’);
xlabel(’time (s)’);
ylabel(’costates’);
legend(’\lambda_x’, ’\lambda_y’, ’\lambda_\theta’, ’\lambda_v_r’, ...
’\lambda_v_l’);
468 grid;
%Plot the state covectors
figure;
plot(t, dual.states (1,:), ’-o’ ,...
473 t, dual.states (2,:), ’-x’ ,...
t, dual.states (3,:), ’-.’ ,...
t, dual.states (4,:), ’-+’ ,...
t, dual.states (5,:), ’-x’ ,...
t, dual.states (6,:), ’-.’ ,...
478 t, dual.states (7,:), ’-+’ ,...
t, dual.states (8,:), ’-x’ ,...
t, dual.states (9,:), ’-.’ ,...
t, dual.states (10 ,:), ’-+’ ,...
t, dual.states (11 ,:), ’-x’ ,...
483 t, dual.states (12 ,:), ’-.’ ,...
t, dual.states (13 ,:), ’-+’ ,...
t, dual.states (14 ,:), ’-*’);
title(’State covectors’);
xlabel(’time (s)’);
488 ylabel(’state covectors’);
legend(’\mu_x’, ’\mu_y’, ’\mu_\theta’, ’\mu_v_r ’, ’\mu_v_l ’);
grid;
%Plot the control covectors
493 figure;
plot(t, dual.controls(1,:)./4, ’-o’, t, dual.controls(2,:)./4, ’-x...
’);
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title(’Control Covectors’);
xlabel(’time (s)’);
ylabel(’control covectors’);
498 legend(’\mu_a_r ’, ’\mu_a_l ’);
grid;
%Plot the Path covectors
figure;
503 plot(t, dual.path(1,:), ’-o’);
title(’Path Covectors’);
xlabel(’time (s)’);
ylabel(’path covectors’);
legend(’\mu_h_1 ’);
508
%Plot the Controls vs time
figure;
subplot(2,1,1); plot(t, vc, ’-o’);
%legend(’v (m/s) ’);
513 title(’Controls - Velocity of Cart’);
xlabel(’time (s)’);
ylabel(’v (m/s)’);
subplot(2,1,2); plot(t, alpha *180/pi , ’-x’);
title(’Controls - Steering angle \alpha’);
518 xlabel(’time (s)’);
ylabel(’alpha (deg)’);
grid;
%% Animate the Solution
523
if animate_soln==1
draw_DIDO_soln;
end
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Listing B.10: DIDO Aircraft Towing Problem: Events.
function endpointFunction = ProjectEvents(primal)
% Event file for the Aircraft Towing Problem
% LT Jeff Johnston , USN
4 % Lt. Col. Eric Swenson , USAF
% AFIT ENY
% 15JAN09
%
% Adapted from files provided by CDR Michael Hurni , USN , NPS
9
% Designate the Initial and Final States
xc0 = primal.states (1,1); xcf = primal.states(1,end);
yc0 = primal.states (2,1); ycf = primal.states(2,end);
beta_s0 = primal.states (3,1); beta_sf = primal.states(3, end);
14 beta_c0 = primal.states (4,1); beta_cf = primal.states(4, end);
xw0 = primal.states (5,1); xwf = primal.states(5,end);
yw0 = primal.states (6,1); ywf = primal.states(6,end);
theta_s0 = primal.states (7,1); theta_sf = primal.states(7,end);
theta_c0 = primal.states (8,1); theta_cf = primal.states(8,end);
19 zeta0 = primal.states (9,1); zetaf = primal.states(9,end);
xa0 = primal.states (10 ,1); xaf = primal.states (10,end);
ya0 = primal.states (11 ,1); yaf = primal.states (11,end);
psi_s0 = primal.states (12 ,1); psi_sf = primal.states (12,end);
psi_c0 = primal.states (13 ,1); psi_cf = primal.states (13,end);
24 phi0 = primal.states (14 ,1); phif = primal.states (14,end);
% Put the Initial and Final States in endpointFunction
% Pre -allocate endpointFunction
29 endpointFunction = zeros (28 ,1);
% Initial Conditions
endpointFunction(1) = xc0;
endpointFunction(2) = yc0;
34 endpointFunction(3) = beta_s0;
endpointFunction(4) = beta_c0;
endpointFunction(5) = xw0;
endpointFunction(6) = yw0;
endpointFunction(7) = theta_s0;
39 endpointFunction(8) = theta_c0;
endpointFunction(9) = zeta0;
endpointFunction(10) = xa0;
endpointFunction(11) = ya0;
endpointFunction(12) = psi_s0;
44 endpointFunction(13) = psi_c0;
endpointFunction(14) = phi0;
% Final Conditions
endpointFunction(15) = xcf;
49 endpointFunction(16) = ycf;
endpointFunction(17) = beta_sf;
endpointFunction(18) = beta_cf;
172
endpointFunction(19) = xwf;
endpointFunction(20) = ywf;
54 endpointFunction(21) = theta_sf;
endpointFunction(22) = theta_cf;
endpointFunction(23) = zetaf;
endpointFunction(24) = xaf;
endpointFunction(25) = yaf;
59 endpointFunction(26) = psi_sf;
endpointFunction(27) = psi_cf;
endpointFunction(28) = phif;
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Listing B.11: DIDO Aircraft Towing Problem: Path.
function pathFunction = ProjectPath(primal)
% Path file for the Aircraft Towing Problem
% LT Jeff Johnston , USN
4 % Lt. Col. Eric Swenson , USAF
% AFIT ENY
% 15JAN09
%
% Adapted from files provided by CDR Michael Hurni , USN , NPS
9
% Load Global Variables
global OBSTACLES;
if OBSTACLES.switch == 1;
14
% Define State Variables For Use in Constraint
xc = primal.states( 1,:);
yc = primal.states( 2,:);
xw = primal.states( 5,:);
19 yw = primal.states( 6,:);
xa = primal.states (10 ,:);
ya = primal.states (11 ,:);
% Define a Border Around Each Obstacle
24 border = OBSTACLES.border;
% Define Obstacle Parameters
xo = OBSTACLES.xo;
yo = OBSTACLES.yo;
29 a = OBSTACLES.a + border;
b = OBSTACLES.b + border;
p = OBSTACLES.p;
c = OBSTACLES.c;
34 % Pre -allocate pathFunction
pathFunction=zeros(length(OBSTACLES.idx),length(xa));
for ctr = 1:length(OBSTACLES.idx)
pathFunction(ctr ,:) = log(((xa -xo(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr)))./(a...
(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr)))).^p(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr)) +...
39 ((ya -yo(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr)))./(b(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr))))...
.^p(OBSTACLES.idx(ctr)));
end
else
pathFunction = 0;
end
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Listing B.12: DIDO Aircraft Towing Problem: Dynamics.
function xdot = ProjectDynamics(primal)
2 % Dynamics file for the Aircraft Towing Problem
% LT Jeff Johnston , USN
% Lt. Col. Eric Swenson , USAF
% AFIT ENY
% 15JAN09
7 %
% Adapted from files provided by CDR Michael Hurni , USN , NPS
% Load Global Variables
global LC LB LA;
12
% Define the States for Readability
%xc = primal.states (1,:);
%yc = primal.states (2,:);
beta_s = primal.states (3,:);
17 beta_c = primal.states (4,:);
%xw = primal.states (5,:);
%yw = primal.states (6,:);
theta_s = primal.states (7,:);
theta_c = primal.states (8,:);
22 zeta = primal.states (9,:);
%xa = primal.statse (10 ,:);
%ya = primal.states (11 ,:);
psi_s = primal.states (12 ,:);
psi_c = primal.states (13 ,:);
27 phi = primal.states (14 ,:);
% Define the Controls for Readability
vc = primal.controls(1,:);
alpha = primal.controls(2,:);
32
% Resolve Angles Stored as SIN and COS
beta = atan2(beta_s, beta_c);
theta = atan2(theta_s , theta_c);
psi = atan2(psi_s , psi_c);
37
% Tow Tractor Kinematics
xc_dot = vc.*cos(beta);
yc_dot = vc.*sin(beta);
beta_dot = vc.*tan(alpha)./LC;
42 beta_s_dot = cos(beta).* beta_dot;
beta_c_dot = -sin(beta).*beta_dot;
% Nose Wheel (and Tow Bar) Kinematics
vw = vc.*cos(zeta);
47 xw_dot = vw.*cos(theta);
yw_dot = vw.*sin(theta);
theta_dot = vc.*sin(zeta)./LB;
theta_s_dot = cos(theta).* theta_dot;
theta_c_dot = -sin(theta).* theta_dot;
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52 zeta_dot = beta_dot - theta_dot;
% Aircraft Kinematics
va = vw.*cos(phi);
xa_dot = va.*cos(psi);
57 ya_dot = va.*sin(psi);
psi_dot = vw.*sin(phi)./LA;
psi_s_dot = cos(psi).*psi_dot;
psi_c_dot = -sin(psi).* psi_dot;
phi_dot = theta_dot - psi_dot;
62
% ======================================================
xdot = [xc_dot; yc_dot; beta_s_dot; beta_c_dot; xw_dot; yw_dot; ...
theta_s_dot; theta_c_dot; zeta_dot; xa_dot; ya_dot; psi_s_dot; ...
psi_c_dot; phi_dot];
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Listing B.13: DIDO Aircraft Towing Problem: Cost.
1 function [EndpointCost , RunningCost] = ProjectCost(primal)
% Cost file for the Aircraft Towing Problem
% LT Jeff Johnston , USN
% Lt. Col. Eric Swenson , USAF
% AFIT ENY
6 % 15JAN09
%
% Adapted from files provided by CDR Michael Hurni , USN , NPS
% Define Cost Parameters
11 %tf = primal.nodes(end);
alpha = primal.controls(2,:);
% Calculate Cost
%min_steer = 1./(4*(alpha -pi/4)).^2;
16 min_steer = abs(alpha);
%EndpointCost = tf;
EndpointCost = 0;
RunningCost = min_steer;
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B.2 C
Listing B.14: Source code of GPS logging software used for custom GPS recorders.
// Modified 08OCT08 by LT Jeff Johnston
// Originally written by Don Smith , AFIT Ctr , ANT Center
//
// Modified to write filenames in sequential order of creation
5
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
//#include <conio.h>
#include <time.h>
10
int main(int argc , char** argv)
{
FILE* SerialDevice = NULL;
FILE* LogFile = NULL;
15 FILE* run_file;
char Buffer [2000];
char logfilename[256];
char date[20];
char command_exec[1024];
20 short int run = 0;
// Mark run file to continuously count # of times run
//NEED to add "run_file.txt" file to same directory as ...
main program
//WILL SEGFAULT IF YOU DON’T!!!
25 run_file = fopen("run_file.txt","r");
fscanf(run_file ,"%d",&run);
run=run+1;
fclose(run_file);
run_file = fopen("run_file.txt","w");
30 fprintf(run_file ,"%d",run);
fclose(run_file);
/* Open the serial device on COM2 readonly*/
SerialDevice = fopen("/dev/ttyS2", "r");
35 if (! SerialDevice) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to open /dev/ttyS2 for ...
reading\n");
return -1;
}
40 /* Create and open the log file */
// sprintf(logfilename ,"/mnt/mmc/test21/data%d",date); //...
Old command uses random number
sprintf(logfilename ,"/mnt/mmc/gps_data/data%d",run); //...
Write file name with run number appended to end
LogFile = fopen(logfilename , "w"); //Opens file for ...
writing in ascii mode , use wb for binary
if (! LogFile) {
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45 fprintf(stderr, "Unable to create and open /mnt/...
mmc/gps_data/data%d for writing\n");
return -2;
}
/* In an infinite loop: read from serial device, write to ...
log file */
50 while (1) {
//Use fread/fwrite if data is binary
//fread(Buffer, 1, 100, SerialDevice); //Read 100 ...
bin elements of size 1
//fwrite(Buffer, 1, 100, LogFile); //Write 100 bin...
elements of size 1
55
//Use fets/fputs if data is ASCII
if (fgets(Buffer , 2000, SerialDevice) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr , "Error or end of file ...
detected\n");
return -3;
60 }
if (fputs(Buffer , LogFile) == EOF) {
fprintf(stderr , "Error writing data to /...
mnt/mmc/gps_data/data\n");
return -4;
65 }
}
/* Execution never reaches here but it makes the compiler ...
happy */
fclose(LogFile);
return 0;
70 }
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Appendix C. Data Disc
A disc containing the data collected in the tests described in Chapter III wascreated for distribution with this thesis document. The files and folders it
contains are described here.
The folder gps data contains a dated folder for each section of the test with re-
sults presented in Chapter IV. The folders 21OCT08, 22OCT08, and 23OCT08 con-
tain data collected at AFIT, while 20NOV08 contains data collected at NAS Oceana.
Each folder contains a subfolder exports which holds the carrier-phase differential so-
lutions generated by NovAtel Waypoint GrafNavTM. Each solution file is named with
the measurement device used and contains a description of the contents. They are
ASCII encoded with DOS end of line characters. Each dated folder also contains a
compressed binary file with the raw measurement data from each device stored as
raw data.tar.gz. These gzipped tarballs can be extracted using the GNU tar 1 and
gzip2 utilities, available for virtually any operating system. The 20NOV08 folder also
contains MATLABr script files used to generate the results of the data collection.
The path planning folder provides the DIDO Aircraft Towing Problem files used
to compute the path presented in Figure 4.24 on page 117 as well as the script
draw DIDO soln.m to create an animation of the resulting motion.
The final folder, scripts, contains MATLABr functions and data objects used to
generate both the results of data collection and the path planning plots.
1http://www.gnu.org/software/tar/
2http://www.gzip.org/
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